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Three men were killed and several others injured when
police and striking coal miners clashed on the streets of
Estevan, Saskatchewan in the fall of 1931. This tragic event
has received little attention, with the exception of a brief
and rather biased account by Anne Buller entitled "The
Estevan Massacre" which appeared in the May, 1949 issue of
the National Affairs Monthly, and a fictional treatment in
E. A. McGourt's Music at the Close. This thesis represents
an attempt to remedy the deficiency by examining and report-
ing the events and analyzing those factors operative not only
in the wildcat strike which commenced on September 8 but also
in the violence of "Black Tuesday," September 29.
After presenting the background information requisite
to establish the physical setting, this study will examine
the underlying and immediate causes of the cessation of work.
A discussion of the events which precipitated the strike and
the violence of ,September 29 will be followed by a detailed
treatment of the confrontation and the aftermath. The find-
ings of a royal commission which investigated the dispute will
be reported and the negotiations which produced a settlement
will be recounted. Because specific conclusions are drawn
throughout the thesis, the concluding chapter will attempt to
place the Estevan experience in perspective by presenting a
sociological analysis of strikes and riots.
i1
The author's task has been complicated by a mass of
contradictory testimony and conflicting reports which make it
difficult to formulate firm conclusions regarding responsi-
bility for the strike and sUbsequent violence. However, the
evidence indicates that such responsibility must be shared by
labour, management, and government, with the lion's share
being apportioned to the latter. The Saskatchewan government
failed to enforce legislation which the coal operators con-
sistently contravened with the result that little was done to
ameliorate labour's legitimate grievances until blood was
shed and lives were lost.
The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to
Dr. C. O. White whose valuable assistance and thoughtful guid-
ance has been so competently and generously given. Dr. White's
knowledge, understanding, and encouragement is sincerely appre-
ciated.
The author is also indebted to Mr. A. R. Turner,
Provincial Archivist, and his Assistant, Mr. D. H. Bocking,
who read the several drafts and whose perceptive criticisms
and helpful suggestions also enhanced the quality of this
study, and to Mrs. Jean Goldie who typed the final draft.
Finally, the author wishes to express his special
appreciation for his wife Glenys who not only willingly trans-
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ABSTRACT
Having organized as a local of the Mine Workers'
Union of Canada (MWUC) only a few days previously, the miners
ot the Souris coalfield walked off the job on September 8,
1931 to reinforce their demands for increased wages and
improved working conditions. The seasonal and fluctuating
nature of the Saskatchewan industry, the reduction in reali-
zation by operators from the sale of lignite, wage reductions
in late.19JO and early 1931, and certain unsatisfactory work-
ing and living conditions may be identified as underlying
causes of the dispute. Three factors ultimately precipitated
the wildcat strike. the absence of any established grievance
mechanism, the coal operators' refusal to recognize the MWUC,
and the refusal of James Sloan, MWUC president, to accede to
demands for the establishment of a conciliation board under
The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act.
On September 29 some 300 to 400 striking miners and
their families ,clashed with police on the streets of Estevan,
Saskatchewan in a bloody riot resulting in three deaths, a
number of injuries, and the ·conviction of several participants
on charges arising out of the confrontation. The tragic
events of "Black Tuesday" helped bring about a settlement,
bat not an altogether desirable one. The authorities, it
would seem, beginning in early October, launched a campaign
aimed at placing the bulk of responsibility for affairs on
"outside agitators," at depriving the miners of the support
and assistance of anyone from outside the district, at
undermining unity among the miners, and at bringing the
parties together under their scarcely impartial auspicies.
The result was a settlement which, while granting some con-
cessions to the miners, was violated in varying degrees at
once by the operators. Not surprisingly, before a royal
commission set up to examine the causes of the strike had
completed its report, there was talk among miners of further
strike action. It is also not altogether surprising that
,
there was no official inquiry into the riot itself.
CHAPTER I
PHYSICAL SETTING
The Souris coalfield forms part of the physiographic
feature known as the Saskatchewan Plain which in turn is
part of the great Interior Plain of North America. The
lignite mined in Saskatchewan is of Tertiary age, from the
Paleocene Ravenscrag formation which comprises an area of
approximately 10,000 square miles in the southern portion
,
of the Province. This formation also underlies much of the
western one-third of North Dakota, an area of some 30,000
square miles, a large section of eastern Montana, and a
smaller area in northeastern South Dakota. 1
The portion of the Ravenscrag formation situated in
Saskatchewan is believed to contain approximately 57 billion
tons of lignite with recoverable reserves estimated to be
3.5 billion tons in the Estevan area, 2.7 billion tons in
the Willowbunch-Wood Mountain area, and 0.3 billion tons in
the Cypress Hill's area. Seven seams, varying in thickness
up to a maximum of fifteen feet have been identified, the
three classified as workable occurring within 100 feet of
1R. L. Sutherland, "The Place of Saskatchewan
Lignite in the Coal Mining Industry of Western Canada"
(Hereinafter referred to as "Saskatchewan Lignite lt ), ~
Canadian Mining and Metallurgical Bulletin, October, 1932,
p. 568.
1
2the general surface level. 2 Mining in the field has been
and is confined almost exclusively to an area fairly close
to the Souris River in the general vicinity of Estevan.
The lignite field of southern Saskatchewan was
known to generations of natives of the "Coteau" district.
It is reported that in 1734 La Verendrye held a council with
Assiniboine and Cree chiefs who had come to visit his trad-
ing post, Fort st. Charles, on the shores of Lake of the
Woods. The chiefs told him of minerals near a river to the
west and described what must have been a bed of lignite on
fire. Was this the Souris River? Whatever the case, when
\
La Verendrye's sons, Louis-Joseph and Fran~ois, went in
search of the western sea in 1742, they undoubtedly traversed
the Souris coalfield in the course of their journey to the
Missouri.
Roughly a century later, in 1853, General Isaac I.
steven's exploration and survey party also set foot on the
coalfield. It visited Mouse River in its search for an
American railway route to the Pacific Ocean.) Then, in
1857, a British expedition under Captain John Pa11iser made
a side trip from'Fort Ellice to investigate reports of coal
deposits along the Souris River. Dr. James Hector, the
2stanford Research Institute, A StUdy of Resources
and Industrial ODportunities for the Province of~~Saskatchewan
(Menlo Park, Cal. I Stanford Research Institute, 1959),
p. 229.
3Archives of Saskatchewan (Hereinafter referred to
as AS), Clippings Files Souris River, n.p., n.d., p. 2.
Mouse River is the English translation of the French name,
La Souris.
party's geologist, examined these deposits and, basing his
conclusion on surface indications only, pronounced the
lignite to be of little commercial significance. The
Souris Valley was also visited by the International Boundary
Commission in 1873-74 and by John Macoun in 1879-81. By
this time more scientific attention was being paid to the
coa14 deposits of the area. In 1875 G. M. Dawson, a
naturalist and geologist with the Boundary Commission and
later a member of the Geological Survey of Canada, completed
an important report on Souris lignite formations. Later, in
1880, A. R. Selwyn, Dominion Geologist, also made an exhaus-
,
tive study of the coalfields and defined extensive deposits
which he believed to be of considerable commercial value.
In the same year W. D. Sutherland had several tons of lig-
nite extracted from a seam near Roche Percee and floated by
barge to Winnipeg for analysis. 5
Robert J. Hassard is credited with founding the coal
industry in the Souris region, the Province's principal
coalfield. Hassard moved from Moose Mountai.n to Taylorton
in 1887 and took a homestead on a quarter section in town-
ship two, range six, west of the second meridian. One day
he discovered a large seam of coal eight feet thick in a
4Coal and lignite have been used interchangeably
throughout this thesis in references to the Saskatchewan
coal mining industry.
5A. R. Turner, "Early History of the Souris River"
(unpublished article, 19.58), p • .5, AS, and "Surveying the
International Boundary, the Journal of George 1'Il. Dawson, t,
Saskatchewan History, 1968, XXI, I, 1.
4ravine near his house and proceeded to develop a mine. By
1891 settlers were coming from allover the south country
to obtain their winter coal supply. Mined by pick and
shovel, the coal was loaded onto small cars in the mine and
then hauled out by oxen or mules to be dumped in wagon boxes.
Hassard sold wagon loads to his patrons for one dollar per
load. 6 Although no authentic records exist for the early
years, by 1892 the coal mining industry was becoming estab-
lished in Saskatchewan, 5,400 tons being produced in that
year. With the advent of additional coal mining enterprises
in the Souris coalfield, this figure rose to 2)2,299 tons in
1914. 7 (Map 1.1 indicates mining locations in this region
in 1914. )
Although production had increased rapidly during the
years before World War I, it had been hoped that the influx
of settlers to the West would have created an even greater
demand for lignite. Three factors, however, militated
against such an increase. railway development, sources of
immigration, and development of burning equipment. 8 Because
railway building preceded organized settlement, early coal
mining was only ~ncidental to railway operations. Since
construction proceeded from east to west, and the locomotives
6Isabel Muirhead, "Early History of Estevan, 1892-
1900" (unpublished article, n.d.), p. 1, AS.
7Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Hereinafter
referred to as DBS), Canadian Mineral Statistics 1886-1 6
(Ottawal Queen's Printer, 1957 , p. 101.
8Suther1and, "Saskatchewan Lignite," p. 569.
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~~p 1.1. Location of Mines, 1914.
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Source: Mi.chael Freedman, itA Geographical Analysis of the Estevan (Saskatchewan)
Coalfield, 1880-1966" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Saskatchewan,
Saskatoon, 1968), p. 43.
6were designed to burn high rank coals, either anthracite or
bituminous, the first coal burned in quantity in western
Canada was imported from the eastern United States. For the
same reason, when domestic coal mines were opened in the
West, largely to supply locomotive fuel, the higher rank
coals of Alberta and British Columbia were developed first.
Settlement of the interior plain areas was also effected
from east to west. Coming from the east, whether from
Canada, Great Britain, or the United States, immigrants
were accustomed to the use of coals of higher rank and heat
value than lignite with the result that the greater part of
\
the fuel supply was imported from the United States during
the early period of settlement. The burning equipment
available at the time was almost exclusively of eastern
origin and was specifically designed for the use of high
rank American or British coals. Consequently, during the
early stages of development, coal was imported to suit the
equipment.
Over the years, consumption of lignite has also been
influenced by its nature. Compared with other Canadian
coals of higher rank and grade, its disadvantages are sig-
nificant. Coal consists of altered vegetal matter together
with such impurities as water and minerals. The longer its
period of alteration by heat, pressure, and chemical agen-
cies, the greater its percentage of fixed carbon and the
higher its heat value per ton. Lignite, a young coal, has
a much lower percentage of fixed carbon and a higher
?percentage of impurities than older coals such as anthracite
and bituminous. Consequently, its rank is low. 9 Coal is
also classified according to grade. This classification was
devised to indicate, from a commercial standpoint, the prin-
cipal properties of a coal as marketed. It includes data
relating to calorific value, size, sulphur content, and the
amount and nature of ash. (Table 1.1 reveals some of the
natural disadvantages of lignite compared to a widely used
Alberta coal. )
. Lignite, a cheap low grade fuel, cannot easily com-
pete with higher grade coals which are better able to with-
,
stand higher transportation costs to markets. This is espe-
cially significant when it is remembered that the Souris
field is located more than 1,000 miles from Canada's major
concentration of industry and population. A soft coal,
lignite is also subject to weathering and crumbles easily
making it less suitable for burning, Subject as well to
spontaneous combustion, it is not easily stored. Sub-
bituminous, a more expensive high grade coal has a much
lower moisture content so that less waste is transported per
ton mile. A hard coal, it is less subject to weathering,
does not crumble, and consequently is more suitable for
burning and more easily stored. Because of these qualities,
sub-bituminous can compete effectively in the principal
market area for Souris lignite--southeastern Saskatchewan
9Canada, Royal Commission on Coal, 1946, Report
(Ottawa. King's Printer, 1947), p. 10.
TABLE 1.1
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOURIS LIGNITE
AND CASCADE SUB-BITUMINOUS COAL
District %Moisture I %Ash %Volatiles %Fixed Carbon %Sulphur Calorific Value(BTU)
Bienfait 35 6.1 26.1 32.8 0.4 7,345
Estevan 35 9.3 25.1 30.6 0.3 6,905
Roche Percee 35 6.5 26.4 32.1 0.5 7,420
Canmore 1.5 8.2 12.8 77.5 0.7 13,910(Alberta)
Source, Canada, Royal COIT~ission on Coal, 1946, Report (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1947),
pp. 7 and 31.
Q)
9and southwestern Manitoba. Nevertheless, lignite is not
without certain advantagesl it produces little or no smoke
upon burning, high volatile content ensures combustability,
low sulphur content reduces equipment wear, and low ash
content facilitates the design of less complex and expensive
burners.
Owing to its inherent liabilities, marketing lignite
has always presented serious difficulties. (See Table 1.2
for the comparative cost of utilizing Drumheller and Estevan
coal at the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.) Until
the early 1920's the bulk of the output from the Souris
\
field was consumed in southeastern Saskatchewan, particularly
in Estevan and vicinity, with only small quantities being
shipped to Brandon and Winnipeg. By 1926, although the
Manitoba market was expanding and thirty-one mines in the
field were producing in excess of 439,000 tons annually,
consumption was still confined to these areas. 10 High trans-
portation costs to the eastern markets necessitated lignite
producers concentrating their marketing efforts in that area
in which they held an economic advantage over rival sources
of fuel. Experience indicated that the market area in which
Saskatchewan held an advantage was a semicircle, with a
radius of about 300 miles, centered on Estevan. East and
northeast of this area, fuel requirements were largely sup-
plied by wood; east of Winnipeg, American coal held the
advantage; and to the west and northwest lay the Alberta
10DBS , Canadian Mineral Statistics, 1886-1956, p. 101.
TABLE 1.2
COMPARATIVE COST OF UTILIZING-DRUMHELLER
AND ESTEVAN COAL IN SASKATOON
Drumheller I Estevan
Heat value per pound (BTU) 10,200 7,320
Moisture content (%) 15 32.56
Cost at mine (t) 60 25
Freight ($) .....2.80 2.60 0
Total eost ($) 3.40 2.85
Cost per million BTU (t) 16.6 19.46
Source: University of Saskatchewan, Presidential Papers I
Series I, Name and Subject Filesl Greig, A. R.
11
coa1fie1ds. 11 By 1930 markets in southern Manitoba and
southeastern Saskatchewan accounted for 90 per cent of the
lignite produced in the Souris field, each area absorbing
45 per cent. (Map 1.2 indicates the market area for Sas-
katchewan lignite in 1930.)
Extracting lignite from exposed outcrops by pick and
shovel gave way to deep seam mining during the l890·s. This
method consisted of sinking shafts to the bottom of the coal
seam to be worked and then mining the coal from a series of
rooms, one after the other, leaving pillars of coal to sup-
port the ceiling of each room. Because these pillars were
not mined and some coal was left on the floor and roof of
the room to reduce the cost of timbering, 4C per cent of the
coal remained unrecovered. Although it had ceased to be the
most economical one available by the late twenties, the six
large mines in the Souris coalfield, Bienfait Mines, Limited,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal Company, National Mines,
Limited, Eastern Collieries, Limited, Crescent Collieries,
Limited, and Western Dominion Collieries, Limited still
employed this method. (See Map 1.3 for the locations of
these mines.) As a result, when Truax-Traer Coal Company
introduced strip mining in this field in 1930, the repercus-
sions soon echoed throughout the industry, influencing
mining methods, output, production costs, coal prices, and
many related aspects of the coal industry in Saskatchewan.
j;
In strip mining a "box cut" is made, and the overburden is
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N~P 1.3. Location of Deep Seam Mines, 1931. Nt ILES
Source: AS, Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources, Coal Administration
Branc~, Exhibits, Turgeon Royal Commission, 1934.
14
removed to form the edge of the strip mine. Parallel cuts
are then made beside the original cut and the overburden
dumped into the mined-out section of the previous cut. The
coal is then stripped by a dragline or power shovel, cleaned
with a rotary broom, and blasted into smaller lumps, This
mining method assures a recovery factor of 85 per cent, con-
siderably higher than that of the room and pillar method.
All in all, the year 1930 was a significant one for
the Saskatchewan coal mining industry, It was a year marked
not only by an important innovation in mining methods but
also by substantial optimism concerning the future. In his
,
maiden speech in the Legislature in February, E. W. Garner,
MLA for Estevan, spoke of the unlimited potential of the
Souris Valley coalfield. "coal deposits in the southern
Saskatchewan coalfield amount to 57,400,000,000 tons and,
within the last forty years only 8,000,000 tons have been
mined.,,12 After pointing out several advantages of utiliz-
ing Saskatchewan lignite and the opportunities for capturing
new markets and increasing domestic consumption, Garner fore-
casted expenditures of approximately $900,000 in connection
with mining coal 'by new methods. 1) His speech typified the
optimism surrounding Saskatchewan~s coal industry in the
early months of the depression.
Despite rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in
12Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Journals and




the province, the industry seemed to be entering a period of
expansion. The Estevan Mercury carried reports indicating
that such was the case:
Humming with big-scale development that will ultimately
place Estevan in the front rank of Western Canada's
industrial centres, the Souris River valley and adjacent
coalfields ••• are a bustling hive of activity.
Approximately two hundred men are engaged in construc-
tion work of the million dollar investment which Truax-
Traer Coal Co. and Dominion Electric Power Co. are
making in this district's future. 14
Several months later, the Mercury reported impressive
increases in lignite production and marketing and concluded:
There-in lies the silver lining of the depression cloud
that looms over Western Canada and the coalfields as the
new year dawns. Many-sided industrial development in
Estevan during the latter part of 1930 kept to the brisk
pace that lignite was setting, and this district looks
to 1931 with confident expectations of great things.
Lignite is on its way:15
Not everyone, of course, agreed with such predic-
tions. Some individuals, claiming Truax-Traer's new mechan-
ical methods for quantity production would reduce the man-
power employed in the li@lite field and consequently restrict
the local trade value of the industry, expressed serious mis-
givings about the paper's conclusions. But the gloom they
14~steV~.Mercury, May 1, 1930, p. 1. Dominion
Electric was erecting a lignite-fuelled, electrical gener-
ating station at Estt;van. It also planned to construct
transmission lines from there to a number of corrununi ties in
southern and eastern Saskatchewan. It proposed to transmit
power as far away as Yorkton, Assiniboia, and Shaunavon,
enlarging its generating capacity at Estevan when necessary
to meet the electrical needs of such centers. C. O. White,
"Saskatchewan Builds an Electrical System" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon,
1968), pp. 169-73.
15Estevan Mercury, January 8, 1931, p. 5.
16
cast was soon dispelled. After ten years of extensive
research scientists perfected a method of carbonizing and
briquetting lignite, and Western Dominion Collieries moved
into production of the "little pillow shaped heat cakes,"
This advance was greeted as a means of offsetting any pos-
sible displacement of manpower in the production of raw
lignite; there were strong indications that a new market
would welcome the perfected briquette, creating employment
for all who might be displaced by mechanical mining proc-
esses. 16 Yet another encouraging piece of news accompanied
this announcement, After many years of experimentation a
German scientist successfully reduced lignite coal to crude
oil which could in turn be converted into high grade gaso-
line. Application of this process to the vast lignite beds
of Saskatchewan and Alberta was claimed to be commercially
practicable. Surely, urged the Mercury, none could deny
that this discovery "will assure industrial independence of
Western Canada for all time to come, ,,17
Unfortunately for the Saskatchewan lignite industry,
marketing the new product was not easy. Attempts at bri-
quetting lignit~ were initiated in an effort to place lig-
nite on a more competitive basis with anthracite, By the
1920's, lignite's chief competitor was sub-bituminous coal,
Hence the new process accomplished little in enhancing lig-
nite's market position, Not only did a strong market for




the briquettes fail to materialize, but the extraction of
gasoline from lignite was also found to be less economical
than advertised. Then too, the plans of Dominion Electric
Power were only partly carried out. l8
Had the expectations of early 1930 been realized,
events of the following year might have taken a different
course. But they were not; and the industry did not long
remain immune to the growing labour discontent born of the
depression and drought. On August 27, 1931 A. Nelson,
secretary-treasurer of the Village of Bienfait, notified the
Department of Railways, Labour and Industries that some 600
coal miners had joined the Mine Workers' Union of Canada
(MWUC), that the union would undoubtedly demand a consider-
able improvement in the wages and working conditions of the
men, and that there was a grave possibility of a difference
of opinion arising between the mine operators and the miners
which in turn could precipitate a serious labour dispute,l9
Attempts to avert the impending strike failed, and at mid-
night on September 7, in accordance with a union vote, 600
miners in the Souris coalfield walked off the job, The
stage had been set for the tragic episode of 1931,
l8The company's progress was abruptly arrested when
the provincial government decided that, through the Power
Commission, ownership arid control of long distance trans-
mission lines would be enjoyed by the people. This decision,
in effect, placed a fence around the Dominion Electric Power
Company and curtailed expansion of its lignite-based power
station. White, IISaskatchewan Builds an Electrical System, II
pp, 175-208, ~assim,
19A5 , Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Deputy
minister's office, Estevan Coal Strike, 1931 (Hereinafter
referred to as Estevan Strike File), A. Nelson to T. M,
Molloy, August 27, 1931.
CHAPTER II
AN INDUSTRY IN FINANCIAL TROUBLE
In the years preceding the depression (and in sub-
sequent ones as well) coal mining in Saskatchewan was highly
seasonal. Approximately 75 per cent of the lignite mined in
the Souris coalfield was produced for the domestic market.
As a result, little demand for coal existed during the late
spring, summer, and early fall months. l Moreover, because
the quality of lignite rapidly deteriorates when stockpiled,
mines operated only when orders were to be filled. This of
course meant that mining was not profitable during about six
months of the year. Indeed, according to William L. Hamilton,
president and managing director of Crescent Collieries, it
was a losing proposition. 2 John R. Brodie, vice-president
of Bienfait Mines, was of the same opinion. He believed
that the mines would be better off financially if it were
possible to close them down completely between April I and
September 1. 3
In addition to the difficulties arising from the
seasonal and fluctuating nature of the industry, the coal
lAS, Saskatchewan, Royal Commission, Estevan-Bienfait
Mining Dispute, 1931 (Hereinafter referred to as Wylie
Commission), Report, p. 85.
2Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 148.
)Ibid., II, 55.
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producers of the Souris field in the late 1920's found them~
selves facing an even more complex prob1em~-a reduction in
realization from the sale of lignite. Crescent Collieries'
realization declined steadily between 1928 and 1931. This
mine obtained $1.77 per ton in 1928, $1.74 in 1929, $1.58 in
1930, and $1.52 in 1931. 4 According to the president and
managing director of Eastern Collieries, Herbert Wallace,
his company's average realization per ton declined from
$2.11i to $1.80* between the 1929-)0 and 1930-31 season. 5
J. C. Thompson, secretary-treasurer of Manitoba and Saskatch-
ewan Coal and one of its major stockholders, stated that in
I
1930 his company sold 86,000 tons of lignite for $181,447;
the following year $181,512 was realized from the sale of
98,314 tons. 6 A. E. Turner, controller of Western Dominion
Collieries, reported that prior to April 30, 1931 his com-
pany received $1.60 per ton for its coal and that subsequent
to this date the average return slipped to $1.29. 7 (See
Table 2.1 for a detailed schedule of the average price per
ton realized annually from 1926 to 1931 from the various
sizes of coal produced at this mine.) When all major mines
are lumped together, the decrease in realization during 1931
varied from twenty-five to seventy-five cents per ton on
domestic as well as industrial coal. In that year the
4Wy1ie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-27.
5Wylie Commission, Proceedings, V, 308.
6Ibid ., IX, 12.
7~., VIII, 275-76.
TABLE 2.1
AVERAGE REALIZATION PER TON OF COAL PRODUCED BY WESTERN
DOMINION COLLIERIES, 1926-1931 (DOLLARS)
Size of coal Price
1926
August
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Lump coal 2.78 2.78 2.74 2.69 2.38 1.97
Cobble -- -- -- -- 2.04 1.84
Nut Coal 1.85 1.88 1.86 1.92 1.53 1.16
Nut slack 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.16
Slack 0.62 0.83 0.93 0.92 0.93 1.16
Mine-run 2.06 2.08 2.09 2.18 2.03 1.88
Average return I 2.10 2.15 2.10 2.06 1.95 1.41
;
Source I Saskatchewan, Royal Commission, Estevan-Bienfait Mining




average cost of producing and marketing Saskatchewan lignite
was $1.61 per ton while the average realization was $1.67,
leaving the Estevan-Bienfait mines an average net profit of
8
only six cents per ton. Despite the fact these mines pro-
duced 657,723 tons of lignite in 1931, an increase of 83,449
tons over the previous year, its value represented a decrease
of $30,011 from the $966,929 realized in 1930. 9 (Table 2.2
indicates net realization for the deep seam mines in this
field during the years 1928-1931.)
For the most part, intense competition in the coal
industry accounted for this reduction in realization from
the sale of Saskatchewan lignite. Coalfields in the east
supplied most of the fuel burned in Nova Scotia, approxi-
mately half the fuel of New Brunswick, and 40 per cent of
the fuel of Quebec. British Columbia and Alberta mines sup-
plied the fuel requirements of their own provinces, in excess
of 90 per cent 10 of the fuel of Saskatchewan, and 33 per
cent of Manitoba's requirements. Imported fuel met the
market demands of one-quarter of New Brunswick, half of
Quebec, practically all of Ontario and two-thirds of Mani-
toba. Approximately 54 per cent of the 35,500,000 tons of
8wylie Commission, Report, p. 109.
9Saskatchewan, Department of Rail~ays, Labour and
Industries, Fourth Annual Report (Reginas King's Printer,
1932), p. 18.
10The 90 per cent imported was for the year 1927;
Table 2.3 shows imports into Saskatchewan in 1930 as repre-
senting approximately 78 per cent of the province's total
coal consumption.
TABLE 2.2
NET REALIZATION, 1928-1931 (PER TON)
Mine 1928 1929 1930 1931




Bienfait Mines -- 1.62 1.59 1.53
Crescent Collieries 1.77 1.74 1.58 1.52
Eastern Collieries
-- -- 1.87 1.60
National Mines (mine being developed)
Source: Saskatchewan, Royal Commission, Estevan-Bienfait




COAL PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, AND EXPORTS, 1930 (TONS)
Production Imported Exported
bther Provinces United States
Canada 14,881,324 -- 16,172.706 624,512
Alberta 5,755,528 3.5,979 1,3.51 2,024,680
Saskatchewan 579,424 1,291,119 2,919 232,5.50
Manitoba -- 775,866 1,541,900 --
Source: AS, Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources,




coal burned in Canada in 1927 was imported, 95 per cent .. of
the total imports being from the United States. 11
In 1930 the province's coal mines produced 579,424
tons, less than 4 per cent of the Canadian total. Alberta,
Saskatchewan's chief competitor, produced 5,755,528 tons or
about 38 per cent of the nation's total coal production.
Table 2.3 indicates that Saskatchewan herself imported more
than twice her total coal production from Alberta, 1,291,119
tons. 12 Saskatchewan lignite competed with both American
and Alberta coals on the Manitoba market. Although Manitoba's
major centers lay within Saskatchewan lignite's primary
market area, only 227,147 tons from the Souris field entered
that province. The remaining 548,000 tons plus of Canadian
coal used in Manitoba came from the Alberta fields. The
inherent disadvantages of lignite as a fuel were largely
the reason Souris producers held such a small share of the
Canadian coal market. Lignite could not compete effectively
against the superior coals produced elsewhere.
Competition among Souris producers themselves also
plagued the Saskatchewan industry. Thomas M. Molloy,
deputy minister 'of Railways, Labour and Industries, stated
that in the opinion of his department competition within the
llWylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-15.
12Saskatchewan, Department of Railways, Labour and
Industries, Third Annual Report (Regina. King's Printer,
1931), p. 44. In 1930 Saskatchewan imported 1,291,879 tons
of coal from Alberta, according to this report. Although
this figure is at variance with that shown in Table 2.3, it
is nevertheless evident that Alberta was the source of the
Canadian coal imported into Saskatchewan.
2.5
field itself was responsible for the decline in the price of
Estevan coal. 13 There had always been a certain amount of
competition among operators of the larger producing deep
seam mines and smaller mines in the field, but with the
advent of Truax-Traer's large mechanized stripping operation
the competition became much keener. Many operators supported
A. C. M. Wilson's contention that Truax-Traer "upset the
whole coal industry. ,,14 C. C. Morfit, consulting engineer
at Western Dominion Collieries, stated that the deep seam
mines could never hope to compete against the prices estab-
lished by the strip mines for slack, lump, cobble, and other
sizes of coal. He also warned that unless the practice of
gradual and persistent reductions ceased many mines in the
district would face insolvency.15 W, L. Hamilton reported
losing a contract to supply coal to the city of Weyburn when
Truax-Traer agreed to sell the same grade of coal to the
city for fifty cents per ton, seventy-five cents below
Hamilton's price. He stated that the stripping plant was
losing money at that rate and concluded it was Truax-Traer's
aim to sell coal below the cost of production in an attempt
to drive the deep seam mines out of business. 16 H. Wallace
claimed that "deep seam mines of the Souris coalfield had
been compelled to put their best lump on the market at $1,81
13Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 10,
14Ibid ., VII, 31,
l.5 Ibid ., VIII, 293-94.
16 Ibid ., X, 193-94.
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a ton • •• and might be forced to further reduce the price
to $1.50 to meet the competition of mechanized mines. "17
J. R. Brodie echoed Morfit's observation, asserting that
unless the price of coal was stabilized the pit mines would
have to close. He also stated. "our prices are entirely
outside of our control, being regulated by competition from
the Mechanized stripper. ,,18
Despite their charges against Truax-Traer, both
H. N. Freeman, managing director of National Mines, and
C. C. Morfit acknowledged that some fault lay with the deep
seam mine operators themselves. Freeman pointed out part of
the difficulty when he said.
the system of mining in this field is a joke; pardon
the expression, but it is a joke. The idea of putting
in a large hoist, to hoist coal fifty or sixty feet to
the surface, where a nice slope could be driven and
the coal handled by a conveying system from the mine. 19
Morfit had much the same to says
it has been the practice, and it is the practice in
this field to mine coal by means of shafts, Based upon
my experience, this district is not a shaft district,
The haulage equipment is of a type that was discarded
by fields that have a larger production years and years
ago. 20
Morfit maintaine,d that there was little room for expansion
in the field because the mines were already operating at the
maximum output for which they were designed, He also
17Leader-Post (Regina), October 16, 1931, p, 1.
18Wylie Commission, Proceedings, II, 19,
~.
19 Ibid ., VIII, 475.
20 Ibid ., 295.
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believed that inefficiency, use of antiquated equipment,
and lack of production was a result of an excessive number
of operators producing coal in one field. 21 The Winnipeg
..
Tribune carried an editorial which adequately summed up the
situation in the Souris coalfield:
deep-seam mines cannot compete with strip mines. A
narrow seam cannot be worked by hand in competition
with a seam which is thick enough to be worked by a
mechanical coalcutter. These things are obvious to
the bystander, but it is natural that the operator of
a sub-marginal mine should resist seeing them. To
admit that a mine is sub-marginal is to accept defeat.
A coal mine that is operating at a loss is not a valu-
able property; it is a liability•••• 22
Another class of competition came from a large
number of smaller mines disparagingly referred to as "gopher
holes." Several factors were involved in the success
enjoyed by these small operations. The absence of any
restrictions on the acquisition of mining leases enabled an
individual to negotiate with the CPR to mine coal on its
land upon payment of a royalty of ten cents per ton. 23 The
operator of one of these truck trade mines enjoyed many
advantages. his capital investment was usually confined to
$100 for a used truck for hauling coal; his operating over-
head was almost negligible; unlike the large operators, he
was not forced to insure his employees at a rate of $3.50
per $100 wages with the Workmen's Compensation Board; and,
as a general rule, his activities were not in keeping with
21Ibid., 296.
22Winnipeg Tribune, October 10, 1931, p. 17.
23Wyl ie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 430.
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the provisions of The Mines Act. 24 Many of these small
operators further undercut their competition's price by
granting the purchaser an "overage" of several hundred
pounds for the price of one ton of coal. 25 One coal dealer
singled out the ~Jenish Mine as a prime offender. James
Parkinson claimed that many people refused to buy his coal
I
at $1.65 per ton and went to Jenish where they received from
1,000 to 1,400 pounds overweight for $1.23. 26 The price at
which these gopher holes marketed coal was indeed attractive.
Freeman mentioned knowing of an individual who regularly
travelled fifty miles to pick up a truck load of coal for
delivery and sale in the United States. 27
Coal subventions also played an important role in
the reduction in realization from lignite. By instituting
a coal subvention the federal government in effect assumed
a portion of the freight charges in an attempt to reduce the
cost of transporting Canadian industrial coal to market.
Prior to the establishment of a subvention, the freight rate
per ton from British Columbia and Alberta coalfields to
Winnipeg amounted to $4.95; from the Saskatchewan field it
was $2.30. 28 In an effort to eliminate American coal and
coke from the Winnipeg market the government, in 1929,
24Ibid ., 457.
25Wyl ie Commission, Report, p. 89.
26Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XII, 58.
27 Ib id., VIII, 456.
28Ibid ., 302.
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granted a subvention of at least fifty cents per ton on coal
being shipped into Manitoba. This subvention of one-eighth
of a cent per ton mile gave Alberta coal a subsidy of $1;07
and Saskatchewan a minimum of fifty cents per ton with the
result, according to C. C. Morfit, that freight rates from
the fields of the two provinces were practically equalized. 29
Freeman alleged that the Alberta operators lobbied
the Department of Mines in Ottawa and eventually succeeded
in obtaining a subvention of one-seventh of a cent per ton
mile in .1931. 30 Morfit pointed out that this new arrange-
ment gave Alberta producers an average subvention of $1.22
per ton while reducing their Saskatchewan competitors to
forty cents per ton, no minimum being allowed. He stated
that to remove this injustice and grant parity, Saskatchewan
producers should receive a subvention of fifty-seven cents
per ton into Winnipeg. Prior to the granting of subventions,
according to Morfit, Bienfait ranked first in the Manitoba
market with the Brazeau and Canmore fields of Alberta second
and third and the Fernie, British Columbia field fourth.
With the introduction of the 1931 subvention, the rating
became Brazeau, 'Canmore, Fernie, and then Bienfait. 31 The
revised rates virtually eliminated a market which, it was
claimed, would have insured almost year-round activity in
437.
~~d., 303-05.
29Ibid., 302-03. Morfit's calculations take into
account moisture content, BTU value, and other factors
regarding th various types of coal.
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the Souris field. Brodie observed that the people who
invested in the coalfields in the district certainly would
not have done so had the subvention been in effect at the
time. 32
Western Dominion Collieries faced additional charges
in transporting coal. This mine paid $3.00 for each railway
car of coal switched from its spur line onto the main line
at Bienfait. Although this amount was refunded to the com-
pany in return for its operating the spur, Morfit claimed
that each year Western Dominion lost several thousand dollars
because it was forced to sell its coal at a lower rate per
\
ton than would have been necessary had the mine located at
Bienfait. He stated:
this practice of a switching charge, of the railways
insisting upon the mines operating a spur, to my mind
is a vicious practice. A railroad should be more than
willing to furnish a free switching service, to a mine
or an industry that furnishes to the railroad an
appreciable revenue. There should be a blanet [sic]
freight rate from all mines in the one freight area.))
The advent of the new strip mining operation, which
increased the competition already prevalent in the coal
industry, and the institution of government subventions
occurred, it must be remembered, in the context of the
general economic depression. The lignite operators, supply-
ing a local and domestic market, enjoyed a relatively high
32Ib id., II, 40-41.
33Ibl."d., VIII 29~, '7.
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degree of stability.34 They did not suffer the drastic
decline in markets and prices experienced by export indus-
tries;35 their production and volume of sales actually
increased during this period. The province's total coal
output rose from 580,189 tons in 1929 to 662,836 tons in
1931, an increase of almost 11 per cent. However, the
average realization per ton declined 16 per cent during the
same period. 36 This downward trend was no doubt due both
to competition and "a general reduction in commodity prices
based on the ability of the pUblic to pay. ,,37 The decline
in prices, arising from this combination of factors, was to
have a mixed effect on the miners, on the one hand resulting
in a lowered cost of living but on the other hand occasion-
ing a reduction in income.
34Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on the Coal Industry
of Saskatchewan, 1949 (Hereinafter referred to as Royal Com-
mission on Coal, 1949), Report (Regina: King's Printer,
1950), p. 14.
35The price index for seventeen major Canadian export
commodities dropped from 100, as of July, 1929, to sixty-two
in June, 1931. See Canada, Report of the Royal Commission
on Dominion Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer,
1940), I, 144.
36Canada', DBS, "Coal Statistics for Canada, 1931"
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1932), p. 64.
37Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on the Coal Mining
Industry in the Province of Saskatchewan, 1934 (Hereinafter
referred to as Royal Commission on Coal, 1934), Report
(Regina: King's Printer, 1935), p. 23.
CHAPTER III
MONEY IS ALSO A PROBLEM FOR LABOUR
lWylie Commission, Proceedings, III, )0.
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A. C. M. Wilson, manager of Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal,
began spreading what little work existed among his employees.
As a result, their earnings reportedly were "S 0 seriously
affected that it is impossible for them to support their
families and themselves with any degree of comfort. ,,2
When the mines re-opened each fall, the demand for
labour frequently exceeded supply. In such circumstances
the operators habitually hired a large number of inexperi-
enced men who were necessarily placed at the working face
where the coal was being mined. The experienced miners
bitterly resented this practice. Harry Hesketh, a miner at
Bienfait Mines, emphasized the danger inherent in having
such men at the coal face and provided several accounts of
fatal or near-fatal accidents involving untrained miners. 3
J. H. Harris, another employee at this mine, alleged the
mine operators placed an untrained man with an experienced
miner to ensure the "green man" would learn the trade. His
basic complaint was that these trainees reduced miners'
earnings because they received an equal share of the money
earned by the partnership while not contributing an equal
share of productive labour. He conclUded by sayings "If
they were not put with experienced men, they would not make
enough to clear their board and they would come back on
management to keep them. ,,4
2Leader-Post (Regina), January 19, 1932, p. 14.
)Wylie Commission, EXhibits, No. C-23.
4wylie Commission, Proceedings, III, 132.
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Against this background of income insecurity and
employment practices ofa type capable of causing unrest
among employees, the decrease in realization accruing to the
mine owners from the sale of lignite ultimately led to wage
reductions, a major ·factor in the ensuing labour dispute.
The companies claimed that reductions in the wage schedule
were" necessary· to cover at least a portion of the loss of
revenue. The miners of course protested, asserting that
cuts instituted were out of proportion to the actual decrease
in realization and to the cost of living. 5 In a further
effort to justify their actions, the operators declared that
the decrease in wages paid "was not nearly in proportion to
the decrease in the price received· for coal" and, when the
increased purchasing power of the dollar was considered,
wages were at a "very fair standard. ,,6
Owing to variations in the quantity of labour-saving
machinery and in the method and system of payment employed
by each mine in the Souris field, any tabulated comparison
of rates of pay would be difficult to produce. Nevertheless,
some understanding of the·effects of the reductions can be
obtained. Joseph Benbridge, mine manager of Bienfait Mines,
stated that prior to October 1, 1930 the men were paid $1.05
per ton for entry coal loaded with a fork, and ninety-five
cents for shovel loading. On this date a five cents per ton
reduction was place? on all types of loading. February and
5Wy1ie Commission, Report, p. 62.
6Estevan Mercury, September 10, 1931, p. 8.
:3S
April brought further reductions after which miners received
seventy cents per ton in the entries and fifty cents in the
rooms.? Harry Hesketh claimed that the hourly wage declined
from thirty-seven and ,a half cents to thirty-five in October,
1930 and to thirty-two and a half cents in spring, 1931. 8
According to John Smyth, machine man and miner at
the Manitoba and Saskatchewan mine, prior to February 28,
1931 miners there received forty-five cents per ton. On
this date the company hired experienced "shooters" at ten
cents per ton to shoot down the coal. This step placed the
miners in the position of being "loaders" at twenty cents
per ton. In the spring of 1931 shooters received an increase
of one cent per ton and miners five cents. 9 As a result of
these changes day men were reduced five cents per hour,
monthly men $10.00, and machine operators one and a half
cents per ton. 10
Charles Morfit revealed that WHstern Dominion, the
last to introduce wage reductions, did so only to keep in
line with the other mines which had cut wages in an attempt
to reduce the selling price of their coal and thereby com-
pete more effectively on the market. 11 Charles Smart, fire-
man at this mine, pointed out that monthly men were then
7Wylie Co~nission, Proceedings, V, 28-)1.
8Ibid., II, 85.
9Ibid., VI, 54-55.
10Wylie Commission, Report, pp. 38-39.
l1 Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 349.
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placed on a thirty-seven. and a half cent per hour basis, a
reduction of five cents. 12 George Wilkinson, an entry man
at the mine, stated that in March, 19)1 room miners' wages
were reduced from fifty-five to forty cents per ton and
entry men's wages from eighty to fifty-five cents, Monthly
men received a $10.00 reduction, day men five cents per hour
less, and machine men and machine helpers one cent and half
a cent per ton cuts respectively,i)
Concerning Crescent Collieries, Dan Maar, a Crescent
machine man, reported the following reductions per ton initi-
ated in November, 19)0. diggers from forty-six to forty-rive
cents, entry men from sixty to fifty-seven and a half cents,
and drivers from thirty-five to thirty cents. The engineer's
salary was reduced $5.00 per month and the clerk's $10,00.
Only machine men and their helpers escaped the wage cut,14
The decision of Eastern Collieries to change from a
screened-coal tonnage basis to a mine-run basis complicates
the task of determining the actual wage reduction there,
Prior to May 1, 1931 miners received forty-six cents per ton
with an additional yardage allowance of twenty-five cents
per lineal foot when coal was cut and sheared and fifty cents
when undercut. After this date they received twenty-five
cents per ton for all sizes of coal loaded. The company
calculated that forty-six cents per ton on the former basis
12Ibid., 174.
l)Ibid., 2)-25.
14Ibid ., X, 40-41,
was equivalent to twenty-nine and one-eighth cents per ton
on a mine-run basis so that the reduction in the schedule
. approximated four and one-eighth cents per ton. Day men
employed at this mine received reductions varying from two
to five cents per hour, depending on their duties. iS
The miners at National Mines agreed to a voluntary
reduction of ten cents per hour on April 13, 1931 with the
result that no complaints respecting wages were voiced. 16
Under this arrangement they received sixty-five cents per
hour and a yardage allowance of $1.75 per lineal yard. All
other wages apparently remained static. day men, thirty-five
\
cents per hour; boys under eighteen years, twenty cents per
hour the first year and twenty-five cents the second; chief
engineer, $110.00 per month; second engineer, $100.00 per
month; and special labourers, using their own tools, forty
cents per hour. i ?
While these few statistics suggest that the reduc-
tion in wages may have imposed a hardship on the miners in
the district, other evidence indicates more conclusively
that it did. Wilkinson jUdged that the reductions instituted
at Western Dominion Collieries deprived the room men and
entry men of approximately $30.00 and $50.00 per month
15Wylie Commission, Report, p. 26.
16Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 473-74.
17Wylie Commission, Report, p. 83. As compensation
for agreeing to the wage reduction, this mine granted each
miner a $20.00 cash advance for the month, charged no rent
for company houses, and supplied the resident miners with
free coal. Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 473.
38
respectively. 18 At Eastern Collieries, where the miners were
paid twenty-five cents per ton, the average wage amounted to
only $1,60 per day.19 And a letter to the deputy minister
of Railways, Labour and Industries dated August 27, 1931
from A. Nelson, the secretary-treasurer of Bienfait, leads
one to conclude that wages may have fallen to quite deplor-
able levels. According to Nelson, in winter 1930-31 the
average monthly wage of the miners was $9.00 to $25.00, the
latter being exceptional. 20 Nelson also stated that the men
were facing an even lower wage scale. This lends credence
to a subsequent statement by Hesketh. "There was a certain
boast made awhile back that they would have men working for
20 cents, before this reduction was made, that they were go-
ing to have another reduction and they would have it if we
had not jumped up. ,,21
In any discussion concerning wages and their reduc-
tion, several other matters should not go unmentioned. These
may be identified as follows, (1) weights and dockage;
(2) size and distribution of coal cars; (3) payment for
extra work; (4) fines and penalties; (5) operation of the
medical plan; (6) compensation; and (7) frequeney of pay.
Although seemingly unrelated to the subject of wage sched-
ules, most of these factors tended to depress the miners'
18Wyl ie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 2J-25.
19Leader-Post (Regina), October 14, 1931, p. 2.
20Estevan Strike File, A. Nelson to T. M. Molloy,
August 27, 1931.
21Wylie Commission, Proceedings, II, 113.
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net income and hence, like the reductions, were sources of
discontent.
Numerous complaints regarding weights and dockage
indicate how these matters affected earnings. with the
exception of National Mines, where complaints of any kind
were -few, mine operators were charged with placing limits
on the weight of cars, over estimating dockage for slack,
and using inaccurate scales. According to T. H. McWilliams,
weighman at Bienfait Mines, ~e had been instructed not to
record the weight of any coal car at more than 4,000 pounds,
despite the fact that many weighed in excess of 5,000. 22
What he said was undoubtedly true since after the strike
dockage was reduced from 950 to 850 pounds per car and the
weight limit increased from 4,000 to 4,500 pounds. 23 The
complaint of the weighman at Crescent Collieries, Edward
Knight, is representative of that of other miners who voiced
their dissatisfaction. He declared that the scale was inac-
curate and was to observe that following the strike weights
increased by several hundred pounds per car. 24
22Leader-Post (Regina), October 8, 1931, p. 21.
23wy1 ie Commission, Report, p. 12.
24Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 55-57. Edwin B.
Lorimer, District Inspector of Weights and Measures,
inspected the scales at the mines in October, 1931 and
reported they were accurate at Bienfait Mines, National Mines,
and Eastern Collieries and granted overweight favouring the
mines by ten and fifteen pounds at Western Dominion Col-
lieries and Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal respectively. He
found the scale at Crescent Collieries impossible to test
because of its erratic action and recommended a thorough
overhaul or a new scale. Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-13.
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The practice of docking a predetermined number of
pounds from the weight of every car of coal was also resented
by miners. Many of them claimed it was unfair of management
to deduct automatically several hundred pounds from the
actual weight of the car containing smaller sizes of coal.
Harry Hesketh stated. "the Company gets everything that is
in the car, whether slack or coal, and they must be getting
something out of it one way or another, they burn some in
the boiler, and it is used other~ise.,,25 As Hesketh pointed
out, slack was being sold for $1.00 per ton while the miners
were being docked several hundred pounds per car for loading
it. In effect, operators were actively engaged in marketing
a product while refusing to pay labour for producing it.
Complaints regarding coal cars can be placed in two
categories--those related to size and those related to dis-
tribution. The miners alleged that only an unsatisfactory
estimate of dockage could be made at Eastern Collieries and
Bienfait Mines where cars of varying size were used. 26 As
a result, they were not given full. credit for the amount of
coal they produced. The question of distribution arose only
in connection with the Manitoba and Saskatchewan mine where
a power shovel went into operation in the fall of 1930.
Because the shovel's loading capacity equalled that of ten
men, it received preference in the delivery of cars. 27
25Wylie Commission, Proceedings, II, 99.
26Wylie Commission, Report, PP. 10 and _29.
27Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 56-57 and 82.
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Fred Booth, a digger at this mine, pointed out that because
the cars loaded during the final shift were dumped by the
first shift, miners working the morning shift waited several
hours before the empty cars were delivered. 28 Wilson, the
mine manager, admitted that, although the company owned a
sufficient number of cars, poor distribution seriously
affected the earnings of the miners. 29
Discontent regarding payment or the absence of pay-
ment for extra work was also, widespread. In the majority of
instances, individuals complained of loss of time--and con-
sequently money--or of not being credited for the full
,
amount of time expended in fulfilling certain duties. Henry
Kushnerus, pit boss at Eastern Collieries, stated that pay-
ment for extra work was computed on an average time per day
per month basis with a daily record being kept by the pit
boss. 3D However, because extra duties were usually performed
sporadically, it is evident that keeping an accurate account
woul~ be impossible. 31 This was true of pit boss and miner
alike. It is readily apparent that in many instances the
miners had little idea of how many hours they had spent on
a specific task. As a general rule, they relied on the
28 Ib id., 98-99.
29 Ib id., VII, 17.
3Dlbid., VI, 14-16.
31Commissioner Wylie charged that the pit bosses at
Bienfait Mines and Eastern Collieries consistently under-
estimated the time spent in performing extra duties. Wylie
Commission, Report, pp. 15 and 31-32.
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tally sheets maintained by management. According to K. G.
John, accountant at Bienfait Mines, due bills representing
the money earned by each miner were distributed on the first
day of each month, the men being allowed two days to take up
with management any complaints respecting wages and deduc-
tions. 32 Evidence suggests that on numerous occasions
employees disagreed with management as to the amount owing
them. Many of them, however, dared not complain for fear of
being told I'take your tools out." Where the less cautious
individuals who did lodge protests were concerned, there
were frequent reports of the failure of management to "square
up." Generally operators took the view that extra work was
covered by payment on a screened-coal basis. 33
Dissatisfaction regarding non-payment for extra work
centered around water removal, clearing clay falls, timber-
ing, and assisting in laying track. For the most part water
removal was not a serious issue at National, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan, or Western Dominion Collieries because these
mines were relatively dry.34 However, such was not the case
elsewhere. J. H. Harris, a miner at Bienfait Mines, stated
that the men spent one-half to one hour each day removing
water that seeped into the mine overnight. In order to
insure against the loss of tonnage, the men reported for
32Wyl ie Commission, Proceedings, IV, 19.
33western Producer (Saskatoon), October 15, 1931, p. 2.
34Wylie Commission, Report, pp. 79-80. According to
S. W. Holley, Western Dominion also paid forty cents per tank
for water removal. Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 242.
work before 7.00 A.M. when the mine opened in order to have
the water removed before the cars began arriving. 35 No
remuneration was received for the extra hours this entailed,
Hesketh reported that during a three week period he bailed
three two ton tanks of water per day without any pay what-
soever. 36 Robinson claimed that he pumped water for almost
100 hours per month for three months and was credited with
a total time of only fifty hours at thirty cents per hour. 3?
He also complained of not being paid for setting up the
equipment for pumping the water. According to Robinson,
this was no mean task. The pipes were old, split and full
of holes, the threads were worn and the couplings did not
fit. 38 Apparently a considerable amount of time was spent
repairing splits, patching holes, re-threading pipes, and
locating suitable clamps and couplings.
Complaints related to the removal of water at
Eastern Collieries were equally prominent. John Billis, a
miner, claimed to have received credit for only twenty-four
of 100 hours spent pumping water in his area. 39 William
Choma alleged he was only allowed fifty hours for pumping
when he had in fact pumped water almost steadily between the
35Wylie Commission, Proceedings, I, 20-21.
36Ibid., 97.
37 Ibid ., III, 3.
38Ibid., 8-9.
39 Ibid ., v, 85 and 89.
hours of4.o0A.JIIl. and 6.00 P.M. for four months. 40 Edward
PierceJr~,manager.of the·mine, shed little light on the
situation by observing that company <policy was to< pay a man
for' pumping i water only if'<·it:entaiJ..eda· "'considerable"
length oftime.~l
Of the. mines in thedistrict,i wa.t,er .posed the"largest
problem for Crescent Collier·;ies with .. the·· result .that.. com-
plaints were •. "'erynumer,ous. Alex 'Peattie, a miner, main-
tained that several men had' to,go/downipt.o the mine as> early
as). 00 A.M. to pump or bail water so tbeycould commence
loading as soon as thecoal'cars were delivered.. His basic
gr ievancewas' that while, engaged in removing water, which
merited no reward, miners:. were unable to load coal and con-
sequently<the irearnings' were; greatly reduced. 42 Four other
miners, ',' JosephPrezonka·, Harry Chikatky, Dimetro Uhyran, and
WasylPyrch,.allegedth.at,they had.bailed or pumped water
for lengthy periods ,of time wlthlit.tle or no rem'Uneration. 43
Frank. Newsome , '.·mine manag~r" stated that the· company paid
twenty-five cents per .tankofwater in the entries but not
in the rooms.
There has not. be.en very muc.h trouble [with water in the
roomsJ. but we were always paying more money for our
rooms, more money per ton ,for the rooms than any other
mine. Clnd inconsequence we figured they were being
40l:bid., 154.
41Ibid.. 272-73.
42IbId., X, 77-78 •
4)Ibid •• 102-15. bassim.
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paid for the water in the rooms. 44
The question of payment for removal of clay falls,
timbering, and assisting trackmen also had a bearing on
miners' earnings. The mine operators stated that payment
for cleaning up clay falls was granted only if it could be
proved the fall was not the result of a miner's negligence
or carelessness. Harris, however, claimed that at Bienfait
Mines remuneration was completely dependent upon the gener....
osity of the pit boss. 4.5 And Charles Brooks alleged that
he and his partner worked three days clearing a fall at
Eastern Collieries without pay even though they were in no
way responsible for the collapse. 46 Replying to the many
charges that no payment was made for timbering, the operators
argued that it was part and parcel of a miner's job and con-
sequently was included in the tonnage rate for mining coal. 47
Although the mines employed trackmen, many complaints of loss
of time (and pay) in helping the trackmen also arose.
According to Choma, on many occasions a trackman said "come
on and get the rails," and both men would set off in search
of some tracks. 48 The operators took the position that while
the miners were not expected to help lay track, it was to
their benefit to do so to prevent additional time loss by
44Ibid., 122.
45Ibid., I, 27.
46Leader-post (Regina), October 14, 1931, p. 2.
47wylie Commission, Proceedings, V, 273 and X, 155.
48 Ibid ., V, 158.
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waiting for the trackmen to complete laying in their area. 49
It is obvious from reading the evidence that considerable
confusion existed in the minds of the miners as to their
duties and responsibilities in helping the trackmen.
Equally clear is the fact that owing to poor planning and'
organization the miners lost an unnecessary amount of time
helping to locate and lay the tracks. An easy solution
would have been to have the trackmen work in pairs.
Fines and penalties were yet further factors reducing
miners' incomes and further sources of discontent and com-
plaint. The most contentious issue concerned fines levied
\
for livestock running at large on company property. Anyone
wanting to keep a few head of cattle signed an agreement
with the mine for grazing privileges; if an animal was found
outside the pasture, a fine was extracted from the owner.
Wilson claimed that only repeated offenders were fined, 50
but one individual was assessed $7.00 for allowing his cow
to run at large when actually the fence was down and the
animal escaped. 51 Another employee was fined $5.00 for
standing in the wrong place in a mine when a trip was passing
out, although there was no evidence of the man having been
warned or a ruleposted. 52 Lastly, according to William
Stalene, he had an $8.00 fine removed from his pay envelope
49 Ib id., 280-81.
50Ibid., VII, 58.
51Wylie Commission, Report, p. 56.
52Ibid •
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for a cave-in for which he was not responsible. 53
The cost of and service under the medical plan was
another cause of dissatisfaction. In 1918 a program was
instituted whereby each miner had $1.25 deducted from his
monthly pay to cover medical attendance for himself and his
family and all prescribed drugs. The plan also entitled
participating families to reduced rates for maternity cases,
x-rays, and specialists' services. 54 Although some miners
reported receiving satisfactory care under the plan, many
others complained of having to wait several days for the
doctor to render his services. Dr. James F. Creighton of
\
Estevan, the participating physician, explained the delay
in his appearance as being a result of the miners' own
failure to report to the mine office where a book was kept
listing the names of those requiring attention for minor
health complaints. This book was kept so that he could
visit all the individuals on his weekly trip to each mine. 55
K. G. John pointed out that arrangements for medical service
had been worked out by the doctor and the men and that
although the mines collected the fee it was immediately
turned over to the doctor--no benefits accrued to the
mines. 56 Although Hesketh's complaint that $1.25 was
53wylie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 215.
wife went to the office crying and Wilson refunded







deducted each month regardless of how much a miner earned"(
sounds rather petty at first glance, it must be remembered
that at times a miner's monthly take home pay did not exceed
$10.00. 58 Some miners undoubtedly regarded this as one more
deduction they could ill afford.
Complaints of non-payment of compensation were also
voiced, Western Dominion Collieries bearing the brunt of the
discontent. Bowman, Brown, and Knutka claimed that they
received no compensation for loss of time owing to injuries
incurred while working in the mine. 59 In addition, A. C. M.
Wilson of Manitoba and Saskatchewan Mines was attacked vocif-
erously by John Locklin whose son was denied compensation.
Locklin stated that when faced with paying compensation,
Wilson "will try and laugh you out of it, if he cannot beat
you that way then he will try and swear it out of you. ,,60
The only other complaint associated with wages con-
cerned the frequency of paydays. More than 350 persons
signed a petition requesting payment of wages every second
week. 61 Peter Dzuba believed that if the men were paid
57Ibid., . II, 88.
58Although the Commission records do not contain
detailed payroll statements, a few of the sample due bills
filed as exhibits indicate that some miners' accounts were
in the red while others took home less than $10.00 of their
gross monthly earnings. Wylie Commission, Exhibits,
Nos. C-7 and -70, 0-15, and M-4, -5, -6, and -7.
59Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 78-122, passim.
60 Ibid ., VI, 257.
61 Wyl ie Commission, Exhibits, No. M-12,
twice instead of once a month credit problems would decrease
and employees would be able to take advantage of reduced
prices at various stores. 62 Freeman, however, stated that
this demand could not be met because coal was marketed on a
and 1929 a miner's average annual income in Alberta and
British Columbia exceeded the Saskatchewan average by almost
50 per cent. (See Table 3.1 for a comparison of the average
price of coal per ton, wage per ton, and earnings in the
coal industry in the three western province s.) h1oreover, in
the early years of the depression the economic position of
Saskatchewan coal miners worsened considerably. Average
annual earnings declined almost 21 per cent from $947.00 in
1929 to $751.00 in 1931. (See Table 3.2 for a comparison of
average earnings of the province's miners, 1929-1931.) The
cost of living index meanwhile fell by only ten points,
62Wy1ie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 136.
63 Ib id., 479-80.
TABLE 3.1
AVERAGE PRICES, WAGES, AND EARNINGS, 1921-1929 (DOLLARS)
British
Columbia Alberta Saskatchewan
Price per ton 4.50 3.62 1.93
Wage per ton produced 2.88 2.05 1.11
Wage per man per diem 5.38 6.34 4.58 \J\0
Wage per man per year 1413.00 1461.00 976.00
Source: Saskatchewan, Royal Commission, Estevan-Bienfait Mining
Dispute, 1931, Exhibits, No. c-16.
TABLE 3.2
AVERAGE EARNINGS OF SASKATCHEWAN COAL MINERS, 1929-1931
1929 1930 1931
Average Number
561of Wage Earners 529 538
Average Number
of Days Worked 225 205 196
Total Wages ($) 530,391.00 449,669.00 404,432.00
Average Daily Wage ($) 4.21 4.15 3.83
Average Annual Wage ($) 947.00 851.00 751.00
Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, "Coal Statistics for




from 100 to ninety.64 Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising that the reductions of 1930 and 1931 produced
widespread discontent among those affected. Nor is it any
wonder that, together with reduced opportunities for sup-
plementary income and other matters pertaining to take-home
pay, they tended to precipitate a reaction on the part of
labour.
64Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion
Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940),1, 144.
C~P~R IV
WHERE NOT TO WORK OR LIVE
While dissatisfaction concerning take-home pay was
a major factor precipitating the Estevan strike, widespread
discontent among miners and their dependents respecting
working and living conditions in general was also an under-
lying cause. Just what these conditions were, at first
glance, is not always altogether clear. Both management
and labour were guilty of exaggeration regarding them. For
example, J. R. Brodie, vice-president of Bienfait Mines,
stated that basically working conditions "are very excel-
lent."! Miners, on the other hand, complained bitterly of
having to work in deep water and breathe unwholesome air,
of hazardous haulage ways, of inadequate first aid facilities,
of poor and overcrowded housing, and about company stores
and pilferage of the mail. Nevertheless, no great amount of
evidence has to be examined before reaching the conclusion
that conditions' were quite deplorable.
Complaints by miners regarding non-payment for water
removal indicated that in some mines, particularly Crescent
and Eastern Collieries, working conditions were less than
ideal. Employees from these mines told of working months--
!Wylie Commission, Proceedings, II, 4.
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even years--in one to two feet of water. 2 Evidence suggests
that the southern section of Crescent Collieries, where
mining went on every day, should not have been worked at all
without substantial progress being made toward overcoming the
problems created by water seeping into the mine. 3 Working
in wet places was not only hazardous but also necessitated
extra expenses for the men. Rubber boots cost $5.00 and
rotted in only a few months, slickers cost $4.00, and con-
siderable amounts of blasting powder also purchased by the
miners were rendered ineffectual. 4
Dissatisfaction concerning ventilation in some of
the mines was also prevalent. This was particularly so at
Western Dominion Collieries. In the mine's eastern district
smoke from blasting hung in the air for long periods of time
because of inadequate equipment for removing it. Poor ven-
tilation was also the product of other factors as well.
Company practice of turning the ventilating fan off during
the noon hour resulted in the quality of air in the mine
being unsatisfactory for several hours afterwards. When
questioned concerning the matter, S. W. Holley, mine manager,
claimed that the fan was supposed to be operated during the
mid-day break but that the fireman was unwilling to supervise
2Ib id., V, 88 and 217 and X, 83-115, passim.
3Dan Moar later reported that this district of the
mine was not being worked. 'He was to observe that the prob-
lem of water was being overcome; as a result of the strike
steps were finally being taken to alleviate the situation.
Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 24-28.
4Ibid ., V, 169 and X, 84.
5S
it. Of the fireman, he stated. "the only reason we keep
him in the mine, although he does things contrary to my
instructions, [is because] he has been there 25 years, and
we hate to fire him for it. u5 Holley's statement suggests
that at times concern for employees determined the actions
of management. While this may have been true in some cases,
it certainly was not in all. For example, in one instance,
a cave-in was permitted to block an air passage in the mine
for at least six months. 6
Ventilation at Bienfait Mines and Crescent Collieries
was also inadequate and there, too, powder fumes remained in
the air for several hours after blasting,? Because mined-
out rooms were improperly bratticed, black damp8 as well was
said to be a problem. Although Dr. Creighton was to state
that he could not recall a single case, in all his years of
being associated with the mines, of any disease directly
attributable to working in them,9 several miners claimed
they had become seriously ill from breathing foul air,
That something could have been done to rectify the
ventilation problem was abundantly clear. Prior to Freeman's
company taking over National Mines, discontent with similar
5Ibid., VIII, 228.
6 Ibid., 14.
7Ibid., I, 45 and X, 32.
8Black damp is a term used to indicate the presence
of foul air caused by an excess of carbon dioxide and a
shortage of oxygen.
9Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 200.
conditions there had existed. However, it had been elimi-
nated when the new firm replaced small, ineffective surface
equipment with a large fan and fan house underground. 10 In
addition, the quality of air at Eastern Collieries and
Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal was also evidently satis-
factory.
The condition of haulage ways and man-ways in some
mines also created discontent. Uninsulated wires carrying
250 volts were in use at Bienfait Mines and Crescent
Collieries. 11 This serious hazard was apparently a necessary
evil. Contact wires on the electric trolleys had to be con-
nected to bare wires. But the same was not true of other
dangerous conditions. According to Alex Peattie, at Crescent
Collieries mud was at times right up to the knees on the
haulage road. 12 Proper provision for removal of water would
have prevented such a state of affairs. In addition, Crescent
and all other mines except National failed to provide a suf-
ficient number of man-holes and did not keep these refuge
places whitewashed and free of trash as they should have. 13
This failure to provide proper places of safety greatly
increased the possibilities of injury and even death from
blasting and from trips passing along the haulage way.
Western Dominion Collieries in particular also often failed
10 Ib id., VIII, 448.
11 Ibid., V, 24 and Wylie Comrnissio'n, Report, p. 81.
12Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 73.
13Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-21.
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to replace rotten timbers with the result that instances of
sections of the roof caving in were frequent, On one occasion
such a fall endangered the life of more than one miner,14
Much of the dissatisfaction and numerous complaints
at Eastern Collieries and Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal
centered around the danger inherent in not having a wall
separating the man-way into the mine from the hoisting
shaft. 1S A partition between these two areas would eliminate
the possibility of serious injury from large lumps of coal
falling from the basket onto the ladder. Miners at the
latter mine also resented the company's policy of locking
the entrance door to the man-way while the mine was hoisting.
On one occasion the men came up to the surface at noon only
to find the door locked. Because those at the bottom were
unaware of this, too many men ascended the ladder, Had a
rung given way near the top, several miners undoubtedly
would have been injured. 16 Hesketh, in commenting on the
man-ways in these mines, also pointed out the danger in the
steps being slippery or littered. He stated it was particu-
larly dangerous when blasting powder was transported in and
14wylie Commission, Report, p. 70,
15Ibid~, np. 33 and 45.
16wylie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 92 and 107.
In a letter to Edward Pierce, Inspector of Mines, dated
February 17, 1930, Wilson stated the door was locked for
purposes of safety and ventilation. This policy was insti-
tuted because miners arriving late frequently failed to
close the door after entering the mine. Wylie Commission,
EXhibits, No. 0-32.
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out of the mine each day.17
National Mine's slogan of "Safety First, Safety
Always" was undoubtedly a factor in the relative absence of
dissatisfaction with working conditions there. This mine
posted a notice to its employees stating that management
wished to avoid accidents: "men protect themselves and
confer a favour on the company by reporting to the mine
foreman any dangerous places or defects in the mine. ,,18 It
is interesting to note that this was the only mine in which
there was evidently no contravention of The Mines Act. 19
The majority of mines also failed to make adequate
\
provision for first aid for employees--a further cause of
discontent. Most of them had a first aid kit and a trained
first aid'man above ground, but not one had such supplies
or personnel below the surface. According to Holley, even
having a first aid kit readily accessible presented a prob-
lem: "The trouble is that if it was left there open for
anyone to use, inside of two days there wouldn't be anything
in the kit. You have to have it locked up.,,20 But such a
problem, even if genuine, cannot excuse the operators.
Trained personnei and adequate first aid equipment should
have been provided in view of the many dangers inherent in
coal mining in general and in these mines in particular.
17Wylie Commission, Proceedings, II, 80.
18Ibid ., XI, 13.
19Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-21.
20Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 235.
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When working conditions in the Souris coalfield are
examined in the light of The Mines Act, numerous grievances
voiced by labour are substantiated. The report of an
inspection undertaken by Robert J. Lee, a consulting mining
engineer and former Dominion Mines Inspector, indicated that
all but one mine were guilty of contravention of certain
regulations contained in the Act. 21 Manitoba and Saskatchewan
Coal and Eastern Collieries failed to abide by the provisions
of Section 13 which stated:
1. Every seam which is being worked shall have at least
two shafts or outlets, affording means of ingress and
egress to the persons employed therein;
2. Such shafts or outlets shall be separated by natural
strata of not less than thirty feet, and there shall be
a communicating passage between them of not less than
four feet wide and four feet high;
3. Proper and sufficient appliances, by means of which
persons can be raised or lowered, shall be kept con-
stantly available for use at each of said shafts or out-
lets. 22
In addition to the former mine, Western Dominion Collieries,
Crescent Collieries and Bienfait Mines contravened General
Rules 5 and 7 of Section 38 which provided:
5. (1) Where inflammable gas has been found within the
preceding twelve months, a pit boss shall, immediately
before work is commenced in any part of the mine, so far
as is reasonably practicable, inspect with a safety lamp
that part of the mine and the roadways leading thereto
where workmen are employed, and shall make a true report
of its condition as regards ventilation. No workman
shall go to work in such part until it and the roadway
leading thereto are reported safe.
21Wylie Commission, EXhibits, No. C-21.
22Saskatchewan, Revised Statutes, 1230 (Regina:
King's Printer, 1930), Chapter 222.
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(2) Where one shift of workmen is employed during any
twenty-four hours, such inspection shall be made once
for every such period, and where two shifts are employed,
once for every twelve hours.
(3) Where inflammable gas has not been found within the
preceding twelve months a pit boss shall once in every
twenty-four hours, immediately before the time for com-
mencing work in any part of the mine, make an inspection
and report with regard to that part similar to the
inspection and report provided for in subclause (1) of
this regulation, and no workman shall go to work in such
part until it and the roadways leading thereto are
reported safe.
(4) Every such report shall be entered forthwith in a
book to be kept at the mine for the purpose, and where
so recorded shall be signed by the pit boss or other
competent person.
7. There shall be a station or stations at the entrance
of a mine, or to different parts thereof, as the case
may require, and a workman shall not pass beyond any such
station until the mine beyond the same has been inspected
and declared safe. 23
Eastern Collieries and the latter three mines also violated
General Rule 13 which stated:
(1) In every road on which both persons and vehicles
travel underground, whether the vehicles are self-acting
or driven by mechanical or manual power or by an animal,
there shall be, not more than twenty yards apart, suf-
ficient manholes or places of refuge.
(2) Every manhole or place of refuge shall be at least
three feet in depth between the sides of the cars run-
ning on the plane or road and the back of the manhole,
three feet in, width and five feet in height or the height
of the seam, but in any case not less than four feet.
(4) Every manhole or place of refuge shall be white-
washed and constantly kept clean, and no person shall 24
place anything therein so as to prevent access thereto.
Eastern Collieries also violated General Rule 20.




depth and not exempted in writing by an inspector, be
provided with guides and proper means of signalling
distinctly from the bottom to the surface and from the
surface to the bottom, and from the surface to every
entrance for the time being in work, and from such
entrance to the surface. 25
Finally, Eastern Collieries and Bienfait Mines contravened
General Rule 36:
It shall be the duty of every person employed in a mine
to report immediately to the manager or pit boss any
defect or danger known to him in any part of the mine. 26
This violation will be discussed in the following chapter
which investigates management's response to labour's com-
plaints.
This prevalent contravention of The Mines Act places
responsibility for the poor working conditions in these mines
squarely upon management and government. The Act placed
definite responslbiYities on the operators. And the govern-
ment in passing the Act had assumed responsibility for its
enforcement. It had made mine owners liable to a penalty
not exceeding $100.00 for each offence under the Act and
additional fines of $10.00 to $100.00 per diem if contraven-
tions continued after notification of the offence by a mine
inspector. 27 Se9tion 33 of The Mines Act further stated:
Where the offence, in the opinion of the court, was
committed wilfully by the personal act, default or
negligence of the accused, and was one reasonably cal-
culated to endanger the safety of, or cause serious
bodily injury to, persons employed in or about the mine,






court is also of the 0p1n10n that a pecuniary penalty
will not meet the circumstances of the case, shall be
liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour for
a period not exceeding three months. 28
However, establishing the precise responsibility of each
party for these unsatisfactory working conditions is a
complicated task. Little can be proved--much can be con-
jectured. That operators of deep seam mines repeatedly con-
travened the provisions of The Mines Act is obvious and
totally indefensible. Yet they were not prosecuted. Why?
At first glance it would appear that the provincial govern-
ment was guilty of failing to enforce its own legislation.
Indeed Samuel A. Lee, an inspector, stated that in the thirty
years he had been around these mines The Mines Act had never
been completely enforced. 29 But was the government aware of
the contravention of the regulations respecting coal mining?
It may be that it was not. The Department of Railways,
Labour and Industries employed inspectors whose duty it was
to examine these mines and to report any violations of the
regulations to the proper authorities--the operators and the
government. But the inspectors evidently did not perform
their duties as. they should have.
Shortly after the new Conservative government took
office in 1929, Edward Pierce was dismissed from his position
as Inspector of Mines in the Souris coalfield after serving
28 Ibid •
29Wy1ie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 41.
nine years and was replaced by Samuel A. Lee. 3D During the
period May, 1930 to August, 19)1 Lee inspected the deep seam
mines every six weeks on the average. The departmental
inspection form he completed contained his observations on
general conditions in each mine in his inspectorate, Of the
smaller mines inspected, many were found to be in "fair" or
"poor" condition and a number of repairs were ordered, How-
ever, this was certainly not so in the case of the large
mines. Lee's report of an inspection of Crescent Collieries
undertaken on August 18, 19)1 is representative of his














On the other hand, between November, 1931 and January, 1932
(after the strike and riot had occurred) he inspected each
of the deep seam mines at least once and each was ordered
to initiate certain repairs--replace broken timbers, create
additional refuge holes and whitewash them, or repair air
passages.J2
30AS , Saskatchewan, Public Service Commission,
G. 55 (8), List of Appointments, Dismissals and Resignations
between Sept. 1, 1929 and June 1, 1930,
31Wy1ie Commission, EXhibits, No. C-18.
32AS, Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources
(Hereinafter referred to as DNR), Coal Administration Branch,
Mine Inspection Files.
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It is incomprehensible how a thorough inspection
system could fail to detect and report certain unsatis-
factory conditions, in existence for some time, in each of
these mines. Yet it would seem they were neither detected
nor reported. Why? The format of the form used in reporting
on an inspection provides one clue--it was much too general
and made little or no provision for a detailed statement on
any point. In reference to this, a Royal Commissioner was
to state: "For example, the space of one line, alloted in
the form for a report on ventilation, which the inspector
invariably reports as being 'Good,' seems to me inadequate
in view of the evidence. ,,33 The form was definitely unsat-
isfactory and -should have been revised so as to encompass
more specifi.c information. Under the heading "Ventilation,"
provision could have been made for a detailed statement
including the quantity of air entering the mine and at the
working face, number of men and animals working in the mine,
condition of air passages, location of the fan and length of
time it was operated, and any other matters affecting venti-
lation coming under notice of the inspector or required by
the regulations 'governing coal mining. 34 For this deficiency
the government was at fault. The onus is on government to
ensure that any inspection form used by one of its depart-
ments or agencies provides for adequate reporting.
But does this mean the government must assume the
33Wylie Commission, Report, p. 126.
34Ibid •
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bulk of responsibility? Not necessarily. In order to
qualify as a mines inspector an individual had to hold a
mine manager's certificate which indicated he possessed a
minimum of five years experience in the underground opera-
tions of a mine. This certificate also proved he had suc-
cessfully completed an examination testing his knowledge of
the provisions of The Mines Act. Although Lee's qualifica-
tions cannot be disputed,35 his pre-strike investigation
reports are most suspect. It is inconceivable that condi-
tions as recounted in his early reports could suddenly
deteriorate while the mines were closed by a labour dispute.
It is equally difficult to accept the fact that not one deep
seam mine required a single repair during a fifteen month
period when repairs ordered between November, 1931 and
January, 1932 were so numerous. Was Lee accepting pay-offs
from the operators to overlook certain required improvements
which would in turn necessitate additional expenditures?
Given the straitened financial status of these mines, the
possibility exists. On the other hand, Lee may simply have
been biased toward the operators. He had been part owner of
a small mine during the 1920's. Consequently, it is quite
possible that personal background alone accounted for the
inconsistencies in his inspection reports prior and subse-
quent to the strike. Whatever the case, responsibility for
35Samuel A. Lee was granted a Pit Boss Certificate
on July 3, 1918 and a Mine Manager's Certificate on July 15,
1919. DNR, Coal Administration Branch, Index of Mines,
Miners' Certificates, Mine Managers' Certificates, and Pit
Boss's Certificates.
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conditions lies very heavily on the inspector and the
operators. The government can' scarcely be blamed for not
prosecuting violations of The Mines Act when it was not
informed of them.
If working conditions in the Souris coalfield were
bad, living conditions were worse. With few exceptions the
miners and their families living in company houses existed
amid sordid surroundings. Annie Baryluk, sixteen year old
daughter of a miner at Bienfait Mines, described conditions
which were quite general when she stated:
One bedroom, two beds in there, dining room, no beds in
there~ kitchen, one bed, and eleven in the family. • • •
I think we need a bigger place than that. When it is
raining the rain comes in the kitchen. There is only
one ply of paper, cardboard paper nailed to about two
inch wood board. • • • It is all coming down and cracked.
• • . When the weather is frosty, when you wakeup in
the morning you cannot walk on the floor because it is
all full of snow, right around the room. 36
Alice Robinson, wife of a Bienfait Mines employee, stated
that the reason families lived in these hovels rather than
in the village of Bienfait was that by living in a mine
house a miner was recognized as a permanent employee and
consequently guaranteed work. 37
Of the 113 houses and bachelor shacks inspected by
Thomas Douglas. District Sanitary Officer, in November, 1931,
fifty-three were reported cold, forty-three leaky, fifty-two
dirty, twenty-five overcrowded, and almost all in need of
repair. Shower facilities for the miners were provided by
36wylie Commission, Proceedings, III, 77-78.
37 Ibid., 74.
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only two mines, Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal and National
Mines. Bienfait Mines kept its camp free from garbage and
rubble and Crescent Collieries provided refuse removal semi-
annually. The remaining four companies made no provision
for sanitation. 38
William Peattie's description of the boarding house
at Crescent Collieries was also not atypical. He stated
that it must have been built with green lumber that had
dried leaving large cracks in the walls and that regardless
of the size of fire built it was always cold in the winter-
time. Peattie added that he would not have wanted an animal
to live in the lice-ridden place. 39 Douglas' inspection
collaborated Peattie's statement, and he recommended that
the mine owners undertake more careful supervision of their
respective boarding houses to ensure they did not become
overcrowded and unsanitary.40
An inspection of residences not the property of the
mining companies presented an equally grim picture of the
conditions under which the miners lived. Although Douglas
found the village surroundings superior to those at the
mining camps, of ' the twenty-five miners' residences in
Bienfait inspected he reported five cold, eleven overcrowded,
38Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No, c-26.
39Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 96.
40Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No, c-26. Douglas was
to report that the per diem rate at the boarding house had
been reduced from $1,05 to ninety-five cents during the Wylie
Commission enquiry.
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eleven dirty, and three infected with bed bugs,41 The
squatters' settlements which had grown up in the east and
west valleys of Western Dominion Collieries' property he
branded "a menace to community health" which should not be
allowed to continue. The twenty-four shacks in the valleys
were poorly lighted and ventilated, dirty and with a bad
odor, and extremely overcrowded. Cattle roamed the property
at will and refuse was scattered about unfenced wells,42 It
was this area which was most frequently described by the
newspapers carrying accounts of the squalor and filth in
which the miners of the Souris field lived.
Establishing responsibility for these deplorable
living conditions is both a frustrating and difficult task,
Numerous miners themselves were partly at fault. They were
obviously not sufficiently concerned even to bother with
keeping their own homes and yards clean and tidy. The mine
owners likewise were in part responsible. Despite their
straitened financial position, they should have been able to
undertake certain repairs and improvements. Leaking roofs
could have been mended, installing storm windows and doors
would have provided additional warmth, storm windows and
doors and shower facilities would have made keeping the
houses clean a more facile task, and sanitary measures could
have been adopted to create healthier and more pleasant sur-




to have taken any positive action. He apparently sought to
prevent overcrowding--a renter signed a contract with
Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal which stated no roomers or
boarders could be taken into a company house without express
written permission from the mine office. 43 But whether or
not this provision was abided by or enforced is uncertain.
In the final analysis, government at both the pro-
vincial and municipal level must assume a substantial portion
ot the blame for the living conditions which preva~led in
these mining camps. The Public Health Act contained specific
provisions respecting boarding houses and sanitation. Regu-
.
lations governing boarding houses established spacfe, light,
ventilation, bedding, water and food, and sanitatiion require-
ments. Any infringement of the regulations carried a penalty
of not less than $5.00 or more than $100.00 for each offence. 44
Regulations governing sanitary conditions were equally spe-
cifio. They prohibited creating, committing or maintaining
a nuisance, provided for the removal or abatement of any
nuisance, established principles governing the condition of
dwellings and outside closets, and regulated water supplies.
Infringement of these provisions made the defaulter liable
to a penalty of a minimum of $5.00 and a maximum of $100.00
Regina: King's Printer, 1930), pp. )-12.
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for each offence,45
Provincial legislation also empowered towns, vil-
lages, and rural municipalities to make bylaws providing for
the health of the area, prevention and spread of communicable
diseases, and establishing and maintaining a system for the
collection, removal, and disposal of garbage and other
refuse. 46 In addition, legislation providing for the estab-
lishment of full time health districts also existed, having
been enacted in May, 1928. It empowered the government to
organize health districts by designating the municipalities
to be included within them and provided for the appointment
,
of a qualified medical practitioner as medical health
officer. one or more sanitary inspectors, one or more trained
nurses, and a secretary, who were to devote their time to the
promotion of the health and sanitation of the district. 47
The participating municipalities were to assume 50 per cent
of all expenses incurred, the remainder being shared equally
by the provincial government and the Rockefeller Foundation.
The Town of Estevan and the Rural Municipalities of
Coalfields and Estevan, falling in Health District No.3,
(one of the districts which became at least partly
45AS, Saskatchewan, Department of Public Health,
Regulations Governing Sanitation {Regina. King's Printer,
19301, pp. 3-12.




operative)48 entered into separate agreements with Doctors
Creighton, Millions, and Fairbairn whereby these physicians
contracted to fulfill the duties of medical health officer. 49
Although the minutes of the respective councils are not
clear on the matter, it would seem that the participating
physicians presented only brief, verbal reports on their
inspections. References to these investigations appear only
infrequently in the minutes of the council meetings. Estevan,
Bienfait, and the two rural municipalities also appointed
sanitary inspectors in accordance with the provisions of
The Public Health Act. 50 That inspections relating to health
and sanitation were carried out in Health District No. J is
evident from department annual reports. However, they are
not specific, they merely record the number of inspections
undertaken each year.
Municipal authorities, then, took steps to fulfill
48Eight rural municipalities, one town, and fifteen
villages combined to form an experimental health district
with Gravelbourg as its headquarters. The drought and
depression, however, forced the provincial government to
curtail certain expenditures and in 1929 Grave1bourg Health
District No. 1 was abandoned as a pilot project for the
establishment ot a rural health services scheme.
Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural
Life, Report No.4, "Rural Roads and Local Goverr~ent"
(Regina. Queen's Printer, 1955), p. 153.
49Estevan, Council Minutes, March 2), 1931, p. I,
R. M. of Coalfields, Council Minutes, July 8, 1931, p. 1;
and R. M. of Estevan, Council Minutes, January 5, 1931, p. 1.
In each instance, these were the dates of new contracts
superseding those which were probably initiated in 1928 but
no record of this exists.
50AS , Saskatchewan, Department of Municipal Affairs,
Financial Statements.
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thelrresponsibllities under the existing legislation.
health officers and sanitary inspectors were appointed.
inspections were performed and reported to the various
councils, and the councils in turn reported these findings
to provincial authorities. Nevertheless, the evidence
clearly indicates that regulations governing health and
sanitation were not enforced,especially in the mining camps.
Why? One possible reason appears in a report of the Health
and Sanitation Committee to the Estevan Town Council. The
Committee observed that a Mr. storey was not living up to
the scavenging contract he had entered into with the Town. 51
Perhaps other contracts were not properly fulfilled. In any
event, there is nO evidence to indicate that the mining
camps had ever been inspected prior to Douglas' investiga-
tion. Had an inspector reported upon the deplorable condi-
tions in these camps, surely the authorities would have
issued directives to have all contraventions of The Public
Health Act rectified at once. The absence of such directives
from the responsible authorities would indicate that either
municipal or provincial officers failed to perform their
duties. If indeed inspections were not carried out, the
responsible municipal government was at fault either for
failing to provide for such inspections or, as in the case
ot Storey, for not enforcing the articles of an agreement
relating to health and sanitation. If, on the other hand,
1nspections were duly performed and reported, the provincial
•
51Estevan, Council Minutes, March 2, 1931, p. 3.
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government can justly be accused of failing to adhere to
legislation providing for the inspection of the camps and
enforcing regulations ensuring the inhabitants satisfactory
living conditions. 52
Any discussion of discontent among employees arising
from working or living conditions in the Souris coalfield
would be incomplete without reference being made to the
stores operated by Western Dominion Collieries and Manitoba
and Saskatchewan Coal, In respect to these stores, mine
operators informed their employees that patronage was pre- vr'
'requisite to continued operation. 53 Compulsion was not
I
implicit in the assertion, but was it implied? In the case
of the Manitoba and Saskatchewan store it may have been.
The manager of the company repeatedly denied ever having
told mine employees they had to deal at the firm's store,54
and two members of a men's committee at the mine professed
no knowledge of compulsory purchasing. 55 Likewise, William
Davis, a company employee, said that while he dealt at the
52Whatever the case, conditions apparently "improved
after 1931, Reporting on an inspection of the area in July,
1932, the sanit~ry inspector observed that improvements had
taken place with respect to the sanitary conditions under
which the mine employees lived. The report also indicated
that the number of inspections undertaken -in 1932 exceeded
those of the previous year by more than 60 per cent.
Saskatchewan, Department of Public Health, Annual Report,
.!.2..JZ. (Regina. King's Printer, 1933), pp. 25-)0.
53Wylie Commission, Report, p. 50.
• 54wylie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 370 and VII, 8
and 50.
55Wylie Commission, Report, p. 49.
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store he was not compelled to do.so. 56 On the other hand,
Steve Lazue stated that he was afraid to deal anywhere else
because Wilson had warned him he would be fired if he did
so.57 And William Paulovitch claimed that he had been fired
for purchasing eggs from another source and reinstated only
after he promised to deal exclusively at the company store,58
Several Manitoba and Saskatchewan employees also
told of having resorted to smuggling articles purchased
elsewhere into the camp after dark. 59 To have adopted such
a course of action suggests that they too may have believed
that future employment and patronage of the company store
I
went hand in hand. But was that really the case? Edward
Edwardson, who served as night watchman at the gate, main-
tained that he never checked people returning to camp for
possession of "s~uggled" gOods. 60 Wilson meanwhile claimed
that the purpose of stationing a man at the gate was not to
prevent the practice but rather to prevent pedlars from
'tdumping" goods in the camp, In April, 1929 he had posted
a notice prohibiting pedlars from plying their trade on
company premises. At that time he permitted a Mrs, A,
Molyneaux to distribute mllk,61 but less than a year later





Jo 59 Ibid 163-68 and Regina Daily star, October 24,
1931. _'t
60Wy1ie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 316.
61Wy1ie Commission, EXhibits, No, 0-90,
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she too was barred.
All employees are forbidden to purchase anything from
Mrs. A. Molyneaux while peddling around the mine. Any-
one doing so will be disobeying the wishes of the
Management ••• and will be inviting trouble for them-
selves•••• Management has decided that it is not in
the best interests of the Company to allow Mrs. Molyneaux
to peddle aroqnd the Mine, furthermore, are determined
to stop same. 62
Employees of both mines further charged that prices
at the company stores were exorbitant. Procop Gemby stated
that the Western Dominion store sold cornflakes at eight
boxes for $1.00 whereas Estevan merchants offered twelve for
the same price. 63 George Wilkinson and J. Brown maintained
that the, prices of miners' supplies were ten to sixty cents
higher at the same store than elsewhere. 64 W. Bonchall said
that the Manitoba and Saskatchewan store charged twenty
cents per pound for meat when it was only fifteen cents in
Estevan stores and ten cents from local farmers. 65 And
Fred Booth recalled paying $3.00 for 100 pounds of flour at
that store and only $2,25 in Bienfait,66 Stan Long, mean-
while, a former Manitoba and Saskatchewan storekeeper, denied
that prices were exorbitant, maintaining that they were in
line with those charged by Bienfait and Estevan merchants. 67
62 Ibid ., No. M-8,
6Jwylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 170.





Both S. J, Wildfong, former storekeeper, and A. C. M. Wilson,
mine manager at Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal, claimed that
an annual sales volume of $35,000.00 resulted in a profit of
about $1,700.00 or 5 per cent, excluding any charge for
rent, taxation, depreciation, utilities, insurance, or
freightage. 68 J. C. Thompson estimated that had the store
been operated by a private merchant, annual profits would
have been in the order of $5,000.00 to $6,000.00. 69 Reported
profits at the other mine were higher. For the year ending
April 30, 1931 the Western Dominion general store cleared
$4,717.00 on sales of $40,608.8970 and the mine supply store
$621,63 ~n sales of $6,304.72. 71
Other complaints concerning the stores were also
heard from time to time only to turn out to be unjustified.
For example, Peter Boruk alleged that errors in his store
bills totalling $33.20 were never rectified. 72 His claim
was proven falser corrections had been made the following
month in each instance. 73
Associated with complaints concerning the stores
themselves were others concerning tampering with the mail
at the post office operated in the Manitoba and Saskatchewan
53.
68~., 308-09 and 369.
69Ibid., IX, 4.
70Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. 0-42.
71Ibid., No. 0-45.
72Wyl ie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 88-91.
73~., 300-02 and Wylie Commission, Report, pp. 52-
77
store, Boruk alleged that he had received a parcel which
had been opened. 74 The charge was denied by three company
clerks15 and could not be proven.?6 Nevertheless, it
resulted in mail service at the store being discontinued.??
Some years earlier a company clerk had been convicted of
tampering with the mail. 78
On the basis of such conflicting and inconclusive
evidence, not a great deal can be said with certainty con-
cerning the stores, That their prices were higher than
elsewhere is apparent. An enquiry into their operation was
to reach that conclusion and was to lead to prices being
1
somewhat reduced.?9 But to suggest that management sought
to exploit employees by charging exorbitant prices would
probably be an overstatement. The enquiry concluded that
high prices were the result of failure by storekeepers to
make the necessary adjustments to bring their prices into
line with those of merchants in neighbouring communities. 80
Likewise to conclude that employees as a whole were obliged
to buy goods in company stores at those prices would seem
to be unwarranted. In the case of Manitoba and Saskatchewan,
74wy lie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 207.
75Ibid., 296, 299, and 326.
76Wylie Commission, Report, p. 52.
77Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 379.




management evidently made definite efforts to restrict the
sources open to employees purchasing goods and, where some
individual employees were concerned, may have gone further.
A number of employees at this mine obviously believed
management would take action against them if they purchased
outside the camp. Beyond that, however, one can only spec-
ulate.
From the foregoing evidence, it is clearly apparent
that the plight of the miners and their families was not a
happy one. Those men fortunate enough to be employed,
worked a minimum of ten hours per day under quite deplorable
I
conditions for a very meagre wage. Many owed their soul to
the company store while others were denied even the opportu-
nity of buying on credit. Families lived under conditions
which were, for the most part, equally deplorable. And
although little can be said conclusively regarding recrea-
tional facilities, it can only be assumed that they, like
many other amenities of life, were unavailable to these
people. Hence, it is not at all surprising that grievances
concerning living and working conditions arose and persisted,
strengthening the mine employees' resolution to answer the
call to strike when the order went out.
CHA.PTER V
STRIKE ACTION IS TAKEN
To the underlying causes of the Estevan strike must
be added three factors which ultimately precipitated the
walkout in early September, 1931. First was the absence
of any recognized procedure for dealing with complaints or
disputes between labour and management owing to a lack of
organization within the mines and the absence of any repre-
.
sentative committee with· authority to speak for the miners.
Second was the demand of union officials that the operators
recognize the Mine Workers' Union of Canada as a condition
precedent to any negotiations for settling the dispute and
the refusal of the operators to accord such recognition.
And third was the antagonistic attitude of the president of
the MWUC, James Sloan, to a conciliation board.
The absence of a grievance mechanism placed the
miners in an extremely difficult position. Because they
lacked organization the men felt helpless in any situation
necessitating an approach to management for redress. Experi-
ence extending over several years indicated that any form of
remonstrance or even enquiry regarding wages or working con-




tools and get out."t Hesketh stated that nobody ever
requested the appointment of a checkweighman at Bienfait
Mines "because they know they would be told it was none of
their business. ,,2 The magnitude of this fear of dismissal
for complaining about conditions was to be emphasized during
a Royal Commission enquiry when Harris requested protection
against any friction or discrimination resulting from the
miners' testimony.3
Several miners alleged that blacklisting was another
technique management employed in handling labour grievances.
Hesketh stated. "If a man started to make a complaint, he
,
was kicked out and sometimes blacklisted. • • • If he was an
old man he knew to keep his mouth shut. ,,4 Wilbur Enmark, an
employee at Eastern Collieries, cl~imed that when he pro-
j
tested the amount of compensation received as a result of an
injury suffered in a mine accident, Pierce, mine manager,
told him he had better take what he was getting or he would
get "a damned sight less." During the ensuing argument
Pierce reportedly saidl "I will chase you out of the
l This p~ase, with only slight variations, was
evidently popular with the officers of most of these mines.
Harris and Hesketh testified to its use at Bienfait Mines
(Wylie Commission, Proceedings, I, 72 and 95), Moar at
Crescent Collieries (ibid., X, 35 and XI, 168). and Billis
and Brooks at Eastern Collieries (ibid., V, 122 and 135).
2Ibid., I, 95. Section 27 of The Mines Act provided
for the appointment of a checkweigher.
3Ibid, , VI, 51,
4Ibid ., II, 103.
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country, tl5 Enmark went on to say that after being without
work for a year R. J. Hassard hired him, saying: "I am
going to give you a job, but Mr. Pierce asked me not to
give you one. ,,6 When questioned about the matter, Pierce
maintained that Enmark had blacklisted himself everywhere
owing to his inability as a miner and had refused the amount
of compensation offered--lOO per cent of his earnings--
because his earnings were so small.? Joseph Benbridge and
K. G. John, on.the other hand, firmly denied that manage-
ment practiced blacklisting. Benbridge, mine manager at
Bienfait Mines, stated that he was never ordered not to hire
a miner because he had been fired by another company and
that he had never blacklisted an individual. John meanwhile
claimed he knew of no instance of blacklisting as charged by
the miners. S Although the miners' testimony cannot be
accepted as conclusive proof that blacklisting was practiced
in the Souris field, its prevalence throughout the entire
coal industry would tend to lend credence to their assertions.
Several miners also alleged that they were subjected
to abusive language by employers whenever a grievance was
voiced. Mike Mikac, a shovel operator at Manitoba and Sas-
katchewan Coal, reported that when he complained of not being
credited with four hours overtime the pit boss, Edward
5Ibid •• V, 124.
6Ibid •• II, 155.
7Ibid .• V, 277-78.
8Ibid ., IV, 14-15 and V, 73.
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Anderson, said "GOD DAMN YOU, you are lucky you get one
hour."9 John Billis testified that the pit boss at Eastern
Collieries cursed his men constantly, Kushnerus acknowledged
that he used "rough language," but only to obtain results,
not to silence complaints. 10 Although profanity exists in
many working situations, this excessive verbal abuse was
indicative of the treatment these miners received at the
hands of their employers, a treatment hardly designed to
foster good employer-employee relations.
Under circumstances such as the foregoing, it is not
surprising that the thoughts of miners in the Souris field
turned to unionization. Evidence of this is sketchy, but
there is no question that they took up the subject during
the recession which followed World War I. It is highly
probable that they then requested the newly formed One Big
Union (CBU)11 to organize them and thereby improve their
bargaining position when seeking improved wages and
9Ibid., VI, 147.
10~., V, 101 and VI, 23.
l1Convinoed of the utter futility of separate action
on the part of workers organized along craft lines, which it
alleged enhanced the relative position of the master class
and promoted division within the ranks of labour, the OBU
sought a more unified organization which would consolidate
labour by organization along industrial lines. By organiz-
ing all the workers in a given industry, regardless of their
trades, into a single union and by placing control in the
hands of locally organized unions, the OBU expected that by
virtue of their industrial strength the workers would be
better prepared to enforce any demands they considered
essential to their maintenance and well being. D. C. Masters,
The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1950), pp. VIII and 18 and Winnipeg Tribune, April 5,
1919, p. 8.
conditions. In any case, in 1920 the OBU assumed responsi~
bilityfor doing so, and an organizer from Calgary, P. M.
Christophers. arrived in Bienfait on June )0, 1920 to
organize a local branch of the union. But little was achieved;
even a mass meeting of the miners in the district failed to
materializes
[Christophers] had been taken away in a high-powered
car Saturday evening [July )rd] about midnight, run to
the borderline, and then and there told in plain language
that if he attempted to return to Canada or was seen
here he would be given a real reception which would
start with tar and feathers.12
The matter was quickly taken up by the police,
whereupon seven men were arrested and charged with kidnapping.
These included Sam Dryden, president of the Estevan Branch
of the Great War Veterans' Association, Corporal George
-
Hunter of the Saskatchewan Provincial Police (SPP), Tom Jones,
Amos Gough. James Clarke, Tom Munroe, and Ray Thompson. 1)
But only one ot them was to be penalized in any way by
authorities for the alleged crime. The case against Jones,
Thompson, Dryden, and Gough was dismissed at the preliminary
trial. After hearing eight prosecution witnesses and delib-
erating for halt an hour, the jury returned a verdict of
"not guilty" in the case of Hunter, Clarke, and Munroe
because "the evidence did not bear out the charge of
12AS, Papers of W. M. Martin, Official Report of
Proceedings at Trial of Those Alleged to be Concerned in the
Kidnapping of One P. M. Christophers, p. 35342 •
...
lJlbid., p. 35340 and Morning Leader (Regina),
August 10. 1920, p. 9.
84
kidnapping.,,14 The Commissioner of the SPP disagreed with
the verdict but believed he could do little about it except
to have Corporal Hunter suspended from the force. In his
annual report, he was to state I
It was felt on the part of the Crown that there was
sufficient evidence to justify a conviction of three
of the accused men, at any rate, but the state of the
popular mind brought about by a variety of causes was
such as to make the securing of a conviction exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible. 15
The Commissioner probably believed than any new jury
which might be selected. to hear an appeal would sympathize
with the accused rather than a man in the position of
Christophers and consequently reach a similar verdict. The
DBU to which Christophers belonged was widely regarded as a
Communist dominated, revolutionary movement, and the "red
scare" which followed World War I had not yet run its course.
He may also have believed that the public was generally
anti-union as a result of the wave of strikes which had
swept the nation in the immediate post-war period, and that
Saskatchewan was especially anti-OBD because the OBD had
been considered at least in part responsible for a number of
sympathy strike~ which occurred in the province at the time
of the Winnipeg general strike of 1919 and because it was
at the moment actively seeking new members in the province.
Indeed, the Commissioner may have believed that even the
14Morning Leader (Regina), October 13, 1920, p. 9.
Also see ibid •• August 19. 1920, p. 9.
15AS, Saskatchewan, Attorney General, Saskatchewan
Provincial Police Annual Reports, 1920.
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presence of union members on another jury might not aid in
securing a conviction owing to divisions within the labour
movement resulting from the creation of the OBU. 16 Hence,
he decided to let the matter drop.
One question immediately arises in connection with
the Christophers affair. Were the mine operators in any way
implicated in the actions of the "vigilante committee"?
They probably were. What did the alleged participants them-
selves stand to gain? Nothing other than possible twenty-
five year prison terms. Hence it is quite possible that
they performed this "removal" at the behest of another party,
the operators. The Inspector of the Weyburn detachment of
the Provincial Police stated that a mine manager "has taken
the stand against allowing any OBD men to work at any of the
mines, in fact there are no union men employed at any of the
mines."l? The very fact that some fifty miners at Western
Dominion and Crescent Collieries were laid off for allegedly
paying membership fees to the OBU also indicated a definite
16W• J. C. Cherwinski, "The Formative Years of the
Trade Union Movement in Saskatchewan, 1905--1920 U (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Sa.skatoon, 1966),
pp. 180-206, ;gassim, discusses in considerable detail the
reactions of labour bodies, the press, and the public to the
Winnipeg general strike, sympathy strikes which occurred in
Saskatchewan, and the OBU. He states that together, the
Winnipeg confrontation and the OBU "bred a feeling of sus-
picion • • • among both the rank-and-file unionist and the
public at large" (p. 202) and that as a result of this "dis-
rupting influence of the first magni tude II (p .. 206), the
battle lines between advocates of industrial and craft
unionism were clearly drawn.
17Attorney General, Saskatchewan Provincial Police
Divisional Reports, 1920.
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commitment to the principle of non-unionization. 18 It is
difficu1t to deny the charge of "A Worker It that "agents of
the mine operators took the organizer out of his home" and
spirited him away.19 The operators certainly stood to gain
by Christophers t removal.
After the abortive attempt at unionization in 1920,
Souris miners apparently refrained from taking further
action along these lines for a number of years; at least
research has failed to uncover any concerted effort to
establish a union until the early thirties. At the latter
time, according to Dan Moar, after dissatisfaction and
unrest had permeated the field for several months, workers
took steps to organize. 20
In setting out anew to organize a union the miners
evidently commenced by making representations to various
labour bodies. However, such a procedure proved unprodUC-
tive. During the early summer of 1931 several attempts were
made to secure an organizer. The matter was brought to the
attention of various labour leaders in Saskatchewan, but
"apparently no action was taken by Trade Unions affiliated
with either the 'Dominion Trades and Labour Congress or the
All Canadian Congress [of LaborJ.,,21 On one occasion a
18Morning Leader (Regina), July 7, 1920, p. 18.
19Western Miner (Lethbridge), September 8, 1931, p. 1.
20Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 167.
21Estevan Strike File, T. M. Molloy to M. A.
MacPherson, October 2, 1931.
87
group of miners also approached M. J. McGrath, a mine
inspector, and asked him to locate and send a union organizer
to the district. This request too was unavailing. McGrath
later asserted. "That is entirely outside the jurisdiction
of the department and we paid no attention to the request
at all ...22
Having failed in their efforts to obtain the co-
operation and assistance of either provincial labour leaders
or the Anderson government, the miners undertook to form
their own organization. During July and August, 1931, men
from the various mines in the field met secretly to discuss
the situation and to devise some form of local organization.
In early August "men's committees" were formed at each of
the larger mines. In addition, a "mines committee" was
established with John Loughran as acting president and
Bernard Winn as vice-president. This committee consisted of
twenty-eight members, twenty-five representing the employees
of the six deep seam mines and three representing those
miners employed at the smaller mines in the district. 23
Upon the formation of this committee, a letter was directed
to the Workers' Unity League of Canada requesting that an
organizer be sent to the district. The League despatched
Martin Forkin who counselled the men to join a mine union
and after several meetings the miners agreed to approach the
MWUC. Upon request, the latter forwarded the requisite
22Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 14.
23Ibid., XI, 165-66 and 243.
88
books and membership cards and organization of a local got
under way.24
The MWUC had been born a few years earlier in what
might be described as a revolt by Alberta miners against
international labour leaders. Alleging that the District 18
officials of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) "act-
ing on instructions from the International at Indianapolis"
had failed their membership in a critical hour by refusing
to take action against several Alberta coal operators who
had abrogated contracts with the UNrWA "by locking out their
employees and starving the men into a large wage reduction,"
a substantial body of miners seceded from the union and,
after organizing into independent groups, signed separate
contracts with the operators, At a meeting held in Blairmore,
Alberta on June 1, 1925, delegates from these independent
groups or unions established the ~~UC.25 The new union
affiliated with the All-Canadian Congress of Labor (AGCL) in
1927 shortly after the latter~s formation but withdrew a few
years later,26 its membership perhaps believing that the
ACCL was growing too conservative. In C?ny case, i.n 1930
Workers' Unity League adherents began endeavouring to have
the MWUC become one of that body's affiliates, and a resolu-
tion favouring the step was passed by the MWUC executive.
24Canadian Miner (Calgary), October 12, 1931, P. J,
and Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 165-66.
25Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Organization
in Canada. 1925 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1926), pp. 179-80,
26Ibid ., 1927, pp. 43-50, and 1930, p, 13.
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Then on May 11, 1931 the MWUC membership voted 1,727 to 641
in favour of affiliating with the WUL. Affiliation resulted
from the radical element gaining control of the IVIWUC execu-
tive in 1930 when James Sloan succeeded in ousting the
moderate Frank Wheatley and replacing him as president. 27
Even before the local branch of the MHUC was fully
organized, Loughran, Winn, and associates faced their first
test of strength and enjoyed their first taste of· victory
over an employer. Perhaps this event facilitated organiza-
tion of the union by demonstrating the value of unity,
strengthened the miners for the greater confrontation which
was soon to follow, and increased their confidence as to its
outcome. If it did, it may to some extent have helped bring
on the September strike, Be that as it may, the organizers
of the mines committee were evidently determined to be as
strong as possible when they presented their demands to the
operators for better wages and conditions. For this purpose,
it would appear that they charged certain individuals with
responsibility for organizing those men referred to as
"foreign workers" at the various mines. This brought action
from management. On August 21 John Adams was fired by
Crescent Collieries for organizing the mine's foreign
employees. A flurry of activity on the part of the mines
committee executive followed. It met with the Crescent men's
committee and workers and then despatched a delegation to
Frank Newsome, mine manager, to demand the man's reinstatement.
27Ibid., 1930, pp. 17, 165-66 and 1931, p. 174.
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Newsome refused to comply. Nor, while acknowledging that
Adams was a capable miner, would he give any reason for
dismissing him. Faced with such a response, the executive
called upon Crescent employees to walk off the job, a pro-
cedure which proved much more effective. After a strike
lasting two and a half days, Newsome capitulated and rein-
stated Adams and the men resumed work. 28
In the last week of August, under such propitious
circumstances, organization of the union went rapidly forward,
During the,week both Sam Scarlett and James Sloan appeared
on the scene to help with organization and were greeted with
enthusiasm by miners and their families, Scarlett, an
organizer for the WUL in Saskatoon, addressed a crowd of
some 1,200 people attending a picnic at Taylorton arranged
by the mines committee on August 23,29 Sloan arrived from
Calgary two days later and after conferring with the men's
committees at the various mines arranged a meeting attended
by more than 1,000 people at Estevan that evening, The
Estevan Mercury duly reported the event.
At a public meeting in the Town Hall aUditorium last
night it was stated by the Dominion president, Jas. Sloan
of Calgary, that the Mine Workers" Union of Canada had
succeeded in obtaining a 100% sign up of mine employees
of the Coalfields, and now had a total membership of
more than 600 here and at Bienfait. The local provi-
sional executive committee of the Union will meet tonight
to draw up demands which will be presented to the coal
operators of the field, seeking better wages and working
conditions, If it is necessary for members of the Union
to go on strike to gain their objective, Sloan said,
28Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 168-69.
29Western Miner (Lethbridge), September 8, 1931, p. 1.
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they will receive the support in their action of the
Workers' Unity League of Canada and of the Red Inter-
national of Soviet Russia, with which they are directly
affiliated, ;'There will be nothing unreasonable in our
demands,' Sloan said, "but if ,we can't get them we may
have to take united action.~JO
With the formation of'a branoh of the MWUC in the
Souris coalfield, a crisis arose which culminated in the
September 8 walkout. The operators of the large mines
adamantly refused to recognize the new organization as a
body with, constituted authority to negotiate on behalf of
the miners. The miners were equally adamant in their refusal
to negotiate independently' of their union. When requested
by the union to attend a joint meeting of all operators and
miners'representativesinthe Estevan Town Hall at 8:00 P,M.
on September; for the purpose of reaching 'an agreement on
hours of work, wages, and living conditions, only the
operators of six smaller mines complied. The operators of
the deep seam mines stated.
We will not meet you [Sloan] or any representative of
an org~iization such as yours which, by your own state-
ment, boasts a direct connection with the 'entire
Workers' Unity League and the Red Internationale of
Soviet Russia,')1
The operators' contention that the WUL, the Canadian
Section of the Red Internationale of Labour Unions, was a
Communist organization cannot be denied. James Bryson, a
MWUCorganlzer appealing a vagrancy conviction before
JUdge Ousley of Moose Jaw in December, 1931, denied that the
)OEstevanMercury, August 27, 1931, p. I,
J1Ibid., September 10,1931, p. 1.
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WUL and consequently the union was connected or affiliated
with the Communist Party of Canada (CCP). He stated that
the party was a political organization while the League was
an economic industrial organization. Bryson testifiedl
there is no connection that I know of, except by the
fact that members of the Communist Party would work in
those organizations and their policy would be carried
out. The policy they would propagate by voting of the
rank and file. That is the only way in which they
could be connected.J2
But the connection of the CCP with the WUL was much
less subtle than Bryson's testimony indicates. The avowed
purpose of the League wass
To organize the Canadian workers into powerful revolu-
tionary industrial unions, created on the axis of the
widest rank and file control; to fight for the defence
and improvement of the conditions of the working class,
mobilizing and organizing Canadian workers for the
final overthrow of ca.pitalism and for the establishment
of a Revolutionary Workers' Government.JJ
Moreover, in a letter written under the Communist Party
letterhead, one C. Marriott referred to the need of
aestablishing closer W.U.L. contacts throughout the district
(Moose Jaw-Regina]," to Forkin being placed in charge of a
COP sub-district bureau, to Forkin being sent to Estevan to
assist the stri~ing miners, and finallY,to a Young Communist
League organizer being sent to Bienfait for the same
32AS, Estevan Judicial District, File of documents
relating to the trial of Anne Buller (Hereinafter referred
to as Anne Buller File), Transcript of evidence in connec-
tion with the cross-examination of James Bryson, Estevan
District Court, December 2, 1931, p. Ja.
33Department of Labour, Labour Organization in
Canada. 1931 (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1932), p. 164.
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purpose. 34
Despite the revolutionary nature and Communist con-
nections of the WUL, the operators' refusal to recognize the
MWUC for that reason is highly suspect and scarcely defen-
sible, Would they have been any more willing to recognize
unionists with Liberal or Conservative connections? The
evidence indicates they would not, George Brown, a miner
at Western Dominion Collieries, asserted that when he was
engaged in securing members for the men's committee at this
mine, Holley warned him. "if you don't layoff the Union
stuff, Mr, Morfit will make it pretty hard for you, ,,35• • •
I
A Bienfait resident, writing to the Honorable H. H. Stevens,
stated. "Mr" Morfit supposedly representing the Operators
is an out and out opponent of any kind of organization for
the men, whether it has red affiliation or not. , • ,"36 In
addition,' the Estevan Town Council observed that "the atti-
tude of the operators towards the right of the men to form
a Union was hostile and should be changed,,,3? Obviously,
anti-unionism not anti-Communism prompted the mine operators
to deny the new organization recognition.
J4Es~evan Strike File, C. Marriott to Tom McEwan,
August 7. 1931 (copy). The date of this letter should have
read September 7. 1931 and addressee Torn Ewen.
35Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 106-07.
36public Archives of Canada (Hereinafter referred
to as PAC), Papers of R, B. Bennett, H. H. Stevens to R, B.
Bennett, October 5, 1931, Archive No. 267373. Stevens
enclosed a portion of a letter he had received regarding
the Estevan strike and riot.
37Estevan, Council Minutes, October 5, 1931, p. 2.
The sudden threat of a serious labour dispute in the
Souris coalfields probably came as no great surprise to pro-
vincial authorities. Mine inspectors had been intermittently
reporting to their superiors the existence of considerable
unrest among the miners. Provided officials in the Depart-
ment of Railways, Labour and Industries promptly passed
information on to their minister, the government must have
been aware that trouble was brewing as early as January,
1931. However, for undetermined reasons, they took no action.
Perhaps they were preoccupied with the multitude of other
problems resulting from the depression and drought. Or they
I
may simply have believed existing problems would either be
settled locally as they had been in the past or their settle-
ment facilitated by conditions produced by the depression
itself. When they finally did decide to intervene, the
situation, according to a man who urged them to do so, was
not beyond reconciliation. In alerting the government on
August 27 to the growing threat of a strike and requesting
that efforts be made to head it off, A. Nelson, secretary-
treasurer of Bienfait, wrote.
It is a pity that you cannot come out here at once to
negociate [sic] a peaceful settlement of the trouble,
and save a lot of Relief expence [sic] & trouble. I
dont [sic] think. you would have much trouble in settling
this matter now, but if left till the .real trouble com-
mences I believe your efforts will be unavailing.38
In retrospect, however, it would seem that Nelson was overly
optimistic and government intervention too late. The govern-
38Estevan Strike File,A. Nelson to T. M. Molloy,
August 27, 1931.
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ment began to act only hours before a date for strike action
was set by the union.
In response to the request the Honorable J. A.
Merkley, Minister of Railways, Labour and Industries,
despatched his deputy, T. M. Molloy, to Estevan to investi-
gate the situation. On September 3 Molloy attended the
joint meeting the union had called for the purpose of placing
the miners' complaints before the operators. When the major-
ity ot operators boycotted the meeting, Sloan informed Molloy
that a schedule of terms had been formulated but that its
eontents would be divulged only at a meeting at which all
,
the operators were present and only after they had consented
to recognize the union. 39 Later that same evening Molloy
lnterviewed C. C. Morfit, president of the Coal Operators'
Association, who again stated that his associates unanimously
refused to meet anyone representing the union because of its
Communist connections. The following day a letter' was sent
by Sloan to the mine operators who were absent from the
joint meeting.
I have been instructed by the Executive Committee of
Miners who ~epresent all the mines in this district,
to inform you that another conference will be held in
the Town Hall at Estevan, on September 7th, 1931 for
the purpose of reaching an agreement covering all mines
in this district, and if your company fails to be
represented at this conference on the above mentioned
date, I have been further instructed to inform you that
your employees will cease work on Tuesday morning,
September 8th, 1931.~O
39Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 169.
40Estevan Strike File, James Sloan to S. W. Holley,
September 4, 19J1 (copy).
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On September 4 Molloy held further meetings. He met
with several Estevan citizens and civic officials as well as
with the operators of the deep seam mines and with represent-
atives of the union. Sergeant Mulhall of the Estevan detach-
ment of the RCMP, Mayor Bannatyne, W. J. Perkins, N. L.
McLeod, MLA, and G. A. Calvert, managing director of Inter-
national Clay Products, all expressed considerable sympathy
with the miners' cause but, owing to the revolutionary nature
of the WUL with which the MWUC was affiliated, were opposed
to the union. The operators meanwhile promised they would
meet a committee of the men provided it was composed entirely
of individuals employed at the mines in the Souris coalfield.
Finally, during his interview with union representatives,
Molloy made known the operators' proposition and was assured
that it would be placed before the executive at a meeting
slated for that evening. 41 However, Forkin intimated that
the men would be advised to reject the proposal, giving as
his reason that he and Sloan should be present at all nego-
tiations to insure that any agreement reached would conform
as much as possible to the contract ratified by the Alberta
coal miners. 42 'Molloy interviewed the operators individually
the following day and convened another meeting of the Coal
Operators' Association but evidently made no further progress
toward a settlement. At this meeting the operators reiterated
~ 41 Ibid ., Memorandum dated September 9, 1931 bearing
only T. M. Molloy's initials (Hereinafter referred to as
Memorandum, September 9, 1931).
42Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 2-3.
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their position--they would negotiate with a committee of the
men but would under no circumstances recognize any union or
organization in any way connec.ted with the Red Internationale
of Labour Unions. 43
Merkley and the Honorable J. F. Bryant, Minister of
Public Works, arrived in Estevan.on September 5 with the hope
of bringing the disputants together. They too met with the
operators, but the latter's position on meeting their employees
remained unchanged. Their other. efforts to get negotiations
underway were equally unproductive. They failed to secure a
meeting with the union. The executive informed the ministers
I
that it would consult with them only in the presence of
Sloan, who, at the time, was in Arcola visiting his sister.
Sloan was reached by telephone and agreed to return to
Estevan for a meeting the next day. However, a mechanical
failure with his automobile prevented him from reaching
Estevan until the early hours of September 7. 44 When Sloan
failed to arrive, Merkley and Bryant departed for Regina in
the late evening of the sixth. It would appear that Molloy
also left the area at about the same time, leaving the
disputants as divided as ever as the strike deadline
approached.
With time rapidly running out, Mayor Bannatyne of
Estevan telephoned Molloy in Regina on September 7 to discuss
the advisability of some of the coal operators attending the
43 Ibl-d 3
_'f •
44Ib1- d XI 170_I, , .
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union meeting scheduled for that evening. The deputy minister
agreed it would be a wise policy and Freeman of National
Mines and E. W. Garner, general manager of Truax-Traer,
attended the session. However, since the other operators
again did not appear, they were refused any new information
relative to the miners' grievances and demands. 45 Neverthe-
leas, the meeting was noteworthy; Loughran, the man largely
responsible for the formation of the mines committee, was
removed as president of the local branch of the union. 46
From the time of his arrival, Sloan seems to have maneuvered
himself into a position of completely controlling the local
organization. Loughran was repeatedly to refer to Sloan's
gradually taking over the whole situation by simply edging
out the executive elected by the mines committee, and Winn
was to state I "we had no power whatsoever after Sloan came
in the field. ,,47
One final factor must therefore be taken into con-
sideration in dealing with the immediate causes of the strike--
the antagonistic attitude of Sloan, president of the ~MUC,
towards a board of conciliation which might have served as
an alternative to a strike. Although Molloy had discussed
the invoking of such a board at the September J meeting with
the union,48 he telegraphed Sloan on September 7 and, in
45Estevan Strike File, Memorandum, September 9, 1931.




reference to the impending strike, stated.
Would strongly urge you advise men to observe law in
such matters and that you apply immediately for board
under Industrial Disputes Act for thorough investiga-
tion working conditions and that the men remain at
work pending investigation. 49
The law to which Molloy referred was The Industrial Disputes
lnveetigation Act. 190Z which declared.
It shall be unlawful for any employer to declare or
cause a lockout, or for any employee to go on strike
on account of any dispute prior to or during a reference
of such a dispute to a board under the provisions of
this act.50
Commenting on the telegram from Molloy, Sloan stated.
We are not breaking any laws; we have a right to strike.
As f~r a board of conciliation, our fight is right here
with the operators and here we stjY. That is th~lcourse
the executive committee have [sic decided upon.'
H1s reaction to a somewhat similar suggestion by W. W. Lynd,
an Estevan lawyer, was even more explicit. When informed of
Lynd's call for a conciliation board, Sloan reportedly
replied. "To hell with the lawyers in Estevan, and to hell
with the Conciliation Board, we don't want it and we are not
going to have it. ,,52
49Estevan Strike File, T. M. Molloy to James Sloan,
September 7, 1931.
50Canada, Revised Statutes. 1927 (Ottawas King's
Printer, 1927), p. 2522.
51Estevan Mercury, September 10, 1931, p. 1.
52Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 246. Because
Lynd met with government officials in Regina prior to his
proposing the establishment of a conciliation board to
Loughran, it is possible that the proposal was made at the
government's request. The proposed board was to consist of
a representative of the operators, a miners' representative,
and a chairman acceptable to both parties. The operators
agreed to the proposition and selected Freoman as their
spokesman, the union rejected the proposal. Ibid., 267-70.
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The evidence would tend to indicate that Sloan's
decision to reject conciliation was taken without his having
consulted either the local executive or the membership.53
John Loughran, first president of the local miners' union,
later stated that although Sloan informed the executive of
the request for establishment of a board and explained the
formation and function of conciliation and arbitration
boards and royal commissions, the matter of agreement or
disagreement to any such body was never discussed. 54 Sloan
advised the miners' committee that:
a Conciliation Board would not meet the situation, as
it existed in the Bienfait coal field. Such a Board
would simply commence negotiations, for the purpose of
arriving at some settlement on terms, whereas, the
miners: wanted a thorough investigation of their
grievances • • • a Royal Oommission was the only means
whereby they would have their grievances, and the con-
ditions under which they had worked so long, fully
brought to light.)5
Sloan's assessment of the boards provided under The
Industrial Dieputes Investigation Act was not entirely cor-
rect. Conciliation boards were vested with extensive powers
of investigation, They could inspect books and other per-
tinent documents, employ expert consultants, inspect places
of work,·summon witnesses, and compel the submission of
53According to Maar, no member or official of the
mines committee was made aware of the offer of a concilia-
tion board, "Nor were the miners aware that they were




evidence. 56 However, it cannot be denied that owing to what
might be called a laissez-faire attitude on the part of
federal authorities and to a number of difficulties inherent
in the coal mining industry in Canada the Act had proved
inadequate. Too much emphasis had been placed on conciliation
and too little on compulsion. Administrators of the Act used
sparingly their powers to subpoena witnesses and compel sub-
mission of evidence; they consistently refused to invoke the
penalty clauses. 57
To conclude this discussion, one question remains to
be answered. Where does one place responsibility for the
coming of the strike? A royal commission examining its
causes was to state., "an organization in each mine with a
committee authorized to represent the men in any difference
The management of National Mines made a con-
or complaint
faction." S8
• • • would have removed much of the dissatis-
certed effort to keep in touch with the men, and as a result
this mine received little or no serious criticism from
miners. According to Freeman, a men's committee to deal
with grievances had been established prior to the organiza-
tion created by Loughran and Winne Under this system, com-
plaints were placed before the committee at which time they
56Canada, Revised Statutes. 1927 (ottawa: King's
Printer, 1927), pp. 2518-20.
57B. M. Selekman, Law and Labor Relationsl A StudY
orthe Industrial Dis ute Investi ation Act of Canada
Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Graduate School of
Business Administration, 1936), pp. 9-10.
58Wylie Commission, Report, p. 93.
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were discussed. If it were felt a matter warranted further
consideration, a delegate approached management. Freeman
stated that in many instances grievances were ameliorated
by the committee without ever being referred to the
employer. 59 The operators of the other mines would have
been well-advised to have followed National's example and
established mechanisms whereby labour could legitimately
and easily seek rectification of any grievances. As has
already been shown, their failure to take such steps pre-
vented any form of labour-management dialogue, much to the
detriment of both parties.
The position adopted by the operators regarding
recognition of the MWUC also helped bring on the strike. A
statement issued by the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatch-
ewan Section) is pertinentl
It would be just as logical for the owners to refuse
to negotiate with the men as unionists because they
were Liberals or Conservatives as because they are
Communists•••• If, after a settlement has been
effected on union lines, the owners find that any of
their employees are attempting to foment discontent
among the workers without just cause, and purely in
the interest of a political party, then will be t~8
time to take a stand against them as politicians.
59Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 474.
60Leader-Post (Regina), September 19, 1931, p. 16.
The UFO's support of the miners is not surprising. From its
inception, it had been sympathetic to the cause of labour and
frequently sent fraternal delegates to labour conventions.
Inspired in part by the example of the OBU, the farmers'
organization owed a special debt to labour. When the militant
le:rt-wing political-action group broke with the parent organ-
ization in December, 1930, it organized the Farmers' Unity
League of Canada which was dedicated to the establishment of
a farmer-labour government. Political co-operation between
the two groups was advanced in 1931 when the leaders of the
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Several Alberta coal operators had recognized the union as
a constituted body with the authority to represent miners in
any employer-employee negotiations. Despite its affiliation
with the revolutionary WUL, the MWUC was registered under
The Trade Unions Act. 61 ' It would appear that the anti-union
sentiment of the Saskatchewan operators was at least as
important a consideration in their stand against recognition
as their professed anti-Communist beliefs. Even the offer
ot the Coal Operators' Association to negotiate with a com-
mittee of the men is suspect. The history of labour-management
relations in the Souris coalfield clearly demonstrates that
,
any employee grievance invariably was countered with a dic-
tatorial "if you don't like it, pack your tools and get out."
Can the miners be faulted for rejecting the operators' pro-
posal? Obviously, past experience had taught them a lesson.
It is not inconceivable that the organization of the
Estevan~Bienfaitminers as a branch of the MWUC, an event
which gave operators the opportunity to raise the Communist
issue, could have been avoided, The union's success in
•
fledgling Saskatchewan Independent Labour Party and the
UFC (55) agreed to work together to create a farmer-labour
party with a socialist program. Duff Spafford, t"rhe 'Left-
Wing' 1921-1931," in PQliticB in Saskatchew~, Norman Ward
and Duff Spafford (eds.), (Don Mills. Longmans Canada
Limited, 1968), p. 54 and S. M. Lipsett Agrarian Socialism
(Berkeley, Cal •• University of California Press, 1959),
p. 84.
61 Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, Director of the Corporation Branch to the author,
June 24, 1971. The 'MWUC was registered by a certificate
dated March 19, 1926. This certificate of registry was
cancelled and considered void by the Department of the
Secretary of State on August 22, 1935.
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organizing the men was a victory won only by default. It
was only after their representations to the Trades and Labour
Congress and the. All-Canadian Congress of Labor failed to
produce any results that the miners appealed to the MWUC.
Only the MWUC responded to the request for assistance in
organizing the coal miners, only the I~UC was prepared to
assume the expense of the requisite organizational activities.
Although undoubtedly politically inspired, Norman
McLeod's attack on Merkley during the 1932 budget debate was
not completely unfounded. "the Minister of Labor had been
placed in the House by the labor union, and yet he had not
sent representatives of recognized unions into the field to
assist the men in joining any recognized labor body. ,,62
Given its knowledge of the unrest in the Souris coalfield--
much of it a result of the miners' unorganized status and
consequently weakened bargaining position--the provincial
government acted unwisely, to say the least, in completely
ignoring the miners' request that a union organizer be sent
to the district. McGrath's assertion that taking such a
step was outside the jurlsdiction of the Department of
Railways, Labour and Industries is inconsistent with Molloy's
sUbsequent action with reference to the possibility of secur-
ing an organizer for the shifting of affiliation of the
Estevan branch of the MWUC into another organization.
Writing to Perkins, Molloy statedJ til have discussed this
.""
matter on several occasions with trade union representatives
62Estevan Mercury, February 25, 1932, p. 1.
lOS
in Regina. ,,63 Perhaps a little more concern on the part of
the government at an early date would have obviated organi-
zation as a MWUC local and may even have prevented the
September confrontation. Although two ministers journeyed
to Estevan in hopes of achieving conciliation of the dis-
pute, their pilgrimage came too late and ended too abruptly.
Failing to win an immediate settlement, they deserted in
the "ninth hour"--perhaps to be out of the area when trouble
erupted. Basically, the Saskatchewan government's action in
the whole affair was a case of too little too late.
Nor can Sloan go blameless in the matter. Can he
not legitimately be accused of subordinating the aspirations
of the Souris coal miners to his own aspirations of enhancing
the image of the MWUC as a militant and successful labour
body by insisting that union recognition be a prerequisite
for any form of labour-management negotiation? Was it not
he who insisted that the walkout was indeed legal and that
the "only real method to settle it [the dispute] was by a
strike?,,64 As president of a national union he must have
understood the law governing walkouts. Sloan was obviously
determined to force the struggle to its ultimate conclusion--
a strike: In order to achieve his goal, he had to garner
complete control of the local organization. This he
. 63Estevan Strike File, T. M. Molloy to W. J. Perkins,
December 19, 1931.
64wy lie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 270.
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accomplished by rendering the mines committee executive
totally powerless. Sloan, the Saskatchewan government, and
the Souris coal operators must share responsibility for the
September 8 walkout. '
CHAPTER VI
STRIKE LEADS TO RIOT
When mine operators in the Souris coalfield found
themselves strike-bound on the morning of September 8. they
were not alone in their predicament. The CPR and Inter-
national Clay Products were also experiencing difficulties
with their employees, the majority of them members of the
Lumber and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union which,
,
like the MWUC, was affiliated with the WUL. A 200 man rail-
way construction gang, engaged in laying track on the Neptune
branch to replace a trestle destroyed by a tornado five miles
west of Estevan, had earlier walked off the job to reinforce
a demand for higher wages. On September 7 some forty workers
at the clay plant had also gone on strike when G. A. Calvert
refused to reinstate the thirty-five cent per hour wage rate
which had existed prior to a spring reduction. When seven
employees returned to work. the strikers. assisted by more
than 200 striking miners~ would invade the plant and refuse
to leave the premises until the seven consented to rejoin.
their ranks. 1 The strike, complicated by management's
refusal to recognize the union, would last until September 23
when, following direct negotiations between the employees'
representatives and management, the restoration of the 1930
lEstevan Mercury, September 10, 1931, p. 8.
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wage schedule was conceded. 2
Once the declsion to strike the mines had been taken,
the union executive stated the action would be maintained
I
until $uch time as an agreement with the coal operators for
increased wages and improved working conditions could be
secured. When questioned concerning the possible duration
of the strike, Sloan replied, "we are making preparations
iV'
for a long sF~ge, if it is necessary. ,,3 And a lengthy one
it proved to be. The strike lasted a month, involved a total
time loss of 5.500 working days and affected twenty-two
operators and 600 miners, 200 of whom were employed at the
time. 4
On the day the strike commenced only one mine in the
Souris coalfield was in operation, Because Truax-Traer did
not, employ men underground and its employees were non-union,
it was not directly affected by the work stoppage, Sloan
intimated that the fifty men engaged in stri.pping coal and
laying track there would be allowed to continue working des-
pite the union's call for a 100 per cent walkout. He warned,
however, that there would be trouble if any attemptwere made
to have the men ioad or ship coal,5 The union further stated
it was prepared to permit coal to be shipped to Dominion
2Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette (Ottawa.
King's Printer, 1931), October, 1931, p. 1066,
JEstevan Mercur~, September 10, 1931, p, 8.
4Saskatchewan, Department of Railways, Labour and
Industries, Fourth Anrrual Report (Reginal King's Printer,
1932), p. 7.
5Leader-Post (Regina), September 9, 1931, p, I,
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Electric Power and the Estevan Hospital but would vigorously
oppose any shipments destined for outside rnarkets. 6 Provi-
sion was also made for local supply. Soon after the strike
began, the Leader-Post reported.
After a conference with union organization officials
this morning [September llJ, the owners of the 25 odd
hillside entry mines were told that they could supply
the demand for home consumption, and could also fill
orders for farmers within a radius of 25 miles of
Estevan. If they attempt to ship coal out of town they
will be closed.7
As the strike progressed and the miners began to feel
the effects of suspended pay cheques, appeals were made for
financial and moral support, responses to which were not long
in coming. The Farmers' Unity League of Saskatoon and the
UFC promised full co-operation in soliciting money and food-
stuffs from their members to aid the men in their struggle
for a decent living. 8 The MWUC membership, meeting in
Calgary, voted in favour of telegraphing $600.00 and promised
additional funds when required. The WUL and several unions
in Fort William and Port Arthur also answered the appeals for
financial assistance. 9 Such responses grew in importance
when the Council of the Rural Municipality of Coalfields
voted six to one against granting relief to the striking
miners. 10 Locally, the union arranged an extension of credit
6Western Producer (Saskatoon), September 17, 1931, p. 1.
7Leader-PQst (Regina), September 11, 1931, p. 1.
8Ibid ., September 19, 1931, p. 16 and Star-Phoenix
(Saskatoo~September15, 1931. .
9Leader-Post (Regina), September 15, 1931, p. 16.
10Estevan Mercur¥, September 24, 1931, p. 5.
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with Bienfait merchants which also greatly aided the strikers
during their struggle,11
Despite the gestures of goodwill by the union toward
those in the vicinity of the coalfield who might require
fuel and the sympathetic response to the plight of the
striking miners by workers and others elsewhere, suspicions
quickly arose that the strike might not be altogether peace-
ful, From the outset there was talk of instituting boycotts.
Rumors of possi.ble violence, ranging all the way from bodily
injury to gunpowder plots, were also prevalent. To assist
the two man local detachment in quelling any future disturb-
,
ance, a squad of four .RCMP officers arrived in Estevan from
Regina at noon on September 8,12 Chief McCutcheon of Estevan
also took steps to prevent trouble. He warned union offi-
cials that any further threats to boycott certain local
businessmen for employing non-union workers would elicit
action under The Criminal Code. He also stated that he was
investigating anonymous letters received by non-union
labourers threatening bodily harm if they continued working,l)
As the strike progressed and tension mounted, additional
reinforcements were sent to the strike zone, A dozen HeMP
under the command of Detective Staff-Sergeant Mortimer
arrived and began operating twenty-four hour a day patrols
throughout the district to maintain law and order, In
l1Leader-Post (Regina), September 15, 19)1, p, 16.
12Ibid ., September 9, 1931, p. 1.
13 Ibid " September 12, 1931, p, 8.
---------------_ .. -
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addition the Coal Operators' Association engaged a private
force of thirteen special constables to assist police in
protecting mine property.14
Before long there were even more definite indications
that serious trouble might be in the offing. The strike was
not a week old when the operators intimated that they might
hire new men to operate the mines. Soon afterwards a third
party also thrust itself into the dispute, announcing that
it would recruit 600 men in the Calgary area and move them
to Estevan with the object of breaking the strike, Lewis
McDonald, president of the Canadian Defenders' League,
stated.
Our idea is not to reduce wages, nor encourage any form
of 'scabbery' but mainly to break that strike••••
This is the first official strike of the Red Interna-
tional Labor Unionists, and the Canadian defenders feel
that if they are allowed to get a hold on other coal-
fields, similar strikes will be inevitable. 15
Organized in early 1931, the League allegedly was formed to
fight the spread of Communism and to protect British sub-
jects. McDonald, formerly a leader of the Alberta miners,
telegraphed Morfit offering to supply as many men as were
required to bring the strike to a halt. 16 Referring to
14Regina Daily Star, September 9, 1931. The "precau-
tionary measures" referred to in this account were in fact
the employing of thirteen special constables. See ibid ••
September 13, 1931.
15Ibid., September 15, 1931.
16Leader-Post (Regina), September 19, 1931, P. 1. It
is not clear when, or even if, Morfit received this telegram
or if he made any reply. However, on September 16, the day
following the first announcement of the Defenders' move, coal
operators "expressed total surprise" and stated "they had con-
ducted no negotiations to secure the relief contingent."
Ibid., September 16, 1931, p. 18.
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McDonald as "the biggest scab herder in Canada," Forkin said.
"if he comes to Bienfait he will get what is coming to him.
• • •
II
"You bet he will," said a striker. "He won't go
back," said another. 17 In the end, failure to arrange for
transportation to Estevan prevented the Defenders from
accomplishing their goal.
Faced with the possibility that the Defenders might
invade the strike zone and that the coal operators might
hire local farmers to mine coal at the various mines, union
officials directed telegrams to a number of centers request-
ing that unemployed men be sent to the strike zone to assist
\
the strikers in preventing the owners' use of "scab labour."
Winnipeg was asked to send 1,000 men, Calgary 800, Port
Arthur 500, and Regina and Saskatoon 400 each. 18 Within
hours of receiving an appeal for assistance, Herbert Court,
secretary of the WUL in Regina, dispatched thirty-five men
and promised an additional 200 if they were needed. 19 The
Communist Party headquarters in Regina informed the union
that almost 200 men had signified a willingness to leave for
Estevan at once if their services were required. 20 On
September 18, Forkin stated that he had received assurances
from Winnipeg, Brandon, and Regina that 1,400 unemployed
workers would be sent to the strike zone immediately if
17Ibid. , September 19, 1931, p. 16.
18 Ibid September 16, 1931, p. 1._.,
19Ibid September 18, 1931, p. 22.
-"
20Ibid September 25, 1931, p. 2._.,
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needed to defeat strikebreaking attempts initiated by mine
management. 21
Wednesday, September 16 was a day filled with inci-
dents--with the expectation of violence. That morning two
mines, Eastern Collieries and Western Dominion, resumed
operations and a third, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, appeared
about to do so. In response to the operators' suggestion that
they might hire new men, approximately 500, the majority of
them farm youth~ from the surrounding district, had applied
for employment. Of these, 200 reportedly commenced work at
7:00 A.M., seventy-five having been engaged on a permanent
basis. 22 Their careers as strikebreakers, however, proved
to be of short duration. In addition to placarding many
prairie centers advising labourers to keep away from Estevan
during the deadlock, the strikers heavily picketed the
affected mines. Hundreds of miners assembled at points where
strikebreaking activities were underway, met with the workers,
and demanded that management dismiss them. Almost 500
strikers surrounded the Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal Com-
pany boarding house at Taylorton and forced the hasty depar-
ture of fifteen strikebreakers brought in to operate the
mine. 23 Later the same day "the ghostly shapes of cars and
lorries, each filled with striking miners,,24 descended on
21Estevan Mercury, September 24, 1931, p. 7.
22Leader-Post (Regina), September 16, 1931, p. 18.
23 Ibid ., p. 1.
24Ibid., September 17, 1931, p. 2.
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Western Dominion Collieries where they explained the strike
situation to the imported labourers. Management, no doubt
fearing an outbreak of violence, complied with the miners'
demand that the men be dismissed. 25 A similar episode took
place at the Eastern Collieries mine. 26 Consequently, next
morning the "big six" were again closed down.
Despite the increasing number of law enforcement
personnel in the district, the coal operators were dissatis-
fied. They evidently hoped to obtain not only police pro-
tection but also police assistance in their strikebreaking
activities. At the conclusion of a conference held Sep-
tember 18, they issued the following statement:
The police failed utterly on Wednesday [16J when the
operators attempted to start work in the mines with
other labor. Otherwise the mines would have been work-
ing today. Adequate protection was promised the mining
industry by the authorities in the event of such steps
being taken. This protection was by no means given,
and in the case of the Western Dominion Collieries,
while the mob was still assembled there~ police were
completely withdrawn from the vicinity.~7
A few days later the companies asked the Attorney
General for sufficient police to enable them to resume opera-
tions. In their demand, the coal operators stated:
Information spread over the country by the Communist
movement of deplorable working conditions in this field
is entirely false and the operators will welcome a royal
commission to investigate to the fullest extent working
conditions, wage schedules and all matters relative to
our industries. We are compelled and must resume opera-
tions immediately and very respectfully and very earnestly
25Estevgn Mercury, September 17, 1931, p. 4.
26Leader-Post (Regina), September 16, 1931, P. 18.
27lQig., September 18, 1931, p. 22.
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request that there be provided at once ample police
~orces to protect life and property pending any enquiry
of any kind from any source. It is our right to operate
our plants and it is our right to demand the necessary
police forces to ensure protection to life, property
and the peaceful operation of our industries~2~
Their plea fell on deaf 'ears. The acting Attorney Gener~l,
Honorable Howard McConnell, seemingly of the opinion that
the Saskatchewan government was not responsible for breaking
strikes, stated that the government had been and still was
according the mine owners ample police protection in the
Estevan district coalfield. 29
While the foregoing events were occurring, efforts
to bring about a negotiated settlement of the strike were
also taking place. On September 9 the provincial government
communicated with the Canada Department of Labour and
arranged to have the Chief Conciliation Officer sent to
Estevan. 30 Provincial authorities were evidently of the
belief that the strike could not last long; among other things,
the rise in unemployment resulting from the depression would
force the union to negotiate, at least with certain operators.
As Merkley stated in a telegram to the Honorable G. D.
Robertson, federal Minister of Labour:
unless union prepared to negotiate with fair operators
feel strike will fail because of demands of unemployed
for chance to work prompted by feeling that union not
acting properly in refusing to state its demands and
28 Ib1d ., September 24, 1931, p. 1.
29 Ib id
-'
30Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 5.
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negotiate with those operators who desire to be fair
to workmen, , , ,31
Learning that a conciliation officer would be sent to
Estevan, the Regina Dgily Star like Merkley anticipated an
early settlement. 32 A·few days later the provincial
Attorney General also renewed efforts to have the matters
in dispute referred to a voluntary board of conciliation
composed of representatives from both labour and management,33
The operators were agreeable to the latter procedure, but
hopes for a quick settlement in this manner had already been
dashed when Sloan, on behalf of the miners, refused to have
any partlof it. 34
On the tenth day of the ·strike the Mayor of Estevan
and the Reeve of the Rural Municipality of Coalfields tele-
graphed the federal Department of Labour requesting estab-
lishment of a board under The Industrial Disputes Investiga-
tion Act and recommending that Judge E. R. Wylie of Estevan
be appointed chairman. Their request was met, at least in
part. On September 18 Wylie was appointed Royal Commissioner
by both the federal and provincial government to investigate
and report on the dispute. However, in view of the important
negotiations to be undertaken by M. S. Campbell, Chief Con-
ciliation Officer, which it was hoped would result in a
31Estevan Strike File, J, A, Merkley to G,D,
Robertson, September 9, 1931.
32Regina Daily Star, September 9, 1931,




resumption of work, Wylie was requested to defer his inquiry
pending a report on the mediation proceedings. J5
Campbell arrived in Estevan on September 21 and after
a brief conference with the operators obtained their assur-
ance that if the miners agreed to return to work pending an
investigation they would be re-engaged in their former posi-
tions without discrimination. 36 At a meeting with Campbell
held on September 22, Forkin and Scarlett agreed to waive
recognition of the union and resume work pending the inquiry's
findings, provided certain specific grievances were rectified
by negotiation between the operators and a committee of
,
miners representing each of the mines. The operators agreed
to negotiate and a meeting was scheduled for the following
evening. However, owing to the miners' absence, the confer-
ence failed. On September 24 Moar and Hesketh, adopting a
less compromising position than the union organizers,
informed Campbell that Forkin and Scarlett had no authority
to agree to terms and stated that unless further (unspecified)
concessions were granted by management, the men would remain
on strike. 3? When the operators refused to accede to any
J5~., XI, 188.
36Papers of R. B. Bennett, M. S. Campbell to H. H.
Ward, September 21, 193~, Archive No. 267263.
J7Although as organizers Forkin and Scarlett were
not in a position to negotiate on the miners' behalf, Sloan
was undoubtedly aware of, and consequently concurred with,
their actions. The miners, having learned by bitter
experience the difficulties inherent in not being recognized
as a strong union organization, probably repeated the
demand for recognition by management of the local branch of
the MWUC.
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additional demands, negotiations collapsed and Campbell pro-
ceeded to Regina for a meeting with provincial authorities. 38
Testlfyinglater before the Wylie Commission, Dan
Moar stated that upon his arrival Campbell told the miners'
committee that the Royal Commission could not proceed until
the men resumed work. He quoted Campbell as saying that
"the Government wasn't going to spend money if we wouldn't
go back to work•••• ,,39 When told the men would not do so,
he allegedly said. "if that is your attitude I am through
with you, I leave this morning. ,,40
The provincial government's attempts to avert the
strike failed, the federal government's efforts to arrange
conciliation of the dispute were unavailing. At the outset
it appeared the strike would be of short duration--the
differences between the operators and the men were not so
38Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, p. 1066.
39Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 189. In a
letter to T. M. Molloy dated November 13, 1931, M. S. Campbell
stated. "Not only did I not say that the Royal Commission
would not be proceeded with unless the men returned to work
but my whole argument was based on the advantages of such
Commission in fairness to all concerned." Wylie Commission,
Miscellaneous Documents. No. 13.
40Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 177. T. M.
Molloy, in speaking of the Chief Conciliation Officer's
efforts, stated. ItIt was apparently Mr. Campbell's intention
to have the men return to work•••• " Ibid., X, 5. That
Campbell should place perhaps greater emphasis on a return to
work than on initiating conciliatory proceedings is under-
standable. Although The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act
prohibited employees from striking without first applying for
an investigation of the dispute by a board established under
the Act, it failed to provide for the operation of such a
board once a strike was in progress. Technically a board of
conciliation could be impanelled only if the strikers could
be induced to return to work.
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great that a settlement was impossible. The union offered
to meet management to discuss the men's grievances and nego-
tiate a contract but the operators refused. If the employers
had been dealing fairly with their employees, why would they
not have welcomed a meeting to adjust any differences? They
wanted instead to exclude union leaders from any negotiations,
a procedure employees obviously feared. Surely both levels
of government were negligent in failing to compel concilia-
tion. Once at the bargaining table, a little concession by
the operators to improve the lot of the miners coupled with
a little reasoned consideration by the workers of the peculiar
,
difficulties of the lignite industry would likely have led to
an amicable settlement of the dispute. Conditions brought
about by the depression would have promoted such an outcome.
Instead the situation wa3 allowed to deteriorate into violence
and bloodshed.
On September 28 information was conveyed to Police
Chief McCutcheon that the miners intended to hold a "nuisance
parade" in Estevan the following day. The parade was to be
held for the purpose of dramatizing the miners' plight in
order to gain local support and to advertise a mass meeting
scheduled for the evening of the twenty-ninth in the town
hall at which time Anne Buller, a WUL organizer from Winnipeg,
would address the assembly.41 As no application for a permit
to hold the parade had been made, Mayor Bannatyne called a
special session of the Town Council for the morning of the
41Estevan Mercury, October 8, 1931, p. 8.
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twenty-ninth to discuss it as well as the matter of renting
the hall to the strikers. After brief deliberations, Council
reportedly passed the following resolutionss
That no public demonstration or parade be allowed in
any public place in the Town of Estevan of strikers or
operators; and that the Chief of Police and Inspector
Moorhead be placed in charge to prevent any such demon-
stration or parade.
That in view of the present situation, it is resolved
that the Town Hall shall not be rented to either the
operators or strikers for the purpose of holdi.ng n~Y
public meeting, and that the parties be notified. .
While the meeting was in progress, McCutcheon received
a long distance call from Sloan regarding the proposed parade.
Sloan was informed that Council was in session and that reso-
\
lutions had been adopted prohibiting any demonstration or
meeting within the limits of Estevan. When asked what he
proposed to do about the parade, Sloan stated that he was
not going to commit himself. 43 Shortly after the session
adjourned, Moar, Hesketh, and McLean, members of the mines
committee executive, arrived at the Town Clerk's office to
pay for the rental of the hall on a previous occasion.
McLean was handed a letter informing him of Council's decision
to ban the meeting slated for that evening, and Moar was given
a copy of a telegram which reads liThe Council have resolved
unanimously that no parade be allowed in the Town of Estevan
nor meeting in the Town Hall ... 44
42Anne Buller File, Minutes of Estevan Town Council,
September 29, 1931, p. 1.
43Estevan Mercury, October 8, 1931, p. 8.
44Anne Buller File, A. B. Stuart to Dan Moar,
September 29, 1931.
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After some discussion the committee at Bienfait con-
cluded that while the Council might prohibit a walking parade,
the resolution would not apply to a motor cavalcade. On this
basis organization of the demonstration proceeded. It was
not until the day following the riot that Moar received a
letter confirming the contents of the telegram. The letter,
dated September 29 and postmarked 10.00 P.M" contained an
additional piece of important information--the police would
prevent any parade or demonstration. Testifying later before
the Wylie Commission, Moar was to state that until this
letter had been received neither he nor anyone else was aware
, .
that Council had instructed the police to stop the parades
"Had there been any such knowledge of such an order to the
police, the miners would never have attempted to hold either
a para4e or motor-car procession in Estevan."45
At 1.30 P.M. on the twenty-ninth, some 200 miners,
all of them evidently unaware that they would soon be con-
fronted by the police, assembled in Bienfait intent on motor-
ing to Estevan, accompanied by their wives and children, to
interview Mayor Bannatyne regarding prohibition of the public
meeting scheduled that evening in the town hall. At two
o'clock the group departed for Crescent Collieries, three
miles distant. That mine had been chosen for a rendezvous
and soon cars and lorries bearing strikers and their families
arrived from various points throughout the district. Here
the men boarded lorries, a few of which were draped with
45Wylie Commission, Proceedings, XI, 173.
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Union Jacks, and the women and children entered automobiles
for the seventeen mile journey, The caravan, consisting of
thirty or forty vehicles, extending for a distance of a mile
along the highway, and moving at a speed aptly described as
that of a funeral cortege, then threaded its way through the
idle mining district picking up recruits en route, And as
it approached Estevan. banners proclaiming "We will not work
for starvation wages," "We want houses, not piano boxes" and
"Down with the company stores" were unfurled,46
Meanwhile, in Estevan the police were reportedly
charting strategy to prevent any violation of the Town Council's
,
edict forbidding any parade or demonstration, They are said
to have decided that should any attempt to demonstrate occur,
they would concentrate their forces at the limits of the town
to prevent the striking miners from entering. 47 Reinforce~
menta had arrived intermittently during the strike, and on
the twenty-ninth Inspector Moorhead had forty-seven RCMP under
his command. The police were equipped with thirty rifles
(100 rounds of ammunition per rifle), forty-eight revolvers,
forty-eight riding crops, and four machine guns capable of
firing 300 shots per minute. 48 Rumors were prevalent that
the police also were holding a stock of tear gas bombs in
readiness. 49
46Leader-Post (Regina), September 29, 1931, P. 12
and September 30, 1931, p. 14.
47Ibid., September 29, 1931, P. 12.
48Canadian Lab~r Defender (Toronto), April, 1932, p. 5.
49Leader-Post (Regina), September 28, 1931, p, 8.
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Shortly before 3:00 P.M. 300 to 400 striking miners
plus members of their families reached the outskirts of the
town. The motorcade approached from the east and proceeded
along Fourth Street, the principal thoroughfare, to Souris
Avenue where twenty-two policemen formed a cordon across the
street. (See Map 6.1) A Leader-Post staff reporter describes
the beginning of the police-miner confrontation thus.
The first lorry, bearing about 20 or 30 men, neared the
town hall. In a flash, mounted and town police, about
20 in all, strung a cordon across the street. The lorry
turned down a side street, while the strikers jeered at
the police. More cars followed, and the police rushed
to cut off a possible entry into the city from the new
vantage point. 50
I
Either of two things then seems to have occurred. According
to one account, while the vehicles comprising the motorcade
were in the process of swinging from Fourth onto Souris, one
truck left the procession, raced down Fourth Street, and
broke through the police cordon. 51 Strikers descended from
the truck and led by Martin Day, who shouted: "Come on boys,
come on, give it to them,"52 rushed toward the police. Chief
McCutcheon first attempted to remonstrate with the miners,
telling them the parade had been prohibited. But Day struck
him with a club (if Day ~truck him at all it was probably
wi~h a piece of lathe,./as one account states) and McCutcheon
ordered his arrest. When two policemen seized Day to take
50lQig., September )0, 1931, p. 11.
~ 51 Ibid. , and Estevan Mercury, February 25, 1932, p. 8.
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him to the police station, several strikers interfered and
the battle was on,53
According to the other account, that of the Canadian
Labor Defence League, soon after the miners arrived a
The police attempted to stop the parade and arrest
r~tin Day, on the advice of Chief McCutcheon of
Estevan, having previously incensed the miners by
trying to break the windows of their cars with their
loaded sticks. The miners defended their comrade and
Chief McCutcheon, without any warning, started to shoot,
followed by the Mounties.5~
Regardless of which account of how the riot began is
most accurate, the following reconstruction of events of ' the
next hour or so is common to a number of accounts, though
,
the reliability of witnesses is open to question on certain
points. Striking miners and their women, wielding clubs and
throwing stones, rocks, and other missiles, now reportedly
launched their assault on the police. Hopelessly outnumbered
and unable to halt the advancing crowd with their riding
quirts and batons, the police retreated step by step firing
warning shots above the heads of the crowd and at its feet.
According to the only newspaper reporter at the scene, it
was not until the police, "with blood streaming down their
faces from wounds caused by stones, bricks and sticks, "55
53Ibid., and Estevan Mercury, March ), 1932, p. 5.
54Estevan Strike File, National Executive Committee,
Canadian Labor Defence League, "Protest Against Brutal Murder
of Miners in Estevan, " Also see Leader-Post (Regina),
October 20, 1931, p, 12, -
55Leader-Post (Regina), September 29, 1931, p. 1.
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stood with their backs to the wall of the town hall that
they levelled their weapons and commenced shooting into the
crowd.
At 3:20 P.M., in the midst of the battle, the fire
brigade was called to the scene and despite the missiles
hurled at them succeeded in coupling hoses to a hydrant.
Their intervention, however, proved both unavailing and
tragic. After a brief encounter five miners captured the
equipment and prevented any widespread drenching, while one
striker, armed with an axe, began smashing and chopping at
the engine. He was shot dead on the spot. 56 At approxi-
mately this moment, Inspector Moorhead accompanied by a squad
of about thirty ReMP arrived on the scene from Truax-Traer
where trouble had been expected. The police ~hen took the
offensive and by 4&15 P.M. the mob had been dispersed,
leaving in its wake some wounded, dead, and dying, and
$60,000.00 damage to store fronts, light standards, and the
fire-fighting equipment. 57
The grim toll of the battle consisted of three dead
and twenty-three injured. Nick Hargan, a twenty-five year
old miner from Taylorton, died instantly from a bullet in
the heart; Julian Gryshko, age twenty-six, died of abdominal
bullet wounds. 58 Pete Markunas, a Bienfait miner aged
56Regina Daily Star, October 5, 1931.
571bid., and Papers of H. B. Bennett, T. S. Belcher
to R. B. Bennett, September 30, 1931, Archive No. 267264.
58Leader-Post (Regina), September 30. 1931,p. 1.
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twenty-seven, died in Weyburn General Hospital two days later
as a result of bullet wounds to the abdomen. 59 Eight other
miners, John Forbeg, Louis Revay, Fred Konopachi, Tony
Stankovitch, Metro Kyatick, Steve Aryluk, Mike Pulharuski
and Charles Grigalis sustained bullet wounds, Kyatick and
Pulharuski being shot in the back. Four bystanders, Miss L.
King, Clive Butterworth, Tony Marten, and Ewald Kru~ger, and
RCMP Constable Palmer were also injured by bullets. In addi-
tion, eight RCMP personnel and Police Chief McCutcheon were
injured by weapons wielded and thrown by the strikers. 60
One death, that of Markunas, may have been the result
of sheer callousness. Testifying later before the Wylie Com-
mission. Dr. Creighton stated that he realized there would
be some men wo~nded during the melee so he telephoned his
secretary and instructed her not to allow anyone into the
hospital unless payment was made to the hospital for a week
in advance. The only exceptions were to be men in uniform
"because the government pays the medical expenses of their
61
own people." An astonishing order from a man who had been
collecting $1.25 a month for a number of years from numerous
miners in the area: Moreover, the doctor's orders may have
been adhered to. In an article which appeared in the
59IQid., October 2, 1931, p. 1.
60..I.l2ll., September 30, 1931, p. 1 and October 1, 1931,
pp. 2 and 9, and Canadian Miner (Calgary), October 12, 1931,
p.--l,
61wy1ie Commission, Proceedings, X, 217.
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Canadian Labor Defender, the Reverend A. E. Smith, national
secretary of the Canadian Labor Defence League, wrote I
I was told a story of the wounding and death of one of
the men. Shot through the body in several places, he
was rushed to the hospital in Estevan in a dying condi-
tion. Entrance was refused him. Prior to his appear-
ance at the hospital, which is a private affair conducted
by a Doctor Creighton, a girl comrade had run to the
hospital. 'Come, doctor:' she cried, 'a wounded man is
bleeding to death on the road down here.' She was told
to go to hell, and when she insisted on the attendance
of this doctor, she was thrust out of the office with a
kick. The dying man had to be driven by auto some 57
miles to Weyburn before he could receive any treatment.
He did not last 10ng. b2
The Estevan riot was a tragedy of errors. Although
Council held authority under The Town Act to prohibit the
proposed parade, their decis~on to do so proved most unwise.
Parades and demonstrations designed to dramatize the plight
of miners and acquire support in their fights for improved
wages and working oonditions were common throughout the coal
mining regions of North America. Had Council issued a permit
to the striking miners to demonstrate, it is unlikely that
any violence or loss of life would have resulted. Although
the situation in the Souris coalfield was tense, it would
appear that the town authorities overreacted in banning the
parade.
Nor were the strikers themselves blameless. Several
miners and sympathizers were cognizant of the Council's pro-
hibition of any parade or demonstration. McCutcheon had
62Canadian Labor Defender (Toronto), March, 1932, p. 4.
Since a number of injured miners were admitted to the Estevan
hospital, it is possible that Markunaswas taken to Weyburn
because of the seriousness of his wounds and the crowded con-
dition of the local hospital.
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informed Sloan by telephone and Moar, McLean, and Hesketh
had definitely been made aware of this fact at the town
office. Detective Staff-Sergeant Mortimer of the RCMP
alerted another man, Chester Me Ilvenna, the morning of the
riot. "I hailed him and said 'hello' and stopped him and I
said I suppose you know about the parade being stopped. He
said there was going to be a parade and he said he was going
to be there. ,,63 The union's parade committee obviously dis-
cussed the ban because it concluded that the prohibition
would apply only to a walking parade, not a motor cavalcade.
This rather interesting rationalization indicates that the
strikers were intent on proceeding with the demonstration
regardless of its legality. But were they determined to pro-
ceed under any and all circumstances? Perhaps they were not.
Moar later testified that the parade would not have materi-
alized had the men been aware of the fact that the local
police and the RCMP had been instructed to prevent the
demonstrators from entering the town of Estevan. If what he
said were true, it is indeed unfortunate that the Town Clerk
neglected to include this important piece of information in
either of the communications he handed to Moar and McLean on
the morning of September 29. And it is equally unfortunate
that two of the senior men charged with carrying out the
Council's decision should likewise neglect to mention the
matter when they had occasion to refer to prohibition of the
63Estevan Judicial District (Hereinafter referred to
as EJD), King's Bench (Criminal), King v. Chester McIlvenna
et aI, KB #286.
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area be absent from a place where trouble was expected
strongly enough for plans to be made to meet it at the time
such trouble arose? How could a police cordon be thrown
across a downtown street when existing plans called for it
being placed on the edge of town?
Let us begin by assuming that two statements, each of
which would seem to be true on the basis of existing evidence,
are in fact true. If they are indeed true one should be able
to answer all the above questions. First, Council passed a
resolution prohibiting parades and demonstrations and
instructing the police to enforce the prohibition. Second,
the Town Clerk, McCutcheon,and Mortimer knew the contents
of the resolution, informed parties affected of part of its
contents, and,in the case of McCutcheon and Mortimer, made
plans accordingly and enforced the resolution when required
to do so, Let us now test these statements against certain
questions. Why would the Town Clerk, McCutcheon,and Mortimer
all omit mentioning that the police had orders to prevent any
parade when they had occasion to refer to Council's decision
to forbid it? There are four possible answers. First, they
simply forgot to mention it. That is possible but highly
improbable. It is scarcely conceivable that three men directly
concerned with an important, very recent development should
forget exactly the same detail concerning it. Did they, then,
simply decide it was unnecessary to mention the instructions
to the police? Again such an explanation is possible it
would go without saying that if it were nece se
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coercion to enforce a local government decision, that coercion
would be provided by the police. But neither explanation
enables one to answer the other questions. Take, for example,
the letter to Moar, postmarked 10.00 P.M. confirming the copy
of a telegram handed to him before the riot. If it were
believed necessary to state in a confirming letter that the
police had been instructed to prevent a demonstration, why
was it not deemed necessary to include the information in the
original telegram addressed to Moar? To use a letter to con-
firm something which had not been stated earlier is to adopt
a procedure which places in doubt exactly what had occurred
earlier. It raises the question, was the letter designed to
cover up something? But before examining that possibility,
let us look at the third possible explanation of why none of
the three officials mentioned instructions to the police. Is
it possible that they decided that it would be best not to
mention it? In certain respects that is a very reasonable
suggestion. Authorities in Estevan could simply have said
to themselves, "Why wave a red flag before an already enraged
bull?" Let us not tell the miners about instructions to the
police lest it provoke them into doing things they might
otherwise not do." This explanation has the dual advantage of
explaining both the conduct of the three men and the difference
between the Moar telegram and letter of confirmation. But it
creates more problems than it solves. To begin with, it is a
procedure which might not work. Council minutes are open to
public inspection. Someone could have asked to see the
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minutes and discovered the instructions to the police.
Secondly, it involves a decision which could prove at least
mildly embarrassing--a decision to compose a telegram and a
letter confirming that telegram which would differ rather
significantly in their details. And it raises even more
serious problems. Supposing Estevan authorities reasoned
along these lines, they could not have failed to consider
the question of whether prohibition of the parade would be
followed by a decision on the part of the miners to call it
off or to proceed with it. Suppose they did this at the
meeting and concluded that if they prohibited the proposed
parade. the miners would call it off. Under such circum-
stances, including instructions to the police in the resolu-
tion would have been pointless. On the other hand, if Council
concluded that the miners would likely proceed with the parade
despite a ban, it is possible that instructions to the police
to enforce the decision might be inclUded in the resolution.
On the surface, this seems to be the best explanation of what
occurred in Council. After the meeting, the police would
make plans to enforce the ban. They would have lots of time
to do it. And plan they did, at least so we are told. They
laid plans to halt the miners at the outskirts of town. But
at this point this line of reasoning breaks down. If they
had hours to plan and indeed formulated a plan to stop the
miners at the edge of town, why did the men forming the cordon
dash out at the last minute and spread themselves across a
street in the downtown area where innocent citizens could be
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killed or injured? And if they were expecting trouble seri-
ously enough to plan for it, what on earth was the major
portion of the police doing at Truax-Traer when the antici-
pated trouble broke out?
Since the three approaches so far attempted all lead
to unanswerable questions, let us start anew with a single
basic assumption on the basis of which all questions can be
answered and all developments explained in a logical manner.
Suppose the resolutions purported to have been passed by the
Estevan Town Council on the morning of September 29 were not
precisely the ones which were passed. In other words, sup-
,
pose that on the afternoon or evening of September 29 the
council minutes were altered by the addition of certain words.
Suppose that in the morning Council passed resolutions merely
stating that the parade had been forbidden and that the town
hall would not be rented. The supposition is sensible. That
is all Council needed to do. By refusing the miners the use
of the town hall, the parade would lose much of its meaning;
and by prohibiting the parade, Council had placed itself in
a position to take such steps as might become necessary to
prevent it. It' this is indeed all the resolutions said, all
questions concerning the contents of the letters handed to
Moar and McLean, the telephone conversation between McCutcheon
and Sloan,and the remarks passing between Mortimer and
McIlvenna disappear. The other questions likewise become
explicable. Therefore let us proceed on the assumption.
Evidence suggests that when Council ended its meeting
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no one knew what would occur in the next few hoursl would
the miners cancel their parade; would they attempt to proceed
with it; or would they decide to do something else, perhaps
close down Truax-Traer? In the light of both the evidence
and the events it seems reasonable to conclude that until
early afternoon the authorities believed that serious trouble
if it developed would take place at Truax-Traer rather than
Estevan. Why should they expect trouble in Estevan from
demonstrating miners? A prime purpose of the proposed parade
had been to advertise a meeting which could not now be held
in the Estevan town hall since Council had refused to rent it.
Moorhead therefore kept enough of his forces (60 per cent)
stationed in the vicinity of Truax-Traer to maintain law and
order and left the balance in Estevan with Mortimer just in
case they were needed at some other location. Early in the
afternoon, authorities in Estevan learned that a large number
of miners were forming a motorcade and would be coming to the
community. They could not have known this until sometime in
the afternoon because the miners' decision to do so and to
speak to the mayor about renting the town hall was made in
Bienfait "shortly after the lunch hour. ,,64 Somewhat later a
hurried consultation among authorities in Estevan probably
took place to decide what should be done. And a decision was
made to callout the police to prevent the parade, a decision
which perhaps envisaged stopping the miners on the edge of
town. But the decision came too late. It was likely made
64Leader-post, September )0, 1931, p. 11.
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just as the miners' lorries began reaching the edge of town.
rrhe police could not run fasL enough to set up the ir cordon
on the outskirts so they threw it up at the only place possible
at such a late moment: across a downtown street. What fol-
lowed was tragedy--three miners dead or dying and twenty-
three other persons injured, including four bystanders struck
by bullets.
Viewing the carnage, the authorities like normal indi-
viduals were doubtless horrified and frightened lest they be
regarded as heavily responsible through failure to take neces-
sary steps to head-off violence, especially violence in which
nonparticipants had been struck by flying bullets. Under the
circumstances they might well panic and begin asking what they
could do to make themselves appear as innocent as possible and
thereby place as much blame as possible on the miners. They
could do a number of things, only one of which concerns us at
the moment. The Council minutes could be changed to state
that Council, meeting in the regular manner earlier in the day,
had specifically advised the police to prevent a violation of
its edict. Such a change would be very useful. It would sug-
gest that the Town Council was an alert body of men, making
specific, even if unsuccessful, provisions to safeguard the
lives and property of their citizens. A copy of the altered
resolution could then be mailed to Moar, indicating an intent
by authorities to warn the miners that if they came to Estevan
they would be met by police even though it had to be post-
marked hours after what it was supposed to prevent had ended
13?
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be rejected as impossible. For one thing, it cannot be dis-
proven by the records of Estevan. There is no account of
the meeting of September 29, 1931 in the minute book. All
that remains as a record· of this meeting is what is purported
to be a copy of the minutes filed as an exhibit at the trial
of Anne Buller, a document bearing no notation stating that
it is either the original or a certified copy of the minutes.
At the same time, other details concerning the Estevan riot
tend to increase the plausibility of this theory.
Among other aspects of the riot warranting discussion
are the weapons employed by the strikers during the battle.
Just what' they used is no:ne too clear. ltExhibit A, " intro-
duced at the preliminary trial of the individuals charged
with rioting, consisted of pieces of lead and iron pipe, an
old-fashioned army rifle with a broken butt, and an impressive
assortment of old automobile parts~-gear wheels, pulleys,
axles, shafts, and miscellaneous pieces of metal. Concerning
the exhibit, the Leader-Post commented: "Judging by the size
of some of the weapons, some husky men must have been in the
crowd to wield them, or to throw them any distance. ,,65 The
Reverend A. E. Smith questioned the exhibit's validity more
explicitly:
I have had some conversation with workers about the
notorious 'Exhibit A' which is being used in the case.
This collection consists of pieces of old piping, rods
and old iron, and one old, rusted axe, gathered from a
scrap heap near the scene of the battle after the crowd
had gone. My informant stated that after the massacre,
the police were in a state of panic and began to cast
65Meader-opost (Regina), October 13, 1931, p. 1.
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about for some way out of the hole into which they had
plunged. They turned to the old scrap heap in the
vacant lot. 66
W. H. Heffernan, defence counsel for many of those individuals
charged in connection with the riot, was equally skeptical of
it. During cross-examination, he charged Chief McCutcheon
with having paid a group of youths to go out and collect the
junk whioh constituted the exhibit. McCutcheon denied the
charge, stating that after the riot he had instructed
Constables Band and McKay to gather up any missiles, except
the stones, that had been hurled at the police. 67
"Exhibit AU provokes some interesting questions.
,
First, is it likely that any miner would have transported an
old, broken army rifle to Estevan much less have dared to
throw such an object at the police? Surely any individual
with even a minimal degree of common sense would realize that
his chances of being shot by the nearest police officer were
exceedingly great should he be seen even picking up such a
weapon. Second, what criterion were Band and McKay to employ
in determining which missiles had indeed been thrown at the
police? There is every possibility that some of these 80-
called weapons were dropped, not hurled, or had in fact been
lying in the street for some time.
The ambiguity of an "official" account of the con-
frontation provokes yet another question. Having charged the
66Canadian Labor Defender (Toronto), March, 1932, p. 4.
67Saskatchewan, Court of Appeal (Hereinafter referred
to as SeA), King v. Anne Buller, CA #52. .
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strike leaders with failing to inform the men that the parade
had been prohibited, the Honorable M. A. MacPherson, Attorney
General of Saskatchewan, in an inspired bit of logic, claimed'
"they were fully armed with clubs, missiles and even fire-
arms. ,,68 If they were unaware of the ban, what possible
reason could the strikers have had for departing for Estevan
"fully armed"?
But armed they were, at least at one time or another.
The melee began with the Day-McCutcheon affair, whatever it
was, and none can deny that missiles were hurled by the
demonstrators--stones, brickbats, iron washers, chunks of
metal, and pieces of wood. 69 According to testimony, at least
one of the miners was also armed with a revolver. A bystander
alleged that he had been wounded by a shot fired by a miner. 70
Another eyewitness, Ken More, claimed that the first shot of
the riot was fired by a striker: "I saw one man pull a
revolver out of his pocket and fire directly towards the police
before any shots had been fired by the police .,,71 An HCMP
.officer also attempted to connect one of the miners, Peter
Smarz, with a revolver. What he described, if it were true,
would have occurred rather late in the riot since Inspector
Moorhead was presE~nt. Constable Taylor stated:
68Leader-post (Regina), October 3, 1931, p. 1.
69Ibid September 29-0ctober 1, 1931, passim.
--"
70Ibid September 30, 1931, p. 1.
-"
71EJD King's Bench (Crimina1 ) , King v. Isadore,
Minster et aI, KB #285.
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In company with several other officers under Inspector
Moorhead we proceeded opposite the court house to the
oil pump. He [Smarz] was with several others, there was
a constable in the middle of the road and he shouted
'Seize that man in the black sweater he has a gun.' In
running away he handed something to a woman and he was
arrested as he was boarding a moving car••• ,72
Like so many other things concerning the events of September 29.
these statements by More and Taylor raise a number of questions.
If Smarz in fact had a gun, why did the police not seize it?
Ii' they were able to apprehend Smarz in the next few moments,
why did they not apprehend the woman to whom he was observed
to hand something? If Smarz were in fact seen holding a gun
by a member of the RCMP, why did that officer not testify
when Smarz was subsequently tried? Over a score of people
had been killed or wounded by flying bullets; here was the
sole opportunity for the authorities to establish that some
of the bullets might have come from a gun wielded by a miner.
Yet they failed to do so, The fact that such, a police witness
did not appear at the trial cannot be explained away by his
having been killed in the riot. He simply was not produced
by the prosecution. Nor did More or Taylor make their accu-
sations at the trial of Smarz. Their statements were made
during the trial of four other individuals, Why were they
not required to submit their evidence at Smarz's trial? As
things turned out, the one man among the miners whose name
was associated with a gun was sentenced to merely three months
in prison at hard labour while his "mental capacity" was being
observed.
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As is frequently the case in a confrontation such as
this, the police came in for a considerable amount of criti-
cism. Heffernan accused them of being Itthe aggressors in
the whole affair" and of having "started the riot with their
riding crops. ,,73 The riot began with the attempt to arrest
Day, a move by authorities which resulted in intervention by
his co-workers. It is conceivable that the officers had
already provoked the miners or used more force than was neces-
sary to prevent Day's being freed. If this were in fact the
case, only a thin line separates attacker from defender.
Heffernan also charged that. "Several of the police • . ..
,
were young and inexperienced men who were brought here before
finishing training school, and who had lost control of them-
selves in the fight and had started firing. ,,74 Thirty-four of
the forty-three RCMP constables on strike duty the day of the
riot had less than one year service with the force and twenty-
six were only twenty-two to twenty-five years of age. 75 That
several of these constables had served with the armed forces
either at home or overseas does little to enhance their suita-
bility for riot duty; soldiers are taught to shoot first and
ask questions later. Did this happen in Estevan on "Black
Tuesday"?
More than one policeman giving evidence at the trials
stated that their revolvers were not drawn until they had
Estevan
73Estevap Mercury, March 10, 1932, p. 5.
74Ibid •
75See Appendix I for a list of ReMP stationed at
on September 28-29, 1931.
• • •
their backs to the town hall. 76 John Munroe of the Estevan
fire brigade, however, stated. "They [the police] were
retreating to the Town Hall and firing into the ground.
And Plate I clearly indicates the police had in fact drawn
their revolvers prior to reaching the town hall. At the
time this photograph was taken, the police had retreated
from Souris Avenue down Fourth street to Eleventh Avenue.
It was evidently not until after the fire engine had been
captured and a man shot that the striking miners launched
their final assault on the police and drove them to the wall
of the town hall.
76EJD, King's Bench (Criminal), King v. John Kolenkas
et al, KB #284. See testimony of RCMP Constables Malcolm
Sutherland and John Nash and William McKay of the Estevan
Police.



































THE AFTERMATH. ARRESTS, TRIALS, AND FUNERALS
In the evening after the riot everything was quiet,
but Estevan was like an armed camp. The ReMP, expecting
reprisals from the strikers hourlYJ maintained a ceaseless
vigil throughout the night. The Mounties, reinforced by a
forty-five man contingent rushed from Regina by special
train, patrolled the community and mining sites incessantly.1
\
Sentries were on duty at different points throughout the
town; machine guns were mounted at strategic locations, and
tear gas bombs were held in readiness for any outbreak. 2
The night wa~ filled with rumours that Sloan, Forkin, and
Scarlett had fled Bienfait in a high-powered automobile
headed north and that a large group of Alberta miners were
on their way to Estevan. 3 As further precautions the
Estevan militia, sixty strong, was called out in case its
services were required to maintain law and order4 and
arrangements were made to move the eighty-one members of the
Winnipeg Strathconas to the strike zone if they were
lLeader-Post (Regina), September 30,1931, p. 14.
2.llUJ!., October 1, 1931, p. 9.
3Ibid., October 3, 1931, p. 16.
4Regina Daily Star, October 5, 1931.
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requisitioned by the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. S
In accordance with their belief that Sloan, Forkin,
and Scarlett were being harboured by sympathizers in
Bienfait, sixty RCMP descended upon the village at noon on
the thirtieth. Armed with rifles, revolvers, quirts, and
billies and accompanied by a patrol wagon on which a Lewis
machine gun had been mounted, they surrounded and searched
Boruk's boarding house but failed to find any trace of the
three union officials. A systematic search of several
miners' homes and a tour of the mining camps also failed to
produce any results. 6
Although these three leaders could not be located
immediately, thirteen other men were arrested on charges of
rioting and remanded for trial at a preliminary hearing in
Estevan. The thirteen, R. W. Dixon, Alex Petryk, John
Kolenkas, Joe Leptak, David Rowsen, Isadore Minster, Joseph
Bernatos, Mike Pulharuski, Martin Day, John Gryciuk, Andy
Levie, Peter Smarz, and Metro Uhyran,7 handcuffed and under
heavy police escort, were then entrained for Regina in the
early evening of October 1. Wives, sweethearts, friends,
and children of the men followed the solemn procession to
the railway station to offer their encouragement and to say
their good-byes on a platform crowded with curious bystanders. S
A. W.
5Papers of R. B. Bennett, A. G. L. McNaughton to
Merriam, September 30, 1931, Archive No. 267369.
6Leader-Post (Regina), September 30, 1931, p. 1.
7Ibid., October 1, 1931, p. 9.
8Regina Daily Star, October 2, 1931.
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When they arrived in the capital, representatives of the
City Police and CPR investigation branch were on hand pre-
pared to frustrate any attempt to release them from ,police
custody. The arrested men were taken to HCMP station cells
downtown, booked, and held over-night prior to being trans-
ferred to Regina Jail. 9 However, their period in cust9dy
was rather brief. Solomon Greenberg of Winnipeg, engaged
by the MWUC as counsel for the miners, arranged the release
of eight of the prisoners within the week. The remainder
were released a few days later. Day, Smarz, Minster, Bernatos
and Rowsen were initially refused and then granted bail by
JUdge J. 'w. Hannon. 10 Four of those arrested, Dixon, Leptak,
Pulharuski and Levie, also appear to have soon had the
charges against them dropped. There is no record of them
ever being tried.
The total number of arrests was brought to sixteen
when William Cunnah, James McLean, and Tony Stankovitch were
taken into custody on charges of rioting and committed for
trial on October 2. 11 Somewhat later still further arrests
occurred. Fred Konopachi, Charles Grigalis, and Roy Buttazoni
were committed for trial on charges of rioting at a prelim-
inary hearing before Magistrate J. C. Martin of Weyburn on
November 18. Each was released on $1,.500.00 bail. 12 Finaily,
,
9Leader-Post (Regina), October 2, 19~1, p. 15.
10Ibid., October '7, 1931, p. 2 and October 14, 1931, .p. 2.
11Regina Daily Star, October 3, 1931.
12Estevan Mercury, November 19, 1931, p. 1.
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Chester Me Ilvenna, appearing on charges of rioting and
unlawful assembly, was remanded for trial by Martin on
December 15. Unable to furnish bail set at $3,000.00, he
was taken to Regina Jail to await a hearing of his case. 13
Despite a concentrated search in Canada and the
United States, police were unable to discover any trace of
three other men wanted on charges of rioting and inciting
to riot--Sam Scarlett, James Sloan, and Martin Forkin.
Traced through a letter written by Mrs. James Sloan, Scarlett
was finally arrested on C. W. Pavo's farm at Birsay, Saskatch-
ewan on October 15. 14 Judge Hannon set bail at $10,000,00
\
and Scarlett was released after electing to be tried with
the other prisoners on March 3, .1932. 15 After "travelling
allover the country," Sloan eventually surrendered to the
I
authorities. 16 Heffernan, Sloan's counsel, telephoned the
Crown Prosecutor, W. J. Perkins, on November 11 and informed
him that he and the fugitive would arrive in Estevan the
following day, at which time Sloan would surrender for pre-
liminary hearing. At the hearing, Magistrate Martin com-
mented that Sloan, charged with rioting. "was· undoubtedly in
a position where suspicion would fallon him .•• but my
feeling is that were I to commit for trial, I should be doing
l3Ibid., December 10, 1931, p.l.
14Leader-Post (Regina), October 16, 1931, p. 1.
15Ibid., October 2), 1931, p. 2.
16Estevan~Jl1el:9iJr..:!, November 12, 1931, p. 1.
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so on suspicion only."l? Hence he dismissed the charge and
released Sloan from custody. Forkin was arrested at Pembina,
North Dakota on a charge of illegally entering the United
States. After his hearing at Grand Forks on June 10, 1932,
he was deported and immediately arrested at Emerson, Manitoba
and brought back to Estevan by Detective Staff-Sergeant
Mortimer of the RCMP to face trial. 18 Finding no evidence
that Forkin took an active part in the riot, Magistrate
Martin dismissed the rioting charge against him at the pre-
liminary hearing. l9 Meanwhile, Annie Buller had been
arrested and charged with rioting and two wounded miners,
Louis Revay and Metro Kyatick, for unlawful assembly.
When court opened in Estevan early in 1932, defence
counsel made application to have eighteen of the twenty
prisoners tried under a joint indictment. Stating their
willingness to have Sam Scarlett and Annie Buller tried
separately, counsel contended that the evidence in the
remaining cases was so similar that a joint trial would be
sufficient. The Crown, represented by H. E. Sampson and
W. J. Perkins, objected to the application on the grounds
that the weight of evidence would only confuse the jury and
make a fair trial impossible. It was finally agreed that
eighteen of the accused would be dealt with in groups.20
17Ibid., November 19, 1931, p. 1.
18Leader-Post (Regina), April 19, 1932, p. 1 and
June 11, 1932, p. 1.
19Estevan Mercury, June 23, 1932, p. 1.
20Leader-Post (Regina), March 1, 1932, p. 13.
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The first group to be tried appeared before Mr. Justice
J. F. L. Embury on March 1, 1932. Counsel for the defence,
W. H. Heffernan and F. J. Cunningham, entered pleas of not
guilty on behalf of Day~ Petryk, and Smarz, all three of
whom were charged with rioting, and Bernatos who faced an
additional charge of assaulting and wounding a police officer,
When the jury failed to reach agreement in the cases of Day
and Petryk, both men were ordered to stand trial at a later
date during the March, 1932 sittings of the Court of King's
Bench. Smarz was found guilty and sentenced to three months
at hard labour in Regina Jail where he was to be kept under
medical observation for his "mental capacity," Bernatos was
also found guilty as charged and sentenced to one year at
hard labour in Regina Jail,21
All members of the second group were charged with
rioting and found guilty. Owing to their having had to be
hospitalized as a result of injuries sustained during the
riot, three of the accused, Konopachi, Buttazoni, and Grigalis,
received special consideration, Extreme leniency was recom~
mended for Konopachi who was bound over to keep the peace
for two years on his own recognizance of $1,000.00 and two
sureties of $500.00 each. Leniency was urged for Buttazoni
as well, He was fined $200,00 and bound over to keep the
peace for two years on a personal recognizance of $2,000.00
and two sureties of $1,000.00 each, Gryciuk, Kolenkas, and
Grigalis were each fined $150.00 and bound over to keep the
21 EJD , King's Bench (Criminal), King v. Martin Day
et aI, KB #283.
154
peace for two years on their own recognizance of $1,000.00
and two sureties of $500.00 each. Kolenkas and Gryciuk were
also sentenced to two and three months respectively at hard
labour at Regina Jail, a jail term being deferred in the
case of Grigalis. 22
The third trial commenced on March 10 and concluded
with the Crown dropping charges of rioting and unlawful
assembly against Rowsen when the jury failed to agree.
Minster, found guilty of rioting, was sentenced to two years
less one day in Regina Jail at hard labour. Cunnah was con-
victed on a charge of unlawful assembly and was bound over
to keep the peace for two years on a personal recognizance
of $250.00 and two sureties of $125.00 each. He elected to
serve one month's hard labour at Regina Jail rather than pay
a $50.00 fine. McLean was also convicted on an unlawful
assembly charge and was given eight months at hard labour
in Regina Jail. 23
In the final group trial Stankovitch and McIlvenna
were acquitted on charges of unlawful assembly, Kyatickand
Revay, meanwhile, were convicted on the same charge and each
received suspended sentences. Both men were bound over to
keep the peace for two years on personal recognizances of
$500.00 and two sureties of $250.00 each. Day and Petryk
were retried and again the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
The cases were set over to the fall assizes, but the Attorney
22King v. John Kolenkas et ale
23King v. Isadore Minster et al.
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General's department dropped all charges against the pair. 24
A charge of rioting laid against Metro Uhyran was also with-
drawn by the Crown. 25
Convicted on charges of unlawful assembly and riot-
ing, Scarlett was fined $100.00 and sentenced to one year
imprisonment in Regina Jail. Hard labour was omitted from
his sentence in consideration of his health. Scarlett suf-
fered from a severe case of sciatica which he claimed caused
him very excruciating pain. Upon Scarlett's conviction, his
counsel submitted a notice of appeal. Justices F. W. G.
Haultain, W. M. Martin, and George Taylor heard the appeal
and, although they removed the fine, they upheld the jail
term imposed by the lower court. 26
Of the trials arising out of the Estevan riot, that
of Anne Buller provoked the greatest interest. Arrested in
Toronto in mid-December, 1931, I~s. Buller was brought back
to Estevan by RCMP Staff-Sergeant Metcalfe for preliminary
hearing on a charge of rioting. 27 Magistrate Martin remanded
her for trial and on February' 23, 1932 w. J. Perkins, agent
for the Attorney General officially charged that.
she, the said Anne Buller, at Estevan ••• on the 29th,
September, A.D. 1931, with divers other persons, unknown,
unlawfully and riotously and in a manner causing reason-
able fear of tumultuous disturbance of the peace, did
24King v. Chester McIlvenna et a1.
25EJD, King's Bench (Criminal), King v, Metro Uhyran,
KB #291.
26SCA , King v. Sam Scarlett, CA #53.
27Estevan Mercury, December 17, 1931, p. I,
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assemble together, and being so assembled together, did
then and there make a great noise and thereby began and
continued for sometime [sic] to disturb the peace tumul-
tuously, contrary to the-provisions of the Criminal Code
of Canada,28
With the courtroom jammed to the limit of its seat-
ing capacity, the trial commenced at 3130 P.M. on March 17,
1932. Mr. Justice H. Y. Macdonald presided with Sampson
and Perkins appearing on behalf of the Crown and Heffernan
and Cunningham for the accused. Prior to pronouncing sen-
tence, Macdonald asked Mrs. Buller if she had anything she
wished to say, She replied in a clear, firm voicel
Your Lordship, I appreciate the opportunity you grant me.
I am ,prepared to receive your verdict and I want to state
further that when I received the invitation from the
miners to come and assist them in connection with their
relief I felt it my duty to assist these miners. My
speech on the Sunday afternoon before the disturbance
was of no character to incite the crowd to riot. My
intention was, and I state now on the basis of the anal-
ysis of the conditions of which I spoke, to make a speech
of an educational character. As such it has since been
commented upon by a number of miners. I am not of the
destructive type. I aim to -educate my class. Throughout
my short life I have endeavored to be and I have been
loyal to that class I belong to, and I emphasise to you
that I did not incite, and my activities were all
directed to the welfare of the men and women that toil.
In some small way I have made an effort to assist the
exploited workers and farmers of this country.29
The trial was interesting in that a great deal more
was made of a speech before a mass meeting of the striking
miners at Bienfait on September 27 than of her participation
in the SUbsequent riot. Her own statement before the pre-
siding jUdge would seem to indicate that she felt obliged
28SCA , King v. Anne Buller, CA #52.
29Estevan Merc~, March 24, 1932, p. 1.
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to answer a charge of inciting to riot rather than riotous
conduct. Although several witnesses testified to her being
present and even urging on women participants, no one pro-
vided conclusive proof that she did in fact actively partici-
pate. 30 Nevertheless, the jury found her guilty as charged
and Macdonald sentenced her to one year at hard labour in the
Common Gaol at Batt1eford and imposed a fine of $500,00,31
The conviction was appealed and on November 17, 1932 Justices
Turgeon, Martin, and McKenzie ordered and adjudged ttthat the
appeal of the said Annie Buller be allowed and her said con-
viction be quashed. ,,32 However, the court further directed
her to stand trial at the next sittings of the Court of
King's Bench in Estevan "to answer to such charge as may
then and there be preferred against her, ,,33 On March 10,
1933 she again appeared in Estevan before Justice J. F. L.
Embury on a charge of rioting. She was found guilty and
sentenced to imprisonment of one year less three months and
eighteen days in Batt1eford Jail. An appeal on this convic-
tion was dismissed on May 9, 1933. 34
Despite the relatively light sentences handed out by
the presiding judges, certain circumstances concerning the
trials of the miners are puzzling while other events make







their fairness suspect. As has already been shown, the
authorities' attempt to convince the jury that a few of the
miners may have been armed was a clumsy one. And there are
other puzzling matters. According to what may be best called
the official version of how the riot began, the blame was
placed heavily on Martin Day. He was said to have struck
Police Chief McCutcheon with a club, At Day's preliminary
hearing at Estevan on October 1, 1931, McCutcheon and Sergeant
John Molyneaux of the RCMP said Day had done so, Molyneaux
said he then proceeded to arrest Day and the fight started.
The following discussion concerning the subject is also
reported to have taken place in the Estevan courtroom:
'Who struck the first blow?' Sergt, Molyneaux was asked,
'The first blow I saw struck was struck by Day,' replied
the officer.
'It's a lie,' roared Day from the prisoner's box.
He was warned to keep quiet,35
Molyneaux is further reported to have said he definitely saw
Day strike McCutcheon and that in the melee he also saw
Joseph Bernatos (who, according to McCutcheon, was right behind
Day in the rush toward the police cordon) draw from somewhere
on his person a large black object, similar to a rubber club,
Such an article 'was placed before the court as an exhibit. 36
However, when the charges on which Day was to be tried were
drawn up on February 3, 1932, he was simply accused of riot-
ing. Bernatos, on the other hand, was charged with both




rioting and assaulting and wounding a police officer. At
their trial both McCutcheon and Molyneaux gave evidence and,
according to the press, it was stated that both Day and
Bernatos were seen striking McCutcheon with clubs.)7 As was
mentioned earlier, the charges against Day were eventually
dropped while Bernatos was found guilty as charged. Granted
the records of these matters are sketchy, but they suggest
that the police could not decide among th~mselves for a few
days who had struck McCutcheon and hence were not consistent
in presenting evidence. That such should be the case is not
surprising in view of the hasty and probably even confused
manner in which the police dashed about to prevent the miners
from reaching the town hall.
Testifying in the case of Roy Buttazoni, Oliver McKay,
Estevan town constable, reported unsuccessful attempts to
secure the accused's conviction for alleged violations of ~
Liquor Act. When asked by defence counsel if the police were
out to get Buttazoni, McKay replied: "yes, if we get the
opportunity.,,38 A sworn statement by a juror, R. J. Buckner,
indicates that a rather blatant attempt to influence a jury
. .
was committed by W. W. Lynd, legal counsel for the coal oper-
ators. According to the statement, Lynd invited Buckner,
Peterson, and Erickson, jurors in the case of Martin Day et al,
to a hotel room for a dril~ and in reference to Scarlett and
Buller stated, "we will have to get the whole bunch of red
37~., March 2, 1932, p. 9.
38King v. John Kolenkas et al,
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sons of bitches. ,,39 Lynd also referred to the lawyers for
the defendants as "not having a ghost of a chance as they did
not know the jurymen.,,40 The Attorney General's repeated
references to several of the accused as "radicals," "reds,"
"Communists," and "agitators" certainly must be recognized
as prejudicial to the trials. Even Justice Macdonald seems
to have exceeded the bounds of propriety in the Buller case
when he said, "I do not think you will have any difficulty
coming to a conclusion that there was a riot. ,,41 Surely when
an individual is on trial on a charge of rioting the presiding
judge should leave the jury to determine whether or not a riot
1
occurred on the basis of the evidence submitted by counsel
during the trial.
Mr. Justice J. F. L. Embury's charge to the jury in
the case of Minster et al also warrants mention. His lordship
stated.
Unfortunately we are not trying the man or the men, the
individuals holding positions of authority, who withheld
from the miners the information that the parade was for-
bidden and prohibited by the town council. I am sorry
that we are not trying those men. They, having received
this information, should have conveyed it to their people.
They knew of the resolution of the town council and it
makes one's pla~d boil to think that they kept this infor-
mation secret.
This statement is significant in that it clearly indicates
p. 4.
39Canadian_Labor Defender (Toronto), November, 1932,
40 Ibid •
41SCA, King v. Anne Buller, CA #52.
42Leader-Post (Regina), March 10, 1932, p. 12.
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that Embury had formulated a conclusion about the innocence
or guilt of the strike leaders (Scarlett, Sloan, and Forkin)
before these men had even been brought before the courts.
This action raises two important questions. First, if in one
instance Embury could pass jUdgment on individuals who had
not been brought to trial, could he not have done so in other
instances. Consequently, although he displayed some sympathy
for the men on trial, he could have been presiding over a case
in which he had already determined the defendants to be guilty
as charged. Second, because two of the presiding judges, in
their charges to the jury, were obviously not unbiased, could
the individuals charged in connection with the events of
September 29, 1931 expect to obtain a fair trial? Given the
circumstances, it is questionable whether justice could be
served.
While the arrests and preparations for the foregoing
trials were getting under way, those who died in the riot
were laid to rest. On Sunday afternoon, October 4, in
flower-covered caskets borne shoulder high by eighteen com-
rades and followed by a procession of 600 men, women, and
children, Nick Nargan, Julian Gryshko, and Pete Markunas
were buried in a common grave in the little cemetery half a
mile north of Bienfait. Several mourners held aloft banners
reading "They Fought for Bread, But Got Bullets Instead,"
"Honor to Martyrs for the Workers' Cause," and "Murdered by
the Bosses' Hired Police Thugs. ,,43 The brief graveside
43winnipea Tribune, October 5, 1931.
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service, contained in the constitution of the MWUC and read
by A. Gough, an official of the Canadian Labor Defence League
of Winnipeg, was the only ceremony of the funeral. 44 Solemn
Ukrainian funeral hymns and "Nearer My God To Thee" sung
unaccompanied by the huge gathering were the only music. 45
According to Edith Fowke, the funeral prompted John Weir, a
left-wing journalist, to write a song to the tune of "Kevin
Barry".
In a little mining village
Scarcely noticed on the map
Bourgeois guns were turned on toilers
And their life's blood there did sap.
No one dreamed of such a slaughter
In that town of Estevan,
That armed thugs with guns and bullets
Would shoot men with empty hands.
Three more martyrs for the miners,
Three more murders for the boss--
Brutal laws to crush the workers
Who dare fight in freedom's cause.
As those miners lay a-dying
In their agony and pain,
Murmured, IIrrhough we die for freedom,
Yet we do not die in vain.
"For the working class will triumph
If united they will stand,
They will win the world for labor
And the worl5:ers rule the land."
Come unite: Come unite:
And for freedom we will fight:
Workers of the world, awaken4'6"Workers of the world, unite:
44See Appendix II for the text of the graveside
service provided for in the lVlWUC constitution.
45Leader-Post (Regina), October 5, 1931, p. 12.
46National Affairs"Monthl~, VI, 4 (1949), p. 172, as
cited by Edith Fowke, "Labor and Industr.i~l Protest Songs in
Canada," in Journal of American Folklore, Vol. 82, No. 323(January-March, 1969), pp. 41-42. See Appendix III for a
similar version by Cecil Boone.
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The tragic demise of these three miners produced a
deep feeling of resentment against the authorities among
their relatives, friends, and co-workers, a feeling probably
increased by the trials and sentencing of other participants,
On the first anniversary of the riot, the Ukrainian Labor
Temple unveiled a monument to the three victims. The stone,
bearing the phrase "Lest We Forget" and marked with a star,
was inscribed with the names of the deceased and carried the
inscription "MURDERED IN ESTEVAN SEPt 29 1931 BY RCMP, .. 47
47Having succeeded in having the letters "RCMP"
obliterated, vi1la.ge authorities attempted to have the objec-
tionable word "Murdered" removed. In a Ie tter dated Sep- ..
tember 26, 1932, A. Nelson wrote to the officials of the
Ukrainian Labor Temple saying:
"I am instructed by the Bienfait Cemetery Board to order
you to remove the word MURDERED from the Monument you
have erected in the cemetery, on the bodies of those
killed in the Estevan Riot. If this word MURDERED is
not erased before September 29th, 1932, the Board will
remove the Monument from the Cemetery without further
notice." (Canadian Labor Defender [Toronto], November,
1932, p. 4.)
The Labor Temple refused to comply with the order and expressed
a willingness to place the matter before the courts. (Leader-
Post [Regina], September 29, 1932, p. 1,) Apparently nothing





THE "SETTLEMENT" OF THE STRIKE
During the course of the strike, as mentioned pre-
viously, the Governor General in Council, under the provisions
of The Inguirie§ Act, appointed Judge Edmund R. Wylie commis-
sioner on September 18, 1931 "to make inquiry concerning the
causes and circumstances which led to a cessation of work in
various mining and other industries at or near Estevan or
elsewhere in Southeastern Saskatchewan during the early part
of September 1931•••• ,,1 The Lieutenant Governor of Sas-
katchewan, under authority of The Public Inquiries Act,issued
a concurrent appointment on September 19, 1931. Although the
strike had been called contrary to the provisions of The
Industrial Disputes Inyestigation Act, the appointment was
not conditional on the miners returning to work. Both govern-
ments, nevertheless, believed the men should not be pursuing
both a legal and an illegal solution to the dispute simulta-
neously.2 For this reason, Wylie was requested to defer com-
mencement of the enquiry pending the outcome of negotiations
undertaken by M. S. Campbell. 3 A few days later, on Sep-
tember 26, after Campbell reported his efforts to effect a
lWylie Commission, Proceedings, I, 4.
2Wylie Commission, Report, p. 3.
3Wylie Commission, EXhibits, No. C-19.
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settlement had failed, Wylie was instructed to proceed. 4
Where academic qualifications were concerned, E. R.
Wylie was probably as suitable an individual as could be
found to carry out the enquiry. Born in Durham County,
Ontario on December 12, 1873, Wylie, upon completion of his
primary and secondary school education, enrolled in the arts
program at the University of Manitoba. After graduation he
studied law under J. T. Brown of Moosomin and was admitted
to the Bar of Saskatchewan in 1903. Ten years later he was
appointed King's Counsel and in 1914 District Court Judge,
JUdicial District of Estevan. In politics Wylie was a Con-
servative and where religious affiliation was concerned a
member of the United Church. Yet one cannot but wonder how
critical an observer he was. In 1931, despite having spent
seventeen years in Estevan, he was evidently far from familiar
with the situation in the coalfield. He was, for example, of
the impression that labour-management relations were good.
When Harris requested protection against any intimidation or
discrimination resulting from the miners' testimony before
the Commission, Wylie refused to grant it and stated that he
believed any resultant grievances could be worked out between
the men and the operators. 5
Advised by telephone of the individuals who were to
participate most extensively in the enquiry, Wylie at once
4~., No. C-20.
5Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VI, 51-52. Also see
Leader-Post (Regina), October 23, 1931, p. 11.
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arranged for an organizational meeting to be held in the
Estevan Court House on September 30. W. W. Lynd appeared on
behalf of the operators of the six deep seam mines, W. J.
Perkins as counsel for the Commission, and John Galloway,
coal operator, on behalf of twenty-two of the smaller mines
in the district. However, as a result of the riot, Perkins
was unable to contact any representative of the miners, and
the inquiry had to be adjourned until October 5. On October 3,
the miners asked to have Solomon Greenberg of Winnipeg
retained as their counsel, but the government refused their
request. It gave as its reason the fact that Greenberg was
not a member of the Bar of Saskatchewan. Perhaps this was the
cause of the refusal. Nevertheless, it is equally possible
that the government did not want an inquiry into the riot
and feared Greenberg would press for one. If this were so,
their fear was justified when, at the inquest into the deaths
of the three riot victims, Greenberg strongly urged the jury
to recommend a complete investigation of the whole affair. 6
As an alternative the government agreed to provide the miners
with any counsel they wished to name from the provincial Bar.
The mines committee responded by agreeing that Perkins be
assigned to the preparation and presentation of their case
and that R. D. Newsome be appointed associate counsel to the
Commission. It was further arranged that J. H. Harris be in
attendance during the enquiry to instruct counsel on behalf
6Leader-Post (Regina), October 10, 1931, p. 2.
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of the miners.? These arrangements completed, the Commission
adjourned to permit a conference between the coal operators
and miners. 8
The Estevan riot, with its terrible consequences in
dead and wounded, served as a catalyst to bring the warring
factions together in an attempt to settle the dispute. ,As a
result of a meeting with W. J. Perkins, the striking miners
expressed a willingness to negotiate with the coal operators
and to formulate a temporary agreement under which they would
return to work pending the outcome of Wylie's enquiry. A
preliminary conference of operators and miners was quickly
arranged and commenced at 11:00 A.M., October 6, in the
Estevan Court House with T. M. Molloy acting as chairman.
The operators were represented by C. C. Morfit and S. W.
Holley (Western Dominion Collieries), A. C. M. Wilson and
I. C. Thompson (Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal), H. Wallace
and E. Pierce (Eastern Collieries), R. J. Hassard, J. R.
Brodie, and F. Norde (Bienfait Mines), J. F. Anderson and
H. N. Freeman (National Mines), J. F. Anderson and G. A.
Richardson (Canadian Coal), W. L. Hamilton and F. Newsome
{Crescent Collieries}, and J. G. Peterson (Shand Mine). The
miners' representatives were G. Wilkinson, T. Bowman, G. Brown,
and N. Guba, Taylorton Mine; F. Booth, J. Smyth, A. Eddy, and
J. Gordon, Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal; J. Harris,
7Wylie Commission, Report, pp. 4-6. w. H. S. Glew
was appointed secretary to the Commission.
8Wylie Commission, Proceedings, I, l2?
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H. Hesketh, G. Beatty, and J. Robertson, Bienfait Mines;
E. Jones, T. Kirkbridge, and A. Konopaki, National Mines;
W. Prokop, J. Adams, E. Knight, and A. Beattie, Crescent
Collieries; J. Billis, A. Boruk, M. Grusha, and W. Molyneaux,
Eastern Collieries,J. Tiers and W. Ashner, Shand Mine;
D. Maar, president of the local miners' organization; and
J. Bryce. 9
When the meeting got under way, Dan Moar, speaking on
behalf of the miners, submitted a proposed contract including
a detailed wage schedule and enumerating twenty-seven condi-
tions under which the men were prepared to return to work.
The first condition called for recognition of the MWUC and
the pit committees at each mine. The remaining twenty-six
points dealt with specific working and living conditions. tO
While this move by the miners suggests that at the
conference they were prepared to bargain seriously and in
good faith, it is by no means as evident that the other side
was prepared to act similarly or that the miners were meeting
their employers in the presence of an impartial third party.
The miners placed their cards on the table by sUbmitting a
9Estevan Strike File, Preliminary Agreement Result-
ing From Conference Of Operators And Miners Of The Bienfait
(Saskatchewan) Coal Field And On Which Miners Went Back To
Work Pending Final Agreement And Findings Of Royal Commission
Now Holding Sittings At Estevan (Hereinafter referred to as
"Preliminary Agreement tt ), pp. 1-2. Because he participated
in drafting the proposed contract, it is probable that the
J. Bryce referred to was in fact James Bryson, an organizer
for the MWUC.
10 Ibid ., pp. 4-6. See Appendix IV for the contract
as proposed to this meeting.
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proposed contract. But the operators neither submitted any
proposals for a contract nor responded to the miners' repre-
sentatives by indicating that they would meet certain of their
proposed terms on the understanding that employees would
resume work on a temporary basis. Rather they viewed the
commencement of negotiations thus I t'We are hopeful that • • •
our meeting will result in the only solution practicable at
this time and that is, the immediate return to work of the
employees......11 As well, they expressed their intention
to consider those miners in attendance as individuals, not as
representatives of the MWUC. 12
,
Molloy apparently believed the onus was on the
employees to submit proposals to settle the dispute. He
tailed to require any submission or commitment from the
operators. Quite the contrary, he suggested that the miners
present their "minimum or maximum demands" and leave all
other matters to subsequent negotiation. 1) What was Molloy's
purpose in assuming this position? Did he feel that the com-
mittee was too large a body to consider the one hundred-odd
items contained in the proposed contract? Did he believe it
to be the quickest method of normalizing conditions in the
11 Ibid., p. J.
12Ibid. The Leader-Post (Regina), October 7, 1931,
p. 12, states that recognition of the union was temporarily
waived by the miners and was not an issue at this meeting.
However, from the statement by the operators it would appear
that the miners made that decision at the meeting rather than
earlier.
13"Preliminary Agreement," p. 9.
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coalfield? Or did he have some other purpose? Since the
miners' proposed contract obviously embodied their maximum
demands, the procedure could lead them into disclosing the
minimum that management would have to concede to resume
operations. Management could then enter negotiations aimed
at a temporary return to work with a distinct advantage.
They could seek to have the men compromise on their minimum
rather than maximum demands. And was Molloy's approach a
part of a larger plan to get the men back to work, a plan
involving even the use of force? This possibility will be
discussed in due course. For the moment, let us examine
merely the immediate result of the procedure.
Responding to Molloy's request, the miners stated that
as a minimum employers would have to agree to the appointment
of checkweighers, an eight hour day, payment on a mine-run
basis, water removal by company men, all wage increases being
retroactive to the commencement of work, and to refrain from
intimidating or discriminating against employees connected
with the strike. The miners compromised on what was probably
their most important demand--recognition of the MWUC was
reduced to merely a demand that pit committees for each mine
be a recognized organization in each mine. 14 After four and
one-half hours of discussion, Morfit, representing the opera-




We, the mine ()perators ,and .emplo,yees in confer~nqeat
the Court 'House,•..Este:van.. this ,6th day of OctoQ~.!.r '1931
hereby agree that the ,mines be ,opened :lmmediatell.¥ Jmd
the men return to ,work on :thefo.ll.owi~gconditi:9(n~• viz ••
(1 ) That ,this.be c()nsJ~ered a temporary .arrangem.~~~ pend-
ingthe findil1gs,o~f the ',Wylie RoyaJ ,Cq:mmission ;~n9the
possible drafting ofaviorkingagreement betwe~n 'Cthe
operators and the·men.
(2) That Pit commltteesforeachmine ,be a recqgnJ.;~zed
organization in each mine.
(3) That the prov1.sions of the mines A.,ct be obs~rved in
relation to check weighers.
(4) That all water in theroadwa,ys and workingf~ge be
removed by the company and that .such places be,lq~~t as
dryas possible. .
(5) That' the terms of any schedule or agreement !:inally
reached between operators and men be made retro~9tive to
, the date of the re-commencement of work by the m~~.
(6) That there shall be no victimization or discrimina-
tion against men on account of the strike. part~9ularly
in reference to men on the payroll on or before,~ep­
tember 7th last.
(7) That contract men be employed on an eight nQMrbasis,
face to face, and the company men work nine hour~ a day.(8) That because of working conditions in the v~~ious
mines, the removal of slack and questions of ov~rweight 15
be left to negotiations between the ope~ators and the men,
Short congratulatory speeches, handshaking,Ctnd cheer-
ing marked the conclusion of the negotiations througoout
which a spirit of understanding and co-operation was said to
have been clearly manifest. 16 The only point of the agree-
ment which prompted prolonged discussion was number ~even
which dealt with a change in the ten hour day thatw~s in
existence prior to the strike. The men pointed out ~hat an
eight hour day for underground workers had been re~Qmmended
15Ibid., pp, 40-41.' With regard to the sev~~th item,
the men asked for an_ eight hour day, bank to bank. :This
meant eight hours from the time a miner entered the _mine to
the time he came back out. Eight hours face to face repre-
sented the number of hours spent working at the coal face.
16Leader-Post (Regina), October 7, 1931, p. ~2.
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by the League of Nations and was already ensured by legisla-
tion in many countries. They also maintained that owing to
the unsatisfactory conditions and poor distribution of cars
eight hours per day was a sufficient period of time to work
below the surface in any of the mines, and they assured the
operators that an eight hour day would increase production.
The operators, citing the depressed economic conditions of
the province, the reduction in realization from coal, and the
fact that the existing wage schedule was based on a ten hour
day, argued for a compromise of nine hours. In the end,
primarily as a result of Freeman's intervention, the operators
agreed to the eight hour day for all underground employees. 1?
While the press reported cheering at the conclusion
of discussions, it is questionable whether' or not the reporter
was paying much attention to the miners' representatives who
, were present. Had he done so, he may well have detected evi-
dence of emotions other than pleasure. There is reason to
suspect that the authorities had already decided to take action
which amounted to breaking the strike. By October 6 they
appear to have deoided to blame the troubles on "outside
agitators," to remove those agitators, and consequently place
the men in the position of having to meet the bosses face to
face without the advice and support of union officials or
individuals from outside the coalfield. Statements and
speeches by individuals, members of government, police officers
and others; the large number of armed police in the field,
l?"Preliminary Agreement," pp. 35-36.
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their presence at various meetings, a number of arrests; the
conduct of meetings; the creation of a Bienfait branch of
the Legion; and the trip to the strike sector by several
government officials support this belief.
A number of rather suggestive events preceded the
conference and the men's sUbsequent ratification of the
October 6 agreement. On the day following the riot, the
Mercury carried an open letter to ex-servicemen from Erwin R.
Osler, president of the local branch of the Canadian Legion,
in which Osler appealed to his comrades to disassociate them-
selves publicly from the lVlWUC organization. 18 On the week-
end of October ), A. H. Graham, Overseer of Bienfait, led a
delegation of returned soldiers to Regina where the Honorable
M. A. MacPherson informed them that the MWUC was Communistic
in its affiliations. According to the Mercury, this event
marked the turning point in the dispute: the ex-servicemen
reportedly returned to the coalfield and vociferously con-
demned the union. 19
October 3 seems to have been the turning point in the
dispute. It was on this day that the provincial government
apparently began putting into e1~fect what may well have been
a plan to smash the miners' union, deprive them of any outside
support, and silence militants. On October 3 the Premier
stated that the mine strike was most unfortunate and that
trouble could have been averted had not "outside agitators"
18Estevan Mercury, October 1, 1931.
19Ibid., October 8, 1931, p. 4.
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been able to persuade the men not to go back to work. 20 On
the same day, the Attorney General replied to a Saskatoon
Trades and Labor Council resolution criticizing the govern-
ment for its handling of the dispute. MacPherson branded the
MWUC as "Communistic in its attitude, prepared to carryon a
wide agitation and propaganda of the principles of revolu-
tionary class struggles" and charged union leaders with avoid-
ing government ministers who had endeavoured to effect a
settlement of the dispute. 21
,October 6 witnessed a further unfolding of the govern-
ment's apparent plan to break the strike. In addition to
.
weakening the men's position at the bargaining table by
requesting them to submit their minimum demands, Molloy,
speaking at a meeting of Bienfait miners, told the assembly
that their union was .tRed...22 Then, on the evening of the
sixth, again on the initiative of A. H. Graham, members of
the RCMP quietly descended on Bienfait and arrested six
alleged strike agitators from Brandon and Winnipeg on charges
of vagrancy.23 Meanwhile, although all was quiet in the
strike sector, eighty-seven RCMP--almost every available man




20Leader-Post (Regina), October J, 1931, p.2.
21Ibid., p. 1.
22Ibid., October 7, 1931, p. 12.
23Ibid., p. 1 and Estevan Mercury, October 8, 1931,
Those arrested were Mike Pereversoff of Brandon and
Poole, Fred Chernisky, Robert Quinn, Frank Lucas, anfl
Wade, all of Winnipeg.
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leading into the district was patrolled day and night and
many road blocks were erected. In one or two instances,
police reportedly fired at the tires of passing automobiles
when the motorists ignored a command to ha1t,24
On the morning of October 7, the day the miners were
to ratify the agreement, James Bryson, a former miner from
Lethbridge and organizer for the MWUC, was arrested at the
Bienfait hall where he was "alleged to have been making a
statement inciting interference with guns should the miners
go back to work, , , ,,,25 He too was apprehended on a charge
of vagrancy, On that same day, T. M. Molloy, speaking at a
meeting of the Estevan Branch of the Canadian Legion, outlined
the provincial government's attitude to trade unions affiliated
with the Red Internationale and stated that because the organ-
ization behind the MWUC was revolutionary in character it
"could not be recognized by the Government.,,26 It is little
wonder that the Mercury should mention the ex-servicemen in
the district, A. H. Graham, and T. M. Molloy as having been
highly valuable in the cancellation of the strike: 27
Nor was that all. While the miners were gathering
24Leader-Post (Regina), October 1, 1931, p. 9 and
October 6, 1931, p,12.
25Estevan Mercur~, October 8, 1931, pp, 1 and 4. The
reference to James Bryce is erroneous; the man taken into cus-
tody was James Bryson. Anne Buller File, Transcript of evi-
dence in connection with the cross-examination of James Bryson,
Estevan District Court, December 2, 1931, pp. 4-54 passim.
26Estevan Mercury, October 8, 1931, p. 1.
27Ibid., p. 4.
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in Bienfait for a meeting to ratify the temporary agreement,
the authorities put on a show of force. Forty armed RCMP
were in attendance to ensure that only miners carrying union
cards entered the meeting and "to prevent agitators from out-
side points getting into the meeting. ,,28 Although the police
returned to Estevan before the meeting adjourned, their pres-
ence was not without effect. The miners, by an oral vote
delivered before Harry Hesketh, decided 130 to 41 in favour
of returning to work. The WUL alleged that out of some 400
strikers only a minority were permitted to vote on the ques-
tion. According to the League, anyone whose name did not
appear on lists supplied by the operators were denied the
right to signify their agreement or disagreement with the
temporary settlement arrived at by labour and management
representatives. 29
Early the following morning, a patrol of forty RCMP
was again on hand reportedly "to nullify possible attempts on
the part of agitators at preventing the recommencement of
work."JO However, perhaps because all these so-called agi-
tators were in custody, no such disturbances occurred and at
7.00 A.M. on October 8 the strike ended. Some JOO miners
then returned to the pits, the shipping of coal being resumed
the same day.Jl A short time later, it was agreed that the
28 Ibid ., p. 1.
29Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-24.
30Estevan Mercury, October 8, 1931, p.l.
31Western Producer (Saskatoon), October 15. 1931p p.
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operators and the men would meet on October 19 to try to
draft a permanent agreement covering wages and working condi-
tions.
In an "Open Letter To The Miners Of The Sask. Coal-
fields," the Saskatchewan-Manitoba District Council of the
WUL despaired of the miners' decision to return to work with-
out what it described as anything more tangible than a promise
of negotiations by the coal operators. Claiming that the
miners were returning to work under unbearable conditions and
the "old" wage schedule, the Council stated that the operators
granted several concessions in order to maneuver the men into
.
going back to work, disrupt the union, and completely break
down the demands of the miners. According to the letter, "the
operators were able to gain this temporary victory over the
miners by employing all the means of terrorism and treacherous
betrayal at their disposal"--the Estevan police, HCMP, a royal
commission, and the operators' agent T. M, Molloy, "an A,F, of
L. faker."3 2 In a second statement, the Council also accused
some members of the pit committees of betraying the miners
for whom they were supposed to speak. It", some of them
had secret meetings with the agents of the operators, without
the knowledge of the men, [And they] • , • exposed their
betrayal • • • by urging the men in their mines to resume
work immediately • , • before the strikers themselves had
voted on the question." The Council went on to claim that
there were also serious irregularities in the manner in whic:h
J2Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-24.
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the vote was arranged, the operators preparing the lists of
voters. The miners were advised "not to be further misled
by the smooth promises of the Royal Commission and the faker
Molloy•••• [to] prepare their forces to resume their
struggle with renewed vigor on October 19th•••• (to] Build
up the Union•••• [to] prepare to strike on October 20th
if the demands ••• are not granted. [And to] DEMAND THE
IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF THE POLICE AND THE MILITIA. • • ..J3
Speaking at a mass open air meeting in Regina on
October 8, Tom Ewen, general secretary of the WUL, severely
criticized the provincial government for attributing the
labour dispute in the Bienfait-Estevan coalfield to "red
influences" and ·'Moscow." According to Ewen, the dispute
arose from local conditions, not the influences itemized by
the government. 34 The UFC also blamed the provincial and
federal government for "condemning Communists and communism
on every possible occasion" and suggested that if their object
was to stamp out Oommunism "they can best do it by remedying
such grievances as are found to exist......35
With the dispute temporarily settled and the miners
back at work, the Wylie Commission sat for a couple of days
and then adjourned, first because W. W. I~nd's father was
taken seriously ill and then while management and employees
33Ibid.
34Leader-post (Regina), October 9, 1931, p. 2.
35 Ibid ., September 30, 1931, p. 1.
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again conferred. 36 During the interval the miners maintained
that they would not continue working under the "old" condi-
tions and would demand a substantial wage increase. The
operators in turn declared that they would be severely handi-
capped by shrinking markets and falling prices in meeting the
men's demands,J7 Evidence also came to light that one of the
companies was apparently not keeping faith with its men, In
a letter to Molloy dated October 13, W, J. Perkins warned of
a Jlfly in the ointment, which promises immediate trouble."
He went on to state that according to reports reaching him,
Eastern Collieries, while observing the letter of the tempo-
rary agreement, was violating its spirit, with the result
that the men were again speaking of striking,38 When ques-
tioned by Molloy, Herbert Wallace denied the allegations:
"As usual your inf'ormationfrom this field regarding ourselves
is garbled and incorrect. ,,39
'rha"t Eastern might violate the articles of the tempo-
rary"agreement is not surprising. Could not all the operators
have believed that by its actions in arranging a temporary
settlement the government was firmly on their side? If this
were indeed the case, the operators had little to fear from
the authorities even if the agreement was not fulfilled.
36Ibid" October 16, 1931, p. 13.
37Star-Phoenix (Saskatoon), October 17, 1931.
38Estevan Strike File, W, J. Perkins to T. M. Molloy,
October 13, 1931.
39Ibid., H. Wallace toT, M. Molloy, October 19, 1931.
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With work in the coalfield having been resumed,
actions by government officials and the police to isolate
the men, smash the MWUe, and keep the mines operating con-
tinued apace. On October 12, a week before the second con-
ference was to be held, Premier J., T. M. Anderson journeyed
to Bienfait and spoke as the guest of honour to those
assembled at a "smoker" held in connection with the founding
of a branch of the Legion in Bienfait. The Premier had not
gone to the area to attempt to avert the strike, had visited
neither the wounded nor the bereaved, and had not attended
the funeral of the slain miners. However, he took time to
make a special trip to Bienfait to mark the establishing of
an organization which would assist in destroying unity among
the miners. Anderson "strongly urged the men to keep away
from another revolutionary movement in their organization...40
Scarlett observed that the type of union the Premier advocated
in place of affiliation with the MWUC was comparable to "a
meal ticket found on the sidewalk with all the nourishment
punched out of it.,,41
Two days later, on October 14, several of the men
held in custody on charges arising from the riot were released
on bail. Two of those granted bail, Isadore Minster and D.
Rowsen, were evidently looked upon by the court as "outsiders. to
Both men were ordered to return to Manitoba and to remain
40Estevan M,rcurv• October 15. 1931, p. 1. Also see
Leader-Post (Regina , October 13, 1931, p. 9.
41Leader-Post ~egina), October 17, 1931, p. 1.
there pending their trials which were to be held at King's
Bench sittings in Estevan on March 1, 1932,42 On October 19,
against this background, the coal operators and miners met
for a second time, T, M. Molloy, representing the provincial
government, was also in attendance, as was W. J, Perkins,
counsel to the Wylie Commission, 'who chaired the meeting.
The operators scored two important victories before the nego-
tiations even began. The miners' committee, stating that the
public had been "kept in the dark too much already," requested
that the meeting be open and' the press allowed to be present.
The operators, alleging that their competitors would obtain
certain valuable information to be tabled during the confer-
ence, refused. 43 After two hours of sporadically heated
exchanges, public and press were expelled. The second victory
came with the expulsion of L. Maurice, vice-president of the
MWUC, who had journeyed from Calgary to act in an advisory
capacity to the miners. 44 Because T. M. Molloy was present
at this meeting, one is led to conclude that the government
favoured not only a complete news"blackout but also the expul-
sion of what were considered "putside agitators." Negotiation
on terms then commenced.
At the conclusion of the first day, a spokesman'for
the miners stated that the strike might resume because manage-
ment appeared unwilling to grant any concessions in those
42Ibid., October 14, 1931, p. 2.
43Estevan Mercury, October 22, 1931, p. 1.
44Ibid •
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matters which meant more money for labour. The owners had
agreed to have materials delivered by company men to places
required by the miners, to a reduction in the price of blast-
ing powder from $3.65 to $3.50 per keg, to refrain from dis-
crimination against or intimidation of employees purchasing
goods at private stores, to the appointment of a checkweigh-
man at each mine, and to sell coal to miners at $1.50 per ton
rather than the former rate of $2.00. Although the operators
had agreed on October 6 to recognize pit committees of the
men, they again refused any recognition of either the miners'
committee or the MWUC. They were obviously as determined as
ever to prevent any type of organization arising which would
enable the miners to bargain collectively with all operators.
Other questions still at issue were the interpretation of the
eight hour day which had also supposedly been settled on
October 6, a minimum wage of $4.00 per day, and pay for
tirnbering. 45
M. A. MacPherson, fresh from a speaking engagement
the night before in Bienfait where he "exposed" the MWUC as
being directly affiliated with the Communist Party of Canada,
arrived in time to attend the October 20 meeting. 46 When
negotiations concluded that day, both side~; intimated that
the outlook for a settlement was not promising. Dan Maar,
spokesman for the men, stated:
I may be wrong but I do not believe the miners will
45Leader-Post (Regina), October 20, 1931, p. 12.
46Estevan Mercury, October 22, 1931, p. 1.
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accept the terms which we will present to them at the
mass meeting this evening. The terms which resulted
from the conference are something better than we formerly
had, but very little better, and some of the miners to
whom I talked Wednesday do not favor accepting them.
I have advised the executive of the miners' union to
seek another conference if the miners fail to accept
the terms offered them Wednesday night, and I also will
advise the meeting to seek another conference rather
than see another strike called. 47
In an interview with the Leader-Post, J, R, Brodie claimed
that the operators had granted the majority of the men's
demands regarding working conditions and had conceded a wage
increase of 10 per cent, Brodie also stated that. "I am of
the decided opinion that, if it were not for interference on
the partlof agitators from outside the province, our men
would take a sane view of the situation and continue to work. n48
It was Brodie's opinion that if the strike resumed it would be
owing to interference by these outside agitators. 49
In the event that negotiations failed and the strike
resumed, an additional twenty-six RCMP were sent to the area
on October 18 to preserve peace. 50 On October 20, yet another
arrest occurred. For a second time James Bryson was taken
into custody by Mortimer of the RCMP. Branded an agitator,
Bryson was arrested at Boruk's boarding house and, after a
brief appearance before Magistrate D. Bannatyne on October 21,
was convicted on a charge of vagrancy and sentenced to thirty
47Leader-post (Regina), October 22, 1931, p. 20.
48 Ibid,
49Ibid., October 21, 1931, p. 20.
50Ibid" October 19, 1931, p. 2.
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days in jail. 51 An interesting aspect of this case is that
before Bryson appeared in court the RCMP stated the prisoner
would be "remanded for a time, until the police seek more
information about him. ,,52 Under these circumstances, it must
be asked. Why was James Bryson arrested? Was it that he had
failed to comprehend the reason for his former arrest? Should
he, "an outside agitator, II have interpreted that arrest as a
hint to leave the area and cease taking part in labour nego-
tiations in the Souris coalfield? Whether or not such was
the case, the RCMP was living up to Inspector Moorhead's
assertion that his men were "keeping close tab on the situa-
tion" and that the arrest of additional "alleged agitators"
might take place. 53
With police still very much in evidence, the men
returned to work on the morning of October 21 despite no
agreement being reached at the mass meeting of miners held
in Bienfait the previous evening. Many miners withdrew from
the meeting upon finding that a vote on the proposed contract
was to be given to everyone holding a MWUC membership card--
the majority of them felt that only those men employed in the
mines on September 7 should be permitted to vote. 54 The pit
committees met the operators separately during the day and on
the evening of the twenty-second the men voted 221 to 8; in
51Estevan Mercury, October 22, 1931, p. 1.
52Leader-Post (Regina), October 21, 1931, p. 20,
53Ibid.
54Ibid., October 22, 1931.
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favour of a continuation of work. 55 Although the agreement
was ratified by a majority of 1)8 out of a total vote of )12,
L. Maurice, vice-president of the MWUC, legitimately claimed.
The vote was a directly intimidated one, intimidation
being carried on not only by the R.C.M.P. and the opera-
tors, but by Hon. M. A. MacPherson, attorney-general, who
openly fought against the Mine Workers' Union of Canada
at a Bienfait meeting which was calleod [sic] under the
auspices of the Canadian Legion.56
Maurice apparently overlooked the important role played by
T. M, Molloy, Among other things, the latter presented the
Leader-Post with a file of documents which further designated
the MWUC as a "Red" organization.57 If the publication of
these doouments failed to convince anyone that "Communists"
at Estevan represented a threat to all British institutions,
testimony in the case of the "Toronto Nine" perhaps succeeded.
A few days later evidence placed before the Court in the trial
of nine prominent Canadian Communists, including Tim Buck and
Tom Ewen, charged with being parties to a seditious conspiracy,
suggested that the Communist Party of Canada, through the
agency of the WUL, sent Communists into Estevan to organize
the men into the MWUC. 58
After the miners were back at work and the HeMP had
been withdrawn, Maurice warned that "all is not clear sailing
yet," and accused Molloy and MacPherson of "holding meetings
55 Ibid., October 23, 1931.
56Estevan Mercury, October 29, 1931, P. 1.
57Leader-Post (Regina), October 21, 1931, p. 11.
58Ibid., November 10, 1931, p. 14.
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with anxious miners and non-sympathizers to smooth the situa-
tion up in favour of the coal operators. • • • " He further
charged that they had influenced "the men to vote for practi-
cally the same destitution,,59 that they had faced before the
strike. Meanwhile MacPherson, referring to the "overwhelming
vote of the men to accept the proposals of the operators,"
reported his satisfaction that the self-appointed leaders of
the strike were eliminated by the men themselves. He also
expressed the opinion that the miners' grievances "might
readily have been adjusted by the operators had not the field
been infested by members of the Red Internationale of Trade
Unions a~d representatives of other communistic organizations •••60
The evidence already put forth clearly indicates that Maurice's
appraisal of the events was much more perceptive than that of
the Attorney General. It was the RCMP and the courts who
"eliminated" the "self-appointed leaders" by arresting them,
imprisoning them, or driving them out of the district. It was
government officials who, greatly aided by the police, dedi-
cated their efforts to eradicating all vestiges of the union.
Of the twenty-seven demands contained in the proposed
contract submitted at the October 6 conference, almost all
were officially granted by management. However, few were
apparently conceded with any real degree of sincerity. Three
conditions were refused by all six deep seam mine operators--
elimination of bunkhouses, pay every two weeks, and recognition
59Ibid., October 24, 1931, p. 16.
60 Ibid •
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of the MWUC. 61 This failure to obtain recognition of their
union meant that the final agreement signed by the operators
and their employees can scarcely be considered even a partial
victory for the miners. In addition to this serious setback,
certain operators refused to concede various other demands
and still other items were to be adjusted at individual mines.
The following terms were-refused by individual operatorsl
Proposal No.
11. right of contract miners
to choose partners
12. extra pay for working in
water
,
14. free tools for men and no
sharpening charges
15. reduced charges for
electric lights and
continuous service
17. all companies to have wash
houses and charge men
fifty cents per month for
use of same
20. removal of machine cuttings
from mine s by companies
23. lost or damaged cars to be
responsibility of company
27. pay for over-shovelling
Refused byl
National and Bienfait Mines
Bienfait Mines,Crescent, and





National and Bienfait Mines,
Western Dominion, and Crescent
Bienfait Mines, crescent'6and
Manitoba and Saskatchewan 2
With the dispute supposedly settled and the men back
at work in the district's coal mines, Judge Wylie reopened
61 Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-21, and 0-8), -86,
and -89, and ibid., Miscellaneous Documents, No.2 and 12.
62 Ibid • See Appendix IV for a more complete explana-
tion of the demands the operators of these mines refused to
meet.
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the public hearings which continued for about three weeks.
By the time its work was completed on November 17. 103 wit-
nesses had appeared and given 2,533 pages of testimony and
evidence. 63 In addition to these proceedings, thirty-seven
exhibits were entered on behalf of the Commission. ninety by
the coal operators, and thirteen by the miners. Miscellaneous
documents numbering twenty-two were also filed with the Com-
mission. Wylie then proceeded to complete his report which
was transmitted to the Governor General of Canada and the
Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan on January 25, 1932.
That report, consisting of 147 pages, dealt in considerable
detail with each aspect of the dispute in the six deep seam
mines as well as with matters generally applicable to all
lignite mines in the Souris coalfield.
The report submitted by Commissioner Wylie presented
seventeen recommendations designed to enhance the various
aspects of the Saskatchewan lignite industry.64 In his first
two recommendations, Wylie advocated that the October 19-20
agreement continue in force until September 1, 1932 and that
during the summer of that year a new wage schedule be formu-
lated at a conference of the coal operators and miners. In
recommendations 3, 4, and 5, the Commissioner advocated pay-
ment on a mine-run rather than screened-coal basis. payment
for additional timbering in any abnormal conditions, and a
63See Appendix VI for a list of witnesses appearing
before the Royal Commission.
64See Appendix VII for the recommendations of the
Royal Commission.
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differential wage scale for a partnership consisting of an
experienced and an untrained miner.
Having put forth his conclusions regarding the wage
schedule, Wylie turned his attention to health and sanitation
in recommendation number 6, to. living conditions in number 7,
and to working conditions- in numbers 8-11. He advocated
better enforcement of health regulations, repair and mainte-
nance of company houses, a sufficient supply of good drinking
water, a more thorough inspection of the mines and a more
detailed inspector's report, strict enforcement of The Mines
Act and accompanying regulations; and a regular inspection of
all tipple scales.
Recommendations 12, 13, 14, and l6-a pertained to the
marketing of Saskatchewan coal. The Commissioner advocated
that. specific heat values and other properties of all co~l
mined in the province be ascertained by government analysis;
these values and properties also be established by the same
method for coal produced by all mines with a specified annual
ton output; coal produced by these mines be sold under a trade
name; and that the Canada Fuel Board re-examine the existing
subvention rate'.
A deputation from the Bienfait Branch of the Canadian
Legion, consisting of A. H. Graham, E. Pierce Jr., K. G. John,
G. Richardson, L. C. Moffatt, and P. Prescott, stole part of
the Commission's thunder with respect to these recommendations
when it interviewed the provincial government in mid-January,
1932. Arguing that the deep seam mines, employing a maximum
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of hand labour, were being put at a distinct disadvantage by
the highly mechanized stripping mines, the delegation requested
the government to purchase all coal for the Relief Commission
from the deep seam rather than strip mines in the Souris coal-
field, to purchase coal for government buildings from the deep
seam mines, to stabilize the price of coal in Saskatchewan to
ensure fair profits to the mine owners and fair wages for
miners, to test the various Saskatchewan coals to determine
officially their value in heat units and pUblicize the results,
to enact legislation prohibiting misrepresentation of coal
value by dealers, and to request the federal government to pay
a coal subvention only to deep seam mines. 65 The ministers
informed the deputation that the government was already buying
coal for public buildings from the deep seam mines insofar as
was possible and that all other requests would be taken into
consideration pending the findings of the Wylie commission. 66
The question of the provincial government patronizing
Saskatchewan coal mines was brought up on a number of occasions
during the Commission hearings. George Richardson of Canadian
Coal reported that the Saskatchewan Power Commission plant in
Saskatoon used Saskatchewan coal during the summer months and
Alberta coal in winter because the Tofield mines provided the
plant with slack at fifty cents per ton. He said his impres-
sion was that "the Power Commission was not concerned about
the prices in the [Souris] field, or the mines being kept up
65Leader-post (Regina), January 19, 1932, P. 1.
66 Ibid •
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or not, or anything elsel all they were looking [sic] was
keeping the cost down. "67
W. L. Hamilton and H. N. Freeman also found fault
with the government's system of purchasing coal by tender.
This practice resulted in heightened competition within the
Souris field and forced the realization from lignite ev~n
lower. Hamilton claimed that for some time the provincial
government had been purchasing coal for less than the cost
ofproduction. 68 Freeman's statement was typical of that of
several deep seam operators.
I think we, as tax-payers in the Province, and in the
Dominion, also the men that are working for the tax-
payers • • • should have protection, and that the Govern-
ment should give us a living price, or a fair price for
our coal, and enable the operator, who has spent his
money to develope the coal mine and to build up industry
in the Province • • • to get some of that money back,
and possibly make conditions a little bett~r for the
workmen than they are at the present time. o9
Apparently the government was persuaded by the opera-
tors' arguments. Honorable J. F. Bryant reported that as a
result of exhaustive tests at the Weyburn mental hospital the
supremacy of lignite Uhas been established beyond all dis-
pute ...70 He also stated that the government was paying $2.55
instead of the former rate of $2.30 per ton and that it was
the government's intention to divide its purchases among all
Saskatchewan mines as fairly as possible on the basis of the
67Wy1 ie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 501.
68 Ibid ., x, 179.
69 Ib1' d 44____., VIII, 5.
70Estevan Mercurx, December 10, 1931, p. 1.
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number of men employed. 71 In the Throne Speech the Lieutenant
Governor also announced that his government "has continued to
conduct tests of Saskatchewan lignite and has circulated
copies of reports on such tests among the combustion engineers
of the Dominion, particularly those engineers interested in
the construction of coal-burning equipment. "72
Judge Wylie also advocated some twenty-five amendments
to The Mines Act in recommendation number 17. These per-
tained to the licensing and certification of mine employees,
wages, hours of work, ventilation, safety measures, mine
inspections, first aid facilities, and wash facilities. As a
result, on March 17, 1932 the Minister of Labour introduced
Bill No. 64, an act to amend The Mines Act, in the Saskatchewan
Legislature.?3 The Bill was given second reading on the
twenty-eighth and referred to the Select Standing Committee
on Law Amendments. 74 Royal assent was granted and The Coal
Mines Safety and Welfare Act became effective November 1, 1932.
Almost without exception, the amendments advocated by the
Wylie Commission became law under the new legislation. Its
passage, however, was not unopposed. On March 31 a delega-
tion of miners' representatives and coal operators represent-
ing both the large and small mines of the Souris field
71 Ibid •
72Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Journals. 1912
(Regina I King's Printer, 1932), p. 10.
73Ibid., p. 84.
74Ib id., p. 105.
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appeared before the amendments committee. The operators
strenuously objected to several clauses in the proposed legis-
lation. Making it compulsory for all miners to hold certifi-
cates would, they claimed, prevent farmers from obtaining
employment in the mines during the winter season, necessitate
importing labour during the busy months, and create unemploy-
ment during the slack periods. Ordering all mines employing
less than six men to provide a certified manager would mean
that many owners who managed their own mines would have to
close. Paying the men every two weeks would be impossible
because coal was sold on terms of thirty, sixty, or ninety
days. Finally, instituting an eight hour day would in fact
result in a working day of seven hours or less because the
miners would be paid from the time they reached the shaft
until the time they returned to the top.75 Although their
protestations resulted in a minor amendment to the clause
relating to certification of miners working at the coal face,
the operators failed to convince the committee that their
objections to the proposed legislation were valid.
Charged with enquiring into and reporting on the
labour dispute involving the coal operators and miners of the
Souris field, the Royal Commission fulfilled its duty admir-
ably. Virtually every aspect of the dispute received thorough
'examination. With the capable assistance of a number of
expert consultants, the financial position of the industry
and the wages, working, and living conditions of the employees
75Estevan Mercury, March 31, 1932, p. 1.
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position they had previously occupied.
It is equally unfortunate that the Commission was not
also endowed with the requisite powers to undertake a thorough
investigation of the riot. When the question of an enquiry
arose during the Commission's public hearings, Judge Wylie
stated that I "Unless there is some particular demand o·f
investigation [sic] those riots, I wasn't intending to do it.
In that case I will get instructions from the Government to
extend the scope of the Commission. u76 Why was the Commis-
sioner not requested by authorities to enquire into and report
on the events which precipitated the violence of September 29?
In the light of the evidence, it would appear that the author-
ities believed it was in their interest to suppress the facts
in order to ensure that the public would ·remain totally igno-
rant of the official blunders which were in part responsible
for the tragedy. Although the cases brought before the courts
shed a certain amount of light on the causes and events of the
September 29 melee, a full investigation undoubtedly would
have removed much of the mystery which surrounds a number of
aspects of the confrontation.
In retrospect, it is quite clear that the October con-
ferences settled little--labour-management relations improved
only negligibly. Before the end of 1931, it appeared that
another strike would be called at Eastern Collieries owing to
violations of the final agreement. Working conditions improved
but were still not satisfactory and discrimination continued.
76Wylie Commission, Proceedings, X, 218.
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A strike in the early part of 1932 led to arrests and trials
at which the courts continued to favour management. Finally,
deportation of and refusal to grant naturalization to mili-
tant miners also occurred.
Shortly before the Commission permanently adjourned,
a confidential report submitted by J. Raffles Cox, an engineer
with the Dominion Fuel Board, indicated that all was not well
in the Souris coalfield. Upon inspecting the six deep seam
mines in early November, 1931, Cox observed that working con-
ditions at Manitoba and Saskatchewan Coal were good but that
the attitude of the men was not entirely satisfactory, that
conditions were fairly good at Western Dominion Collieries,
as was the general feeling of the miners, that the general
attitude was antagonistic at Bienfait Mines where conditions
were only fair, that attitudes were good at Crescent Collieries
despite conditions being only fair, that conditions were good
and attitude excellent at National Mines, and that the general
feeling amongst the miners at Eastern Collieries was surly
and unpleasant, working conditions being poor.??
That the attitude of the miners at Eastern Collieries
was "surly and unpleasant" is not surprising, As was pointed
out earlier, only a few days after the temporary agreement had
been signed certain miners charged that its provisions were being
abrogated by this company, Then, only a few weeks after the so-
called permanent agreement had been signed, reports indicated
that conditions were such that another strike appeared imminent.
r?'7Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. c-68.
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When shown a sworn statement regarding a proposed strike at
Eastern, the Minister of Railways, Labour and Industries
directed a memorandum to his deputy on December 7 saying.
"these people will have to be told, and told decisively, if
they are not prepared to live up to their agreement the Govern-
ment will have to step in and see that the miners are treated
ona fair and reasonable basis.,,78
Although the December, 1931 strike was averted, 1932
witnessed a continuation of labour unrest in the Souris coa1-
field. In the ~atter part of February, five employees of
Crescent Collieries walked off the job. The five men,
Martin Day, John Propoff, Harry Schytitcka, and Alex and
William Peattie, the pit committee at this mine, left the job
because a checkweighman (James Mclean) appointed by the miners
had not been allowed to take his place at the mine. Because
he had not been previously employed by the Crescent operators,
he was ordered off the property. The five strikers were
arrested and charged under Section 57 of the I l1dllst,rial
Disputes Investtgq,tion Act. 79 All were released on $50.00
cash bail each by Magistra.te J. C. Martin. 80 Rumours of a
general sympathetic strike: arose, but it did not take place.
However, about 150 men represerlting all employees of Bienfait
Mines and Crescent Collieries and three-quarters of the miners
78DNR , Coal Administration Branch, Mine Strikes and
Disputes, J. A. Merkley to T. M. Molloy, December 7, 1931.
79Leader-Post (Regina), February 23, 1932, p. 1.
80Ibid ., February 25, 1932, p. 1.
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at Eastern Collieries went out in sympathy with the five-man
strike party.81
An interesting sequel in this dispute was the subse-
quent arrest of W. L. Hamilton, owner of the Crescent mine,
on a charge under The Mine§ Act of unlawfully causing the
removal of a checkweighman appointed by the men at his mine. 82
Appearing before Magistrate Martin on March 5, Hamilton was
freed on the charge against him. His employees, on the other
hand, were given the alternative of a $20.00 fine each or
twenty-one days in jail•. At the conclusion of the trial,
Wilfrid Heffernan, counsel for the five Crescent employees
observed. "The Mines Act is a piece of class legislation
designed for the protection of the coal barons of this dis-
trict.,,8)
That labour-management differences remained unresolved
during the next few years is evident from the records of the
Royal Commission on Coal, 1934. Several miners testifying
before Commissioner W. F. A. Turgeon reported that many of
the terms of the October 22, 1931 agreement had been and were
being abrogated.
81 Ibid • Twenty-six miners at National Mines went on
strike for a few hours, but on a purely individual matter.
It was alleged that certain men at this mine were not union
members. The dispute was. quickly settled by the miners them-
selves. Ibid., February 2), 1932, p. 1.
82Estevan Mercurx, March 3, 1932, p. 8. Information
against Hamilton was laid by Alex Peattie.
8JIbid., March 10, 1932, p. 1.
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Proposal No.
2. eight hour day
J. right of miners to appoint
a checkweighman
12. extra pay for working in water
15. reduced charges for electric
lights and continuous service
16. rent charges and repair of
houses by company
17. all companies to have wash
house and charge men fifty
cents per month for use
of same
19. removal of clay and blackjack
from mines to be paid for by
company
20. removal of machine cuttings
from mines by companies
21. handling of rubbish and waste
from mines to be borne by
companies
22. water removal by company
25. wrecked cars of coal to be
paid for by company at average
weight of such cars




















As previously mentioned, a delegation of miners met
with the law amendment committee of the provincial Legislature
84AS , Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on Coal, 1934,
Proceedings, XV, 195-214 (Bienfait Mines); XIX. 7-)1 (Crescent
Collieries); XIX, 74-111 (Eastern Collieries); and XIX, 12)-)1
(Western Dominion Collieries). See Appendix IV for a more
complete explanation of the items abrogated by these mines.
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in April, 1932 to discuss proposed amendments to The Mine~
Act. At that time, two members of the delegation, Harris
and Hesketh, put forth charges of discrimination on the part
of coal operators in the Souris coalfield against miners who
took an active part in the strikes in that area. 85 Reporting
on the matter of discrimination, D. A. Niven, Counsel for the
Turgeon Commission, stated that the men involved in the 1932
strike were prejudiced in the eyes of the employers and that
any possibility of a union of the men had been totally elim-
inated. One man involved in that strike was later unable to
obtain naturalization papers. Some twenty others had been
unable to obtain employment since the February wildcat strike.
Referring to the 1931 dispute, Niven stated that practically
all the miners prominent in the strike were no longer in the
employ of these mines, that one leader had been unable to
obtain employment in the field since that time, and that
another leader had been deported. 86
Several disputes of varying magnitude occurred during
the period 1932-1949, the majority of which involved union
recognition, collective bargaining, and wage schedules.
Settlements were as temporary as the October 6 agreement and
commissions of enquiry into the causes of the disputes were
frequent. The miners flirted with a variety of unions and
affiliated with a number of parent bodies; the coal operators
85Leader-Post (Regina), April 4, 1932, 'P. 10,
86Roya l Commission on Coal, 1934, F'actum of D. A,
Niven, p, 18.
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usually refused to recognize any of the groups. In many
instances, the grievances allegedly rectified in 1931 were
prominent factors in subsequent strikes. 8?
8?Eight major strikes were called during this period,
involving a total time loss in excess of 23,000 working days.
A federal conciliation board in 1938 and a provincial con-
ciliation board in 1940 were invoked to settle two of the
disputes. Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, 1932-
1949. In addition, three royal commissioners appointed by
the federal government, G. E. Britnell (1941),' T. W. Laidlaw
(1943), and W. F. Carroll (1944), and two provincially
appointed commissioners, W. F. A. Turgeon (1934) and J. E, L.
Graham (1949) enquired into and reported on coal mining in
the Souris Valley, George Fletcher Henderson, Federal RoyalCo~~issio in Canad 186 -1 661 A Check1i t (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 19 7 , pp. 1 0- 5 and Archives
of Saskatchewan, teA Guide to the Records of Royal and Special
Commissions and Committees of Inquiry Appointed by the Province
of Saskatchewan," 1968, pp. 62 and 86,
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
There is a definite tendency to view industrial con-
flicts primarily as being precipitated by disgruntled workers
who strike for higher wages, improved working and living con-
ditions, shorter hours, certain welfare benefits, union recog-
nition, and the like. The worker's dissatisfaction arises
from the belief that "he is productively dependent on someone
else, the dependence is called a job, from it he receives a
wage; for it his day is clocked, his routine pre-determined,
his operations segmented, his creativity fragmented. "1 In
Joy in Work, an extensive study of the industrial influences
that decrease or eliminate entirely the pleasure in work,
Henri De Man distinguished two groups of causes of worker
dissatisfactions intra- and extra-occupational social hin-
drances. With respect to intra-occupational hindrances, he
enumerated three contributing factors: dissatisfaction with
general working conditions, unjust wage systems, and dis-
ciplinary subordination of the worker. De Man listed perma-
nent relegation of the worker to a lower economic and social
class, insecurity of livelihood, and disparagement of manual
labour as extra-occupational social hindrances. 2 From these
lMabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, Social





basic dissatisfactions come protests against the existing
social structure, industrial conflict, and social disorgani-
zation, such as occurred in the Souris coalfield in 1931.
Manifestations of social disorganization in industry
are seldom the result of unilateral action on the part of
organized or unorganized labour. Usually the employer, the
personal manifestation of the establishment, is equally
responsible for those factors which produce industrial con-
flict. Consequently employers have developed certain
"weapons" for use in industrial struggle--espionage, dis-
crimination, propaganda, and scab labour.
The Estevan experience by no means exemplifies all
the methods and techniques to be discussed. However, it does
provide an adequate illustration of the utilization of certain
weapons by the employers. Although there is insufficient
evidence to indicate that the coal operators used espionage
tactics to spy on a legitimate labour organization either to
ascertain the miners' activities or sabotage the union, it is
apparent that the employers were aware of the steps taken by
the miners to organize into a union and that a determined
movement was launched to destroy the MWUC. The HCMP, on the
other hand, definitely used "special agents" to obtain infor-
mation on the activities of the strikers. It was through the
efforts of John Eberhardt, special constable, that the police
discovered the miners planned to parade several days before
it was scheduled to take place in Estevan. 3 Eberhardt was
3SCA , King v. Buller, CA #52.
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also directed to attend at least one of the mass meetings at
which Buller, Scarlett, and Sloan spoke to the assembled
strikers. 4 Although this information was not obtained
directly by the operators, they evidently gained access to
it and used it for their own purposes and to their own advan-
tage.
Discrimination is another weapon which employers use
effectively. Militants can be discharged on different pre-
texts. they can be transferred to less desirable jobs; their
pay can be reduced. S The employer may also promote non-union
workers over their heads to demonstrate that advancement can
be obtained only through co-operation, Confidential black-
lists can also be invoked to prevent a militant worker from
securing gainful employment locally or in other industrial
regions. The practice of blacklisting and discrimination has
already been discussed and it has been shown that both these
tactics were used in the Souris coalfield. .Adams was fired
by Crescent Collieries for organizing the "foreign" workers,
P. Dzuba, a machine man at Western Dominion Collieries, told
the Wylie Commission that four men were also fired because
management said they were Bolsheviks, despite the fact that
the charge was not proven and the men had created no trouble
at the mine. 6 Several other miners were blacklisted, dis-
charged and denied employment, or otherwise discriminated
4Anne Buller File.
5Elliott and Merrill, Social Disorganization, p. 215.
6Wylie Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 126 and 135.
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against owing to their militancy or suspected Communist tend-
encies.? Once the strike was settled, some were subjected to
a series of petty discriminations on the job--providing they
were fortunate enough to get their jobs back--and others were
blacklisted. At least two miners were even evicted from com-
pany houses on one pretext or another. 8
Propaganda, the deliberate manipulation of certain
symbols to secure a desired response, is another important
device utilized by management. The dissemination of propaganda
by employers or employers' groups involved in industrial con-
flict, discrediting the purposes, leadership, and activities
of the labour organization with which they are dealing, often
influences public opinion, especially in smaller communities
where the general public may be persuaded their interests lie
with the employer and in opposition to the strikers. 9 This
tactic may be instrumental in getting the men to return to
work and in breaking the strike. The Souris coal operators,
immeasurably assisted by government officials and police
authorities crying t'Red," "outside agitator," "Communist,"
and "British Democracy," quickly succeeded in swinging public
support to their side and against the MWUC. Union officials
were characterized as ogres who sought to wreck havoc on the
industry, the community, and the workers, and as agitators
7DNR, Coal Administration Branch, Mine Strikes and
Disputes, Memorandum for file dated September 14, 1932.
8EJD, District Court, Crescent Collieries v. Martin Day,
#52A of 1932 and Crescent Collieries v. Alex Peattie, #52B of
1932.
9Elliott and Merrill, Social Disorganization, p. 216.
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and opportunists who were ooncerned with furthering their
own objeotives rather than settling the strike quickly and
amiably.
The union's affiliation with the WUL has been dis-
cussed and it has been shown that regardless of its Commu-
nistic ties, the MWUC was a legal labour organization.
Molloy's interview with several community leaders indicated
that although they held oonsiderable sympathy for the strikers,
they opposed the strike because the miners were associated
with what they considered a revolutionary union which posed
a serious threat to all democratic institutions. The local
newspaper, the Estevan Mercury, served management's purposes
well in this matter. One editorial, referring to the Commu-
• •there will be troublous times for good citizens••now,
nist movement, stated, "unless it is hit, and hit hard, right
"10
Another referred to "the appearance of Communist agents in
the field and the resultant fanning of the flame of discontent
into a fury of law defiance. ,,11 Letters to the Editor of the
Western Producer, many of them from individuals in Estevan
and vicinity, indicated that "the red scare" promoted by the
government, employers, and the media had done its job well. 12
The use of imported labour is another weapon the
Souris coal operators employed. Although the tactic failed
10Estevan Mercury, October 1, 1931, p. J.
l1 Ibid •
12Western Producer (Saskatoon), December J, 1931, p. 10.
January 7, 1932, pp. 14 and 16; and March 17, 1932, P. 9.
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owing to the solidarity of the strikers and the sheer number
of pickets, it served to place the miners in an awkward posi-
tion. Even the brief use of "scabs" indicated to the general
public that the wages and conditions the miners refused to
accept were capable of attracting other men to the mines.
The strikers were shown to be "dogs in the manger"; not only
did they refuse to mine coal, they prevented others who were
willing from doing so. The employing of "scabs" also pre-
sented the operators with the opportunity of demanding addi-
tional police to protect mine property and to enable them to
resume operations. This placed the strikers in the position
\
of possibly incurring the law's wrath by defending their jobs
against management's interlopers.
The strike is the principal weapon of employees
involved in industrial struggle. It is "a concerted suspen-
sion of work by a body of employees, usually for the purpose
of adjusting an existing dispute over the terms of the labour
contract. Hl ) Most of the power the workers can mobilize is
directly or indirectly related to the strike or the threat of
its application. It indicates to the general public that the
workers have reached the end of their powers of collective
bargaining and restraint. The strike is also a deliberate
"throwing down the gauntlet" to employers--job, security, and
pay temporarily become secondary values risked in order to
l3John A. Fitch, "Strikes and Lockouts," Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences (1935 edition), XIV (Hereinafter
referred to as "Strikes and Lockouts"), 419.
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enhance ultimate rights. 14 Its application is dependent upon
the willingness of the workers to precipitate themselves and
their families into uncertain conflict for the sake of long-
or short-range benefits.
Once a strike is underway, the leaders must maintain
the loyalty and enthusiasm of the strikers. The means used
to promote morale include meetings addressed by popular
leaders, publication of bulletins carrying "encouraging" news,
and social gatherings and other devices directed towards
group solidarity.15 The Estevan strike leaders employed many
of these devices. Picnics were held at which speeches were
made to promote solidarity and to expound the justness of the
strikers' cause. Mass meetings were held at which Buller,
Scarlett, Forkin, Sloan. Minster and others decried the con-
ditions under which the men were forced to work and live and
the starvation wages paid by a group of coal operators dedi-
cated to the exploitation of the miner in the name of free
enterprise. The assembled miners were warned that victory
would come only through solidarity and heeding the advice of
MWUC officialdom. 16 The nuisance parade was but another
vehicle used to demonstrate the miners' solidarity and com-
mitment to their cause.
Picketing is another weapon in the employee's arsenal.
Individual picketing is designed to persuade the prospective
14Elliott and Merrill, Social Disorganization, p. 217.
15Fitch, "Strikes and Lockouts," p. 422.
16Western Miner (Lethbridge), September 8, 1931, p. 1.
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customer or non-striking worker that the business or industry
is unfair to organized labour and that patronage or labour
services should be withheld. 17 In the case of mass picket-
ing, the tactics frequently change from persuasion to coercion.
A large number of pickets usually indicates mass solidarity
and sympathy with the strike and clearly informs non-striking
workers that their best interests--and often their physical
safety--lie in remaining outside the strike zone during the
deadlock and not attempting to take the jobs of the strikers.
Strikers despise "scabs" who attempt to replace them. non-
strikers, alleging they are being denied their "right to work,"
despise strikers. Picketing played a very important role in
the Souris labour dispute. The sheer number of pickets served
to keep out prospective "scabs" and to bring unauthorized work
to an abrupt halt wherever imported labour was being used.
As previously mentioned, the strikers succeeded in closing
and keeping closed several mines which attempted to operate
despite the union's call for a 100 per cent walkout.
As is the case with employers, propaganda disseminated
by or on behalf of the workers plays an important role.
"groups involved in a controversy, in addition to controlling
the opinions of their own members, invariably attempt to
influence the opinions of other members of a public ... t8
During the coal mine dispute in the Souris field, labour
17Elliott and Merrill, Social DisQrganization, p. 217.
18Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, Sociological
Ana1~~ia (New York. Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1949),
p. 30 •
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attempted to enlist sympathy by identifying its corporate
opponents with "big business" which is allegedly subversive
to civil liberties. Mine owners and operators were charac-
terized as tyrants who kept the miners in virtual slavery.19
The ReMP, sent to the strike sector to maintain law and order,
were represented as being "the bosses'hired thugs," "Bennett's
stool pidgeons, " and Ita fascist outfit ... Everyone who failed
to support the strikers and their cause were immediately
placed in the awkward position of having to identify with
these two objectionable groups. Several left-wing newspapers
provided the reader 'with the "truth" about the dispute and
roundly applauded the strikers' heroism and solidarity in the
face of bourgeois terror. 20
Force is yet another weapon which labour unions might
utilize as a last resort to keep the strike from breaking up,
but most responsible labour leaders tend to avoid its use
because the resultant violence and destruction of property
damages labour's case with the general public. The United
States Senate Committee on Education and Labor (the La Follette
Committee), which investigated and reported on "Violations of
Free Speech and Rights of Labor" in 19)1, found a greater
propensity to use firearms and other lethal weapons on the
part of employers than strikers. The committee reported that
19Western Miner (Lethbridge), September 8, 1931, p. 1
and Canagian Miner (Calgary), October 12, 1931, p. 4.
20Western Miner (Lethbridge), September 8, 1931, p. 1,
Unemployed Worker (Vancouver), October ), 1931, p. 4 and
October 10, 1931, p. 2; and Canadian Miner (Calgary), October 12,
1931, p. J.
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"industrial munitioning on the part of employers is widespread
and commonplace. "21 This was certainly the case in the
Estevan dispute. Shortly after the miners went out on strike,
the Coal Operators' Association engaged thirteen special con-
stables to patrol mine holdings in the district to prevent
any damage to or invasion of company property. The strikers,
on the other hand, obviously found no reason to equip them-
selves for any form of armed struggle.
The employer also has usually been able to mobilize
the law enforcement agencies against strikers in industrial
conflict when in fact the police should not have been used at
all. When the Estevan strike was called, the mine operators
immediately requested that the local RCMP detachment be
increased to ensure the protection of mine property. Although
the strikers had evinced no intention of invading or damaging
the properties, the operators subsequently demanded additional
ReMP. In refusing to grant their request, the Attorney
General may well have suspected that some reason other than
the protection of private property formed the basis of the
demand. Perhaps the operators believed that the strikers
would be intimidated by so large a temporary force. Or per-
haps they felt public support could be gained by aligning
themselves with the forces of good. Whatever their reason,
it is more likely that hope for police assistance in breaking
the strike rather than fear for their property prompted their
,demand.
21Elliott and Merrill, Social Disorganization, p. 219.
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Social disorganization precipitated by a labour dis-
pute is reflected most seriously among those directly affected
by the strike, the worker and his family. In his struggle'
for higher wages, better working conditions, and the right
to organize and bargain collectively, the Estevan miner sacri-
ficed his sole source of income for the duration of the con-
flict. The depressed state of the agricultural economy pre-
vented him from securing even temporary employment, and being
removed from the relief role served only to compound the hard-
ships, For actively participating in the strike, he faced
the possibility of being unofficially but effectively branded
as an agitator, a recalcitrant, and a troublemaker.
If the strike is the culmination of social disorgani-
zation in the lives of workers and their families, it also
precipitates forms of social disorganization in the industrial
community, Community institutions are endangered, group con-
sensus is threatened, and normal community functions may be
completely disrupted. For several weeks Estevan was an armed
camp; the district was constantly patrolled. Rumors of vio-
lence were rampant. Anonymous letters carried threats to
boycott certain local businessmen for employing non-union
personnel; non-union workers were warned that they could
escape bodily harm only by withdrawing their services. 22 Non-
participants also tend to take sides:
Since controversial issues usually involve conflict of
group interests, people's attitudes toward a controversy
are in a large measure determined by the position of the
22Leader-Post (Regina), September 12, ,1931, p. 8.
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various groups to which they belong. In some contro-
versies, of course, opinions are confused by the fact
~~~~e;~~td~~~!~!~io~~o~~St~~i~~~~.~jople belong have
It is extremely difficult to remain neutral. Wives, children,
and friends of the conflicting groups join the struggle, and
because each side defines the situation differently, social
disorganization becomes a grim reality.
To understand the Estevan riot which arose from the
strike, it is useful to refer to literature on riots in
general. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines
riot as.
an outbreak of temporary but violent mass disorder. It
may be directed against a particular private individual
as well as against public authorities, but it involves
no intention to overthrow the government itself. In
this respect riot stops short of insurrection or rebel-
lion, a14hough it may often be only a preliminary to the
latter. 2
Riots are an index of social unrest, "as much a symptom of
social disease as pain is a symptom of' biological disorder. ,,25
The law governing riotous offences encompasses all
those forms of attack upon thn integrity of the state or the
public tranquility which stop short of treason. In critical
periods of social unrest there is often a tendency to confuse
the two and to treat riot as treason, at least with respect
to the instigators or ringleaders. 26 Under English Common
2JWilson and Kolb, Sociological Analysis, p, 305.
24K• Smellie, URiots," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, XIII (Hereinafter referred to as "Riots"), p, 386.
25Ibid
-'
26William Seagle, "Riots," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, XIII (Hereinafter referred to as "Riots"), p. 388,
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Law, riot is a misdemeanor consisting of tumultuous disturbance
of the peace by an assembly of three or more persons. However,
rrhe· Riot Act of 1715 made riotous assembly a felony when
twelve or more persons were involved and failed to disperse
within one hour of the reading of the Act, which had to be
read exactly as prescribed by the Statute. 27
Civil disturbances (i.e. unlawful assembly and riot)
are defined in Sections 87 and 88 of the Criminal Code of
Canada. From an examination of these definitions, it may be
seen that in order to constitute a riot, five elements are
necessary.
The presence of not less than three persons;
A common purpose;
Execution or inception of the common purpose;
An intent to help one another, by force if necessary,
against anyone who may oppose them in the execution of
the common purpose;
Force or violence displayed in such a manner as to alarm
at least one person of reasonable firmness. 28
To constitute the offence of unlawful assembly, there need
not be any intention on the part of any member of the assembly
to commit any offence. It is the manner in which the assembly
conducts itself that brings it within the purview of the sec-
tion. However, according to Section 88, "If an unlawful
assembly goes a step further and proceeds to do what the
people in the neighborhood fear it may do, viz: 'disturb the
peace tumultuously,' it has become a riot. ,,29
• • •
2"1 Ibid., P. J89.
28J • C. Martin, "Unlawful Assembly and Riot," Royal




In the case of a riot by twelve or more persons any
official who has notice of it is legally bound to read The
Riot Act which calls on them to disperse, Should they fail
to do so within thirty minutes, the official is legally bound
to cause their arrest for which purpose he is entitled to
call to his assistance whom he will, If in the endeavour to
arrest or disperse them any of the rioters are killed, such
killing is excused,30 However, the agency or agencies charged
with the responsibility of arresting or dispersing the crowd
are bound to use such force as is reasonably necessary
to protect premises over which they are watching, and to
prevent serious crime or riot. But they must not use
lethal weapons to prevent or suppress minor disorders or
offences of a less serious character, and in no case
should they do so if less extreme measures will suffice.
Should it be necessary for them to use extreme measures
they should, whenever possible, give sufficient warning
of their intention. 31
It must be remembered that a riot must be in progress before
the proclamation can be read--its reading is a warning of the
possible consequences if the crowd does not disperse. Never-
theless, if a riot exists, the duty to suppress it does not
depend upon the reading of the proclamation. 32 Regardless of
the fact that The Riot Act was not read in the Estevan affair
and regardless of who one ~ight charge with ultimate respon-
sibility for it, it is quite clear that in the light of the
law a riot did occur,
JUdge James H. Lincoln in The Anatomy of a Riot
30 Ibid" p. 147.




observes that "riots are similar to a mulligan stew in that
many factors are mixed up together, and, once mixed, can
never completely be sorted out.")) He asserts that anyone
who attempts to arrange motives for the participants in a
riot in a neat pattern gives only an inaccurate account)4 and
that it is futile because of the dozens if not hundreds of
variables needed to draw a portrait of a rioter.:35 A mob
acts as one man but in a manner in which no one man would
act alone; all inhibitions are cast aside and a sense of
power develops,:36 Violence, irresponsibility, and destruc-
tiveness distinguish this type of collective behavior.
As the crowd begins to form, a universal feeling of
anonymity, •• develops, Self-appointed leaders arise
and channel the energies of the crowd in the direction
it is already moving. The attention of the members is.
centered increasingly on a single object and purpose.
At a certain pitch of emotional tension the crowd acts.
It may continue to act for some time until the emotional
level drops. The crowd then dissolves and self awareness
returns to its members. 37
The Estevan riot was indeed a case in point, For
several days strike leaders and strikers planned the parade
to Estevan. On September 29, they set their plan in motion.
As they confronted the HeMP cordon, either Martin Day or Chief
of Police McCutcheon raised emotions to the required pitch.
3Jt.Tames H, Lincoln, The Anatomy of a Riot (New York I
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19b8), p. 6.
:34 Ib i d., p • 9 •
35Ibid., p, 10.
36Edgar A,' Schuler, et aI, Outside Readings in
Sociology (New Yorke Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), p. 274.
37Wilson and Kolb, Sociological Analysis, p, 307.
219
Regardless of which of them was responsible, the melee com-
menced with the arrest of Day. 38 During the battle, another
self-appointed leader, Anne Buller, reportedly urged the
rioters to maintain the barrage of missiles being hurled at
the police. 39 Attention was centered on the police--the
personification not only of the establishment, but also of
the capitalist system which placed the workers in subjugation
to the masters, With the arrival on the scene of Inspector
Moorhead and reinforcements, and the wounding of some miners,
the latter's enthusiasm for battle evaporated and the emo-
tional level dropped. Only then did self-awareness return
to the participants and they quickly dispersed.
The "active" crowd, a lynch mob for example, always
has the same fundamental characteristics, It begins with an
exciting event--sometimes with the mere rumor of an exciting
event--which violates the expectations of the community or
of a certain segment of the community,40 The President's
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (United
States) reports:
Disorder did not erupt as a result of a single 'trigger-
ing' or 'pr~cipitating' incident. Instead, it was gener-
ated out of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere,
in which typically a series of tension-heightening
incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked
in the minds of many •• , with a reservoir of underlying







the rioters appeared to be seeking was fuller participation
in the social order and the material benefits enjoyed by the
majority of .American citizens. Rather than rejecting the
American system, they were anxious to obtain a place for them-
selves in it ... 43 Despite membership in a union affiliated
with a parent body dedicated to the overthrow of the capitalist
system, it must be concluded that the individual Souris coal-
field miner was much more concerned with making a place for
himself in the system than destroying it.
Judge Lincoln further states that although profes-
sional agitators took advantage of a riotous situation in the
Detroit riot of 1967, they did not start the riot and the
41Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Herinafter referred to as Civil Disorders), otto
Kerner, chairman (Washington, D. C.I Government Printing
Office, 1968), p. 3.
42Wilson and Kolb, Sociological Analysis, p. 307.
43Civil Disorders, p. 4.
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only real direction they exercised was to get store windows
broken because the people were attracted like flies to honey
by the broken windows and the opportunity to loot. 44 The
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders states that
it "found no evidence that all or any of the disorders or the
incidents that led to them were planned or directed by any
organization or group, international, national or local" but
that "Militant organizations, local and national, and indi-
vidual agitators ••• sought to encourage violence, and •••
helped to create an atmosphere that contributed to the out-
break of disorder. ,,45
\
Lincoln is extremely critical of those who would
expect to reach valid conclusions by compiling and stUdying
statistics on unemployment and povertys "It is nonsense to
attempt to analyze the situation and reach conclusions solely
on the basis of what percentage of rioters have jobs, etc."46
Although he states that jobs alone are not the answer for
many who are unemployed and that counselling services must be
extended along with jobs, he admits that "without job oppor-
tunities, all else is futile. ,,47 A few of Judge Lincoln's
statements regarding poverty and the role it played in the
Detroit riot are relevant:
It is asinine to try to measure the part poverty played
44Lincoln, The Anatomy of a Riot, p. 4.
45Civil Disorders, p. 5.
46Lincoln, The Anatomy of a Riot, p. 62.
47Ibid., p. 98.
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solely bY4~ statistical analysis of the income of those
arrested. ts
Poverty is the propagator of rebellion. 49Yesterday~s poverty was respectable ••• today's
poverty produces a poverty of spirit as well as stigma,
despair, rebellion, defeat, anger, futility, and
failure. 50
Perhaps the old adage "poor but honest" should be changed to
"poor and angry."
The President's commission identifies twelve deeply-
held grievances which it ranks into three levels of relative
intensity.
First l~vel of intensity.
1. Police practices.
2. Unemployment and underemployment.
(}. Inadequate housing,
Second level of intensit¥t4. Inadequate education.5. Poor recreation facilities and programs.
6. Ineffectiveness of the political structure and
grievance mechanisms.
Third level of intensity.
7. Disrespectful white attitudes.
8. Discriminatory administration of justice.
9. Inadequacy of Federal programs.
10. Inadequacy of municipal service.
11. Discriminatory consumer and credit practices.
12. Inadequate welfare programs,51
Many of the grievances identified by the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders can be applied to the
Estevan scene, : Unemployment and underemployment, inadequate
housing, the ineffectiveness of grievance mechanisms, and
the inadequacies of federal, provincial, and municipal welfare
48 It id" p. rl.
49 I bid,. P • 8 •
50 Ib;d 59
--=.-'. p, •
51Civil Disorders, p. 4,
and other assistance-oriented programs were definitely
factors in the outbreak in September, 1931. Discriminatory
consumer and credit practices have already been discussed
in connection with the company stores. Recreation facilities
and programs were virtually non-existent, and the education
of the miners can probably be accepted as inadequate.
In its report the commission states "The results of
a ••• survey of various Federal programs--manpower, educa-
tion, housing, welfare and community action--indicate that,
despite substantial expenditures, the number of persons
assisted constituted only a fraction of those in need" and
that despite the institution of some post-riot programs "Little
basic change in the conditions underlying the outbreak of dis-
order has taken place. "52 This is particularly evident in the
case under discussion--1ittle basic change in conditions
emanated from the October agreements. The new "program"
initiated as a result of the October 6 temporary agreement
was being circumvented by one mine before the ink had dried
on the contract. Many of the items contained in the final
agreement were being abrogated by several of the six deep
seam mines within a few short weeks of October 20, 1931. The
number of sUbsequent labour disputes in the Souris coalfield
emphasize the insincerity of many of the mining companies'
promises to rectify the deplorable conditions which precipi-
tated the September strike and the resultant civil disorder.




majority of instances the principal official response has not
been to ameliorate the conditions which provoked disorder but
to train and equip the police with more sophisticated weapons. 53
Lincoln asserts that more effective law enforcement will do
nothing to stop the basic infection. He categorizes society
as consisting of three groups. those who promote unrest but
who do not necessarily provide direction; those who do not
attack the basic causes of unrest, but merely suppress any
expression of unrest by use of force; and those who are will-
ing to attack the causes of unrest. 54 In his estimation, "it
is important to treat the symptoms" but "it is vital to treat
the conditions that produce the symptoms. t.55 In his ··Address
to the Nation" on June 27, 1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson
of the United States perhaps provides the most concise and
pertinent observations
The only genuine, long-range solution for what has hap-
pened lies in an attack--mounted at every level--upon
the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of
us. know what those conditions area ignorance, disgrimi-
nation, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs,5
From what has been said of the aftermath of the Estevan riot,
it seems evident that among those whose task it was to pick
up the pieces there was a majority who were more prepared to
suppress unrest by force than attack its basic causes. The
symptoms were remedied but the disease remained untreated.
53Ibid.


























3 yrs. C.N.H. Police.
3 .. Air Force.
3! yrs. Coldstream Gds.




7 years in Gordon High-
landers & 3 years in
Indian Police.
9 months in Fifeshire
Constabulary, Scotland.
9 years in London Met •



















































































































Rank. Name. Age. Service.
Const.Nightinggale. 25. 8 Months.
" •Harrison. 24. 8 "
"
.Parsons.A.W. 23. 8 "
..
•Needham• 24. 8 "
" .Dilby. 23. 9 "
" •Osborne. 26. 9 ..
..
.McNei1. 25. 11 "
"
•Cameron. 27. 11 "
..
.Waddy. 28 • 2t Yrs.
"
•Stoddart. 26. 11 Months.
" • Gray. 23. 8 "
" • Thomas. 26. 7
..
" •Hart. 22. 6 It
It
•Tench. 31. 8 "
Previous Service
& Remarks.
4 yrs. in U.S.A.
Marines.
Met. & Glasgow Police
Exper. & Scots Guards.
O.T.C. in England.
R.C.Air F. & Indian
Service.
Commission in Suffo1ks •
Source: Estevan Judicial District, King's Bench (Criminal),
King v. Chester McIlvenna et al (KB #286),
Exhibit D 9.
APPENDIX II
Text of Graveside Service
Fellow Workers--Today we are gathered here for the purpose
of paying a last tribute of respect to our departed brother,
who but a short time since was with us, sharing our joys and
sorrows, but has now passed on into the great beyond from
whence none return.
We do not understand life, how then can we understand death,
but we do believe that death is only the entrance to a fuller
and better life. Our presence here today and our tokens of
respect would be mere symbols, if we did not believe that out
in the great infinity beyond the comprehension of mankind,
the soul of our departed brother is looking down on us today,
conscious of our reverence.
Our departed brother shared the ambitions and hopes that are
common to most of us, the right collectively to work and live
in peace, getting that portion of this world's rewards that
would keep him and those he loved in comfort and decency, and
at the end that his brother workmen would tenderly place him
to rest in the grave of his fathers.
He has, therefore, left us a duty to see that we make every
endeavor to realize for his loved ones and all others who
must pass this way, the reward,s for which he hoped.
And so we lay on the grave of our departed brother, these
evergreens, as a token of our respect and esteem, believing
that this world is a better place because of his having been
here. Amen.




(Words by Cecil Boone)
In a little mining village
Scarcely noticed on the map
Bourgeois guns were turned on workers
And their life's blood there did sap.
No one dreamed of such a slaughter
In that town of Estevan,
That armed thugs with guns and bullets
Would shoot men with empty hands.
Just a protest from the miners,
And boss bullets then did fly,
,Caring not who was the target
Or the number that would die.
Blazing forth, nine hundred bullets
Bodies full of lead did fill,
Murdered three, and wounded twenty--
But the Cause they could not kill.
Three more martyrs for the miners,
Three more murders for the boss
Brutal laws, to crush the workers
Who dare fight in Freedom's cause,
As those miners lay a-dying
In their agony and pain,
Whispered, "Though we die for freedom,
Yet we do not die in vain."
"For we know our class will triumph
When they shall united stand;
They will take the world for labor
And the workers rule the land."
"Then the workers' day of vengeance
Will be proclaimed with each breath;
Labor's cause is right and mighty
And beyond the reach of death,lt




Between Operators and Miners of the Estevan District
1. Recognition of the Mine Workers Union of Canada and Pit
Committees.
2. Establishment of the eight hour day from bank to bank.
3. Right for the contract miners to appoint their check-
weighman.
4. Material to be delivered to the face, or where required
by the miners.
5. Powder and supplies to be sold to miners at cost price.
6. No discrimination or intimidation of employees who pur-
chase their goods in private stores.
7. Coal to be sold to miners at cost price.
8. Miners should receive their pay every second Saturday.
9. Bunkhouses to be eliminated.
10. The charge for room and board in the company boarding
houses shall not exceed ona dollar per day.
11. Contract miners shall have the right to choose their own
partners.
12. 75 cents extra wages per day for both contract and day
workers working in wet places.
13. Equal turn of cars for all men.
14. Free tools for the men and no charge for sharpening them.
15. A charge of 25c for light or bulb and continuous 24-hour
service.
16. House rent to be charged one dollar per room, and proper
repairing to be kept up by the company.
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17. All companies to install wash houses; the men shall be
charged 50c a month for use of the same.
18. Company to supply fresh drinking water.
19. Where the miner has to remove bone clay or blackjack from
any portion of the seam, same to be paid on the basis of
lac per inch per lineal yard,
20. The company to remove all machine slack or cuttings, or
where the miner loads same to be paid on a mine run basis,
on the regular tonnage rates.
21. All rubbish, rock and other material and waste to be
handled and unloaded by the company.
22. All water to be removed by the company, on all roads, and
at the working face, and same places to be kept as dryas
possible.
23. The company to be responsible for all cars lost or dam-
aged in the mine.
24. Where any part of the mine has caved in the workmen not
to be held responsible for loss of tools or any other
material.
25. All wrecked cars of coal to be paid for by the average
weight of same type of cars for the day.
26. Company to supply all chalk to miners free of charge.
27. In any room more than 20 feet wide, over~shoveling to be
paid at 50c per lineal yard.
Contract Rates
Electric Undercutting and Shearing Machines
Sullivan 7 foot under-cut, per ton ••••••••••• $
Jeffery 9 foot under-cut, per ton. • • • • • • , , • • •
Jeffery Shearing Machine, per cut•• , ••• , • , •• ,
Sullivan Bottom Cutter, 9 foot cut, per ton. • • • • • •
Morgan Gardiner Under-cutter, per ton••••••••••
Sullivan Shearer & Under-cutter, under-cutting, per ton.
Sullivan Shearer & Under-cutter, shearer, per place, , •
Sullivan Shearer, Minimum Rate •••• , , , ••• , ••
Moving and repairing electric machines, Minimum Rate • •
Engineer Hydro Electric shovel, per hour , • • • • • • •






















Pick Mining narrow work 8 ft. wide, loaded by shovel, ton
Loaded by fork, single • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Loaded by fork,double fork, •••••••••••••
Yardage in entries, per lineal yard • • • • • • • • • • •
In entries where bottom is taken out (seam) loaded by
shovel, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Loaded by fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Yardage in entries, coal 3 ft. 6 in. & under, per lineal
yard • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
In entries where coal is 3 ft. 6 in. & under, extra charge,
ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
PICK MINING Rooms
Rooms from 12 to 20 feet wide, loaded by shovel, per ton.
Loaded by fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Loaded by double fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • •
In rooms where coal is under 3 ft. 6 in. in height,
loaded by shovel,per ton ••••••••••••••
Loaded by fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Loaded by double fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • •
Yardage, narrow work 8 ft. wide, under-cut, per lineal
foot loaded by shovel • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
If sheared • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Contract Mining
Undercut in entries 8 ft. wide, loaded by shovel, per ton
Loaded by fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Loaded by shovel and sheared, per ton • • • • • • • •
Loaded by fork and sheared, per ton. '.' ••••••
Where only sheared in entries, per ton • • • • • • • • •
In entries where undercut & sheared and also shot down,
ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Opening up room necks extra per cut • • • • • • • • • • •
















Rooms from 12 to 20 ft. wide, undercut, loaded by shovel,
ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .65Loaded by fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .75Rooms 12 to 20 ft. wide, undercut and sheared, loaded by
shovel, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .60Loaded by fork, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .70Rooms 12 to 20 ft. wide, undercut and sheared and shot
down loaded by shovel, per ton • • • • • • • • • • • .40




The company to handle all cars to and from the working face.
Timbering
Three piece set consisting of a boom and two props,
each set • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Where boom is needled into the rib side, and prop set
under the other end, per set • • • •
Where prop and cap piece required, and ordered to be





The company to lay and lift all track at the working face,
as required by the contract miners.
Brushing
Lifting bottom in entries, price per lineal foot. .50
Lifting bottom in room necks and cross-cuts, price per
lineal ft. • • ., • • • • • • .75
Lifting bottom in rooms, price per lineal foot. .25
Scale of Wages
(Fer 8-hour Day from Bank to Bank)
INSIDE WAGES
Miner t • • • t • • • • • • • .$ 4.00Timberman • • • • • • • • • 4.00Shot Lighter • • • • • • • 4.00
Tracklayer • • • • • • • • • • 4,00Electric Motor Driver • • , • • 4.00
Driver, one horse , • • • • • • • • • • 3.75
Driver, 2 horses (or 251- extra for each horse) • 4,00
eager • • • • • • , , • • • • • 4,00Steam Incline Ha'Ulageman • • • • • • • 4,00
Pumpman • • • • 4,00Tracklayer's Helper • • • 3.75
Timbermen Helpers • • 3.75
Gager's Helper • 3.75
Rope Rider • , • • • • • • 3.75Track Cleaners • • • • • • • • • 3.75
All Other Unclassified Labor • • • 3.75
Boys under 18 years, 1st year • • • 2.50



























Engineers, per month • •




Electrician • , • • •
Box Car loader Engineer •




Teamster • • • •
Box Car Shoveller
Wash Houseman • , • • •
All other unclassified labor • • •
Boys under 18 years of age, 1st year •
2nd year •
Sources Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. M-13.
APPENDIX V
Protest Against Brutal Murder
of Miners in Estevan:
Demand Immediate Withdrawal of Armed Government Forces
from Strike Area and Punishment of Murderers:
HELP THE STRIKERS IN THEIR HARD STRUGGLE:
Workers and Farmers: Sympathizers of the struggles of
toiling masses against their exploiters and oppressors: Raise
your mighty protest against this latest brutal and murderous
attack of the armed forces of capitalism against the working
class of Canada. Following all kinds of terrorizing measures
against t~e impoverished and starving masses of workers and
farmers, and the attack upon their rights and free speech,
press and organization, the capitalists of Canada are now
using their armed forces for massacring the unarmed workers
peacefully demonstrating for the purpose of gaining sympathy
for their demands.
On Tuesday, September 29th, several hundred miners of
Bienfait, Sask" who are on strike, went on trucks and cars
to the nearby city of Estevan, for the purpose of advertising
a meeting that was to take place in the Estevan Town Hall in
the evening to win the sympathy of Estevan workers for the
Bienfait strikers. They carried some banners upon which the
demands of the strikers Wf~re inscribed, but no fire-arms or
any weapons whatsoever. All they intended to do was to hold
a peaceful demonstration. Their wives and children were also
with them. As soon as they reached Estevan, their trucks and
cars, Dome of them decorated with Union Jacks, were attacked
by the Mounted and local police.
The police attempted to stop the parade and arrest Martin
Day, on the advice of Chief McCutcheon of Estevan, having pre-
viously incensed the miners by trying to break tht~ windows of
the cars with their loaded sticks. The miners defended their
comrade and Chief McCutcheon, without any warning, started to
shoot, followed by the Mounties. Men leaving Estevan to return
to Bienfait were fired at and wounded when they attempted to
climb on the trucks. People at the windows of nearby houses
were shot at. The only weapons, used by the strikers in self-
defense, were stones and pieces of iron picked up from the
streets ••• This is the toll of this bloody massacre: three
dead, eighteen wounded (some of them not expected to live) and
twenty-three arrested. Wounded miners were not admitted to
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the local hospital.
The 100% strike of the coal-miners of Bienfait was called
about three weeks ago. Following are the unbearable conditions
the miners are fighting against: •• Average wages amount to 25c
per ton of coal; miners have to buy their own powder and pay
rent for tools, boots and slickers. They work fourteen to
sixteen hours a day and yet practically nothing is left of
wages after deductions are made for different charges by the
company. The miners are cheated on the weight of the coal
dug. They have to buy food and clothing from the Company-
owned stores and pay from 100% to 300% higher prices than in
private stores. They have to live in company houses and pay
exorbitant rentals. The houses are unrepaired. Bunk houses
for single men are not fit for human beings to live in. Over
and above prices for board, miners are compelled to pay 5c per
day for the rent of dishes. They have to pay for the use of
water. With one exception, there are no wash houses. Provi-
sions of the Health and Mines Act are not adhered to by the
Company. There are no first aid stations, etc., etc.
In order to change these conditions, the miners of Bien-
fait, for the first time, have successfully organized them-
selves into the Mine Workers Union of Canada, and put forward
the following main demands:
(1) Recognition of the elected pit committees composed of
miners working in the mines. (2) The eight hour day. (3) The
right to appoint their own check weighman in order to see that
they are not cheated on the weight of the coal dug. (4) Right
to purchase goods where they please. (5) A minimum wage of
$4.00 for underground workers, $3.50 for workers above ground
and $2.75 for young workerB. (6) Proper housing, fair rents,
free tools and powder to be suppLied at co~~t. (7) Pure drink-
ing water to be supplied free. (8) Wash houses to be provided
in all camps at fair charge to the miners, etc.
The operators have employed all means in their power to
crush the heroic struggle of the miners. They called on the
police and milit~a to terrorize the strikers and arrest their
leaders. They are responsible for the attack on the peaceful
strikers' demonstration. They have enlisted the aid of the
Government in setting up the Hoyal Commission presumably to
enquire into the miners grievances, but in reality to lull the
fighting spirit of the strikers by placing their hope in the
"justice" of the Commission's findings. They have enlisted
the aid of the Deputy Minister of Labor, Mal1ay [sic], an A F
of L faker, to get the strikers back to worlc under va{~e prom-
ises of a satisfactory settlement later on. They hav(~ tempo-
rarily succeeded in getting the men back to work with the aid
of the police and troops on the one hand and treacherous
manouvres of Malloy [sic] and part of the strike committee on
the other. Some of the demands of the miners were temporarily
agreed to, the negotiations to be continued after the findings
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of the Royal Commission. A dastardly betrayal of the strike
is being prepared and the miners are getting ready to continue
their struggle in the near future.
This in brief is the situation which demands an immediate
action on the part of every thinking worker and poor farmer,
The bloody massacre must be answered by the toiling masses
with a thunderous protest to the Saskatchewan and Federal
Governments, and with assistance greater than ever to the
struggling miners of Bienfait.
RAISE YOUR'MIGHTY PROTEST AGAINST THE ESTEVAN MASSACRE:
STOP THE BLOODY HANDS OF THE MURDERERS OF WORKERS:
DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMED FORCES
FROM THE STRIKE AREA AND THE PUNISHMENT OF MURDERERS:
DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE ARRESTED WORKING
CLASS FIGHTERS:
ORGANIZE A UNITED MASS DEFENSE FRONT OF WORKERS AND
FARlvlERS:
RAISE AND SEND DEFENSE FUNDS TO.
CANADIAN LABOR DEFENSE LEAGUE,
Room 308, 331 Bay St., Toronto 2, Ont.
ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
CANADIAN LABOR DEFENSE LEAGUE.
Source, Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Deputy
minister's office, Estevan Coal Strike, 1931.
APPENDIX VI
List of Witnesses Heard During the Sessions
Of The Royal Commission
WITNESSES FOR THE WORKERS
No. NAME. MINE. DATE HEARD.
1. Harris, John Howell. Bienfait Mines CO,Ltd. Oct 5-1931
2. Hesketh, Harry. n " " " 5 "
3. McWilliams,T.L. .. " " " 8 "
4. Mularkey,Wil1iam. " " " " 8 "
5. Marcilli, Pete. " " It " 8 "
6. Enmark,Wilbert. " " " " 8 It
7. Robinson,John. " " It It 9 It
8. Beattie, George. It " It " 9 "
9. K1ymak,Wil1iam. It " " " 9 "
10. Robinson,~~s.A1ice. n " " " 9 n
11. Baryluk,Annie. " " " n 9
It
12. Harr is, Mrs. Mary. " " " " 9
It
13. Hogg,Wilfred. It tt " .. 9 "
14. Kingdon, Leslie. " tt It " 9 "
15. Billis,John. Eastern Collieries Ltd. " 14 It
16. Brooks,Charles. n .. " .. 14 "
17. Choma, William. " " " .. 14 "
18. Keisel, Louis " " " It 14 ..
19. Hominuik, Alex. " " " " 14 It
20. Sczyblo -- tt It " " 15 "
21. Szekeras,Paul. It It " " 15 It
22. Kiien,Jacob. " " " " 15 "
23. Stenen,John. " It It " 21
It
24. Smyth, John. Ivfanitoba & Saskatch{,;wan. " 21 "
25. Boruk,Pete. " It " " 21 ..
26. Booth, :Fred. " " " " 22 It
27. Elioff,J. " " " " 22 "
28. IVIitmiataik,M. It " If " 22 ..
29. Bonchal,W. tt " " " 22 "
30. Davis,William. " " " " 22 "
31. Kresko,lVIike. " " " " 23 "
32. Slenka,Joe. " " " " 23 "
33. Stalene,William. ,. " " " 23 ..
34. Hewka, Charles. " " " " 23 "
35. Davis, Sam. " " " " 23 "
36. Thompson,I~s.Madeline. " " " " 23 u
37. Gray, lVII's. Franc is. " " " " 23 u
38. Lazur, Steve. " " " " 23 "
39. Sa1amanskek,Solomon. " " " If 23 "
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Inspector of Weights &
Measures.



























Sources Wylie Commission, Exhibits, No. C-30.
APPENDIX VII
Recommendations of the Royal Commission
1, That the agreements arrived at between the men and the
operators during the conference held on October 19th and
20th continue in force until September 1st 1932.
2, That during the Summer of 1932 wage schedules for the
following year, or such longer period as may be agreed on,
be fixed at a conference between the operators and the men
of the respective Mines.
3, That in order to remove a cause of friction in the
future as to dockage screenings, etc. the wage schedules of
the Mine~ be worked out so that in every Mine where the
change of system can be reasonably effected, the Miner shall
be paid on a Mine-run basis.
4, That pending the revision of these schedules, normal
conditions of timbering in the rooms continue to be included
in the tonnage rate, but that any abnormal condition, requir-
ing additional timbering in the rooms, be paid for at the
present rate for timbering in entries, or at such other rate
as may be agreed on,
5, That on the revision of wage schedules, provision be
made for a different rate for the man not qualified under the
Act to have charge of a working face, and the qualified man
with whom he is working in the same room,
6, For the better enforcement of health regulations, that
the Government consider the advisability of including all
Mining Camps outside of an incorporated village in a separate
unit or Health District.
7, That provision be made in the Mines Act or Public Health
Act, requirin~ the owner, manager or agent to keep all houses
in Mining Camps, occupied by Mine workers, in a r'E~asonably
good state of repair, and to provide the Camp with a suffi-
cient supply of good drinking water,
8, A more thorough inspection of the Mines and a more
detailed inspectorts report, covering all working conditions
in the Mine and reporting on any contravention of the Act
and regulations,




10, An inspection of the tipple scales on or before the
first day of September in each year by the Inspector of
Weights and Measures.
11, That the check weighman, or representative Committee
from any Mine may, at any time, apply to the Minister who
shall be empowered to and may, if he thinks it necessary,
direct an inspection either as to weight or as to the condi-
tion of the scales.
12, That the heat value in B.T.U. and other values of the
coal mined in different districts of Saskatchewan, be ascer-
tained and fixed by Government analysis.
13, That the heat value in B.T.D. and other values of the
coal from all Mines producing coal above a certain quantity
for sale, be ascertained and fixed in the same way.
14, That the Government consider the advisability of intro-
ducing legislation, with a view to having the coal from all
Mines in the Province, producing coal above a certain quan-
tity, sold under a trade name, and the name of the Mine and
the area in which it is situated designated.
15, That the working arrangement between the operators and
the men for the deduction of an agreed amount for medical
services and sick fund, be continued, and that the amount be
paid out by the operators as directed by the men, the details
to be worked out and embodied in future legislation.
16, That the special Rules referred to in Section 39 of the
Mines Act be formulated and adopted at a special conference
between the Manager and a representative Committee of the men
at each Mine, and approved by the Minister as soon as possible.
16-a That in view of the evidence sUbmitted, the existing
subvention ra.te be reconsidered by the Canada Fuel Board.
17, That the Mines Act be amended so as to incorporate in
due form the fol~owing provisions.
(a) A provision making it clear that the Act is intended
to apply to Coal Mining, and not to other forms of Mining.
(b) That in addition to the Certificates of Mana.ger and
Pit Boss provided by the Act, there shall be a Third Class
Certificate granted to any applicant qualified to act as
Manager of a Mine where less than six persons are employed,
and a Miner's Certificate granted to any applicant entitled
to be in charge of a working face.
(c) That no person be allowed to operate a Mine where less
than six persons are employed, without having first obtained
the Third Class Certificate referred to, at least.
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(d) That no Miner be allowed to be in charge of a working
face at any Mine, unless he is the holder of a Miner's Cer-
tificate, and that no Miner shall receive such Certificate,
unless he has been employed in some capacity underground in
a Mine for, at least, six months, and has satisfied the
Inspector by oral examination as to his ability as a Miner.
(e) That an applicant for a Third Class Certificate must
have qualifications, at least, equal to. those of a qualified
Miner, and must satisfy the Inspector by oral examination as
to his ability to manage the class of Mine to which his
Certificate applies.
(f) That any applicant for a Third Class Certificate, or
any applicant for a Miner's Certificate, being dissatisfied
with the decision of the Inspector may appeal in writing to
the Minister, who may appoint a special Board for the purpose
of granting such applicant an oral examination, or may other-
wise decide the matter, and his decision shall be final.
(g) That on and after the 1st day of September, 1932, all
wages ea~ned by any person, or persons, employed in or about
a Mine, in which twenty or more persons are employed under-
ground, shall be paid twice a month unless otherwise agreed.
(h) In a Mine where wages depend on the amount of coal
gotten out, all wages shall be paid according to the weight
or admeasurement of all the coal gotten out by the Miner,
with a provision that an agreement may be made between the
Miner and the operator for deductions on account of slack or
nut coal, or on account of impurities in the coal.
(h-a) That an adequate amount of ventilation shall mean
not less than 200 cubic feet of pure air per minute, for each
person and animal employed in the Mine.
(i) That the Mine fan be kept in operation for 24 hours a
day, including Sundays, and that should it be stopped at any
time during working hours, the Miners be immediately with-
drawn until the operation of the fan is resumed.
(j) That all air passages be kept reasonably clear of clay-
falls or other impediments.
(k) That all doors in actual use in the Mine be kept closed,
and that all doors not in actual use be taken off the hinges,
and that no doors be propped, or fastened back, or opened,
except for the passing of persons, animals, cars or locomotives.
(1) That the Owner, Agent or Manager in every Mine shall
post in some conspicuous place at the Mine, a plan showing
the ways of ingress or egress to and from the various outlets,
with the travelling roads leading thereto.
24)
(m) That immediately after inspection, the Inspector shall
cause to be posted in some conspicuous place at, or near, the
entrance to the Mine, a copy, or duplicate, of his report.
(n) That properly constructed ambulances, or stretchers,
with splints, bandages, and sufficient other medical supplies
necessary for the purpose of rendering first aid, shall be
kept at every Mine ready for immediate use in case of accident.
(0) That at least one person in every Mine shall hold a
Certificate showing that he has taken a course in First Aid
and Ambulance work, fitting him to give first aid to persons
injured in or about the Mine.
(p) That where more than 20 persons are employed below
ground, a wash-house approved by the Minister shall be pro-
vided containing hot and cold water, where such persons may
conveniently wash themselves and dry and change their clothes.
(q) rrhat the present agreement in the larger Mines referred
to as to hours, be continued until September 1st 1932, and
that, thereafter, no Miner shall be allowed to work below
ground for more than 8 hours during any consecutive 24 hours,
except in case of emergency, provided that the time may be
extended by special agreement between the operators and the
men when necessary, in order to enable the Mine to fill
increased orders in the busy season, or rush orders at other
times.
(r) That man-holes be required in every haulage way, the
same to be at least 3 feet in depth from the wall, 5 feet
high, and 3 feet.wide, and when old rooms or cross-cuts are
used as man-holes, the same shall be properly marked in
accordance with the Act and kept clear of refuse or other
material,
(s) That no working place in a Mine shall be driven more
than 60 feet ahead of ventilation, without cross-cuts.
(t) That sub-~ection 3 of Regulation 5 of the Mines Act be
revised so as to make it clear that in all Mines where
inflammable gas has not been found within the preceding 12
months, the Pit-Boss, or other competent person shall inspect
the Mine every day, immediately before work is commenced in
any day,
(u) That a copy of the report of such Inspector shall be
signed as provided by the Act and also posted in a conspicuous
place at, or near, the entrance of the Mine.
(v) That Section 37 of the Regulations be repealed and a
new Section substituted, providing that a sufficient supply
of suitable timber shall be constantly kept in each working
place, as near the working face as is practicable, and in no
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case shall it be further away than the nearest cross-cut to
the working face, or other convenient place in the vicinity
thereof.
(w) That the Miners in any Mine may require the Owner,
Manager or Agent to deduct a certain pro-rata amount from
their wages to pay the check weighman, but will pay the same
to him in such amount and at such time as the men in each
Mine direct.
(x) The recommendations in this report have been limited
to complaints made during the Inquiry, and matters arising
therefrom, but some further revision of the Act, in due
course, would appear to be necessary in order to better
regulate the Industry in its present state of development.
Sourcet Wylie Commission, Report, PP. 139-47.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The Report, Proceedings, Exhibits, and Miscellaneous
Documents of the Royal Commission which enquired into the
Souris coalfield labour dispute proved the most productive
sources of information for this study. Other major sources
were the Records of the Deputy minister's office, Saskatch-
ewan Department of Labour; the Records of the Coal Adminis-
tration Branch, Saskatchewan Department of Natural Resources;
and the Labour Gazette and Labour Organization in Canada,
publications of the Canada Department of Labour.
The Estevan Mercury and the Regina Leader-Post, while
providing some important information relating to the strike,
carried detailed accounts of the riot. The absence of other
I
sources necessitated almost complete dependency upon the
items reported by these two newspapers. The Canadian Labor
Defender, Canadian Miner, Western Miner, and Unemployed Worker
adequately presented labour's attitude and reaction to the
events in the coalfield in fall, 1931.
The value of the court records was restricted because
few of the lower court decisions were appealed. Had the
cases been taken to a higher court, complete transcripts of
the King's Bench (Criminal) trials in Estevan would have been
produced. Unfortunately they were not, with the result that
detailed information relating to the trials was available
only in the cases of Anne Buller and Sam Scarlett.
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Of the numerous secondary sources consulted, the
works of Elliott and Merrill, Wilson et al, Fitch, Seagle,
Smellie, and Martin merit specific mention. Lincoln's
The Anatomy of a Riot and the Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders both proved valuable'in the
general discussion of riots.
The absence of any records of the Mine Workers' Union
of Canada or of the federal departments of Labour and Justice
relating to the Estevan strike and riot of 1931 is indeed
unfortunate. The existence of such records undoubtedly would
have enhanced the quality of this study. Likewise, the
records of the ReMP would have been of inestimable assistance.
However, because they are held by the Special Investigation
Branch of the force, these records are inaccessible for
research purposes.
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